God Made the Country, and Man Made the Town:

The Impact of Local Institutions on the Political Attitudes and Behavior of Immigrants and Minorities in the Unites States

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ABSTRACT

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Are all immigrants in the United States willing and able to integrate successfully within a liberal democratic polity? This research question guides the three papers included in the present dissertation. To explore this question I designed and implemented a multi city survey in the United States (the American Cities Survey) which contains representative samples of foreign and native born blacks, whites, Latinos and Asians living in New York, Chicago, Houston, Phoenix, Los Angeles, San Francisco and San Jose. Based on the findings of the American Cities Survey, which include multiple attitudinal, cultural background and political behavior measures at the individual level, along with socioeconomic and demographic measures in six distinct local institutional environments, I find that all voting eligible immigrants and immigrant communities–regardless of their native origin and their ancestral religious affiliation— are willing and able to integrate politically so long as political institutions and contexts (especially local ones) provide them with the same exposure to the political system and institutions, and opportunities to participate in politics as the ones provided to all other citizens. I thereby challenge both the academic and popular perceptions that certain immigrant groups have anti-democratic and anti-liberal attitudes due to their shared cultural characteristics (i.e. religious affiliation or political socialization in a non-democratic polity) that persist even after migrating to a liberal democratic polity and are passed on to the second generation. Two of the three papers

focus on Latino immigrant communities. I discover that the notion that Latinos vote less than similarly situated blacks and whites has persisted overtime for two reasons: first, simply because a greater proportion of Latinos have settled in localities where institutions tend to inhibit political competition and depress turnout, biasing representative national samples; second, because the smallest geographical unit one can study with existing survey and Census (CPS) data does not allow for exploration of political behavior at the individual level beyond the state. This is problematic for studying groups like Latinos, because 50 percent of their population is concentrated in three states and less than ten cities. I find that the results found at the national level are not replicable at the local level and Latino political participation varies by city. In localities where institutions provide incentives for political party competition the probability of a citizen of Latino origin voting is equal to that of blacks and whites of similar age, income and education. In other words, the evidence presented here suggests that the correlation found at the national level between Latino immigrant group membership and apolitical attitudes and behavior is of a contingent, perhaps even spurious nature, artifice of geographical concentration of members of this group in local institutional environments that depress political activity. The theoretical framework and findings of this dissertation reveal that immigrant political attitudes and behavior towards the host country's political system is shaped mostly by individual experiences with this system, and not by prior or inherited cultural or religious beliefs from their (or their ancestor's) country of origin.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements..... ii

Dedication. v

Preface..... vi

Introduction..... 1

Paper 1. Where There Is a Will, There Isn't Always a Way:

The Impact of Local Political Institutions on Latino Communities Political Participation..... 11

References..... 92

Paper 2. Souls To the Polls! The Impact of Catholicism on Hispanics Political Attitudes and Behavior, a Revisionist Interpretation……..... 96

References..... 133

Paper 3. The Impact of Political Events on the Political Engagement of Blacks, Whites, Latinos and Asians in Six American Cities……..... 136

References..... 225

Conclusion..... 23

Appendix 1-The American Cities Survey Field Dates and Population Estimates compared to the U.S. Census 2010..... 237

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DEDICATION

To all my teachers, especially to the last, in the sense that from now on I will never again be formally enrolled as a student, Robert Y. Shapiro, who has inspired me to continue doing research involving the formation and change of political attitudes and with his example in the classroom and in how he mentors and advises students to become a teacher too; and, to the first, Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai, who taught me to write when I was five years old and who kept reminding me throughout my life that "the end of education is character."

PREFACE

One cannot comprehend the motives of stars because they do not have motives. The inner life is the unique quality of living man.

-David Apter, *Ideology and Discontent*, 1964

Belief systems have never surrendered easily to empirical study or quantification. Indeed they have often served as primary exhibits for the doctrine that what is important to study cannot be measured and that what can be measured is not important to study.

-Phillip Converse, *The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics*, 1964

I came to write this dissertation out of my interest in immigration, American local politics and the formation, change and measurement of political attitudes in a democratic polity. On the morning of July 2nd 2000, when the opposition party won the Presidency after 70 years of one party rule in Mexico and Vicente Fox became the President elect, I received a letter of acceptance to intern at the Protection and Legal Department of the General Consulate of Mexico

in San Francisco. Subsequently, I was offered a position at the Press, Trade and Political Affairs Office of the Consulate, during a period of transition in Mexico's Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a result of the historic change of government.

President George W Bush, who became the 43rd President of the United States shortly after Vicente Fox was inaugurated into office, met with him more than any other foreign leader during the earlier months of 2001 and at the time called Mexico, America's most important friend among the world's nations and spoke of a "special relationship" with Mexico, a phrase traditionally reserved for Britain. The US and Mexican government were in the process of negotiations around a comprehensive immigration agreement that would have had far reaching consequences for both countries. In this context, my work at the Consulate involved meetings with community leaders, employers, Mexican immigrants and local politicians and law enforcement to aid the high-level negotiations. I often arranged and attended meetings with powerful Mayors such as Willie Brown, mayor of San Francisco or ex-California Governor Brown, Mayor of Oakland at the time, along with their Sheriffs and Police Chiefs, to discuss ways in which permanent Mexican Americans and their children could better integrate into the cities and towns where they lived and worked in or ensure that the seasonal workers basic rights were respected and could safely and cost effectively come and go every year. My on-the ground experiences at the Consulate thus profoundly shaped my interest and knowledge about the process of immigrant political integration.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, crushed the comprehensive push for immigration reform, and Mexico very quickly lost its prominence in Washington. To my surprise, however, at the local level, very little changed - the sheriffs, the Mayors and even Nancy Pelosi's office staff continued working closely with us. While I had assumed that push for

the political incorporation of immigrants was driven by orders from the top, I learned from my more experienced colleagues at the Consulate that even if President Fox had helped our image and increased the interest of local level officials about Mexico, the Consulate had regularly had a close working relationship with local political leaders and law enforcement and that some of them cared more about the politics of their cities and towns than what was dictated by Federal government agencies, including the State Department. Our interests would sometimes align because employers needed workers and a way to hire them legally and law enforcement officers needed information we could provide on undocumented migrant workers being repatriated. Mayors and local representatives wanted to keep their constituencies happy and they preferred to deal with the local Consulate rather than the State Department or the Mexican Embassy in Washington, which they considered "invasive", and as the Mayor of a small town once told us, "having no business here". I observed and experienced during my years working closely with local and federal agencies and politicians that there was a tension among them and that mayors, police chiefs often prevailed over Federal agencies. These observations guided my intuition that in the United States and other strong federal systems, immigrant political integration may be tied to the local political context. They motivated the research questions and hypotheses I explored in the three papers of my dissertation.

Through another project at the Consulate involving the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME), I also observed how variations in the local context shaped the political views of Mexican leaders. The IME is composed of two locally elected Mexican-American leaders from the area covered by each of the 50 Consulates in the United States. These leaders would travel once every year to Mexico City to guide the agenda of the Mexican government towards their communities and the bilateral priorities in terms of legal protection of Mexicans in the United States. The

representative from San Francisco, Candido Morales Rosas, was elected to be the Director of the Institute by President Fox and the consular staff was invited to participate in the IME meetings to help organize the delegates into issue-based Committees that would draft a document that reflected what they thought should be top priorities for the Mexican government. Having worked closely with Mexican migrant leaders in California I assumed this would be a straightforward task since my experience was that at least first generation Mexican migrants shared concerns and priorities. Instead, political attitudes amongst the delegates seemed to be different and sometimes even at odds.

The Mexicans from Northern California expressed concern that the IME process "deceived" their coalition partners (African Americans, Asian Americans and Latino "brothers and sisters") and opined that the Mexican government should not try to advance any agenda that would exclude these groups. The Mexican-American leaders from Chicago met in private to draft a document that demanded that the IME become an independent entity from the Mexican Government and hold elections to name a Director. They also demanded that the top priority should be to allow Mexicans living abroad to vote in Mexican Congressional Elections. The Mexicans from Texas were predominantly well-off older businessmen who insisted that the Mexican government should not interfere in any way with US political issues and should focus on generating a better image of Hispanics through cultural events and refused to address immigration issues. I was astounded by the diversity in views and opinions. How was it that people who had been politically socialized under the one-party rule of the PRI (the Party of the Institutionalized Revolution), who had read the same civics textbook in Mexico growing up, and had likely similar experiences and problems within the US, had adopted such divergent political attitudes ? The delegates were passionate about defending their "Californian", "Texan" and

"Chicagoan" political views and values than finding a common ground. I was left wondering if this was a random event due to the selection process that year or something that was indicative of how immigrants arriving in different states and cities acquired political beliefs and values. These experiences were of the starting point of some of the questions that I try to answer through the papers in this dissertation: how do local political cultures and institutions affect migrants arriving to different cities and localities? Do these local factors carry more influence in shaping their political attitudes towards the host polity than the national political climate and institutions at their time of arrival?

It was during my first year as a PhD student that the particular lens through which I would be examining these questions was decided. I took Bob Shapiro's seminar on public opinion where I was assigned to present the seminal article by Phillip Converse, *The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics*. Reading the Converse article, I decided that beyond the specific substantive questions I was interested in regarding Mexican immigration, the burning, meta-question that motivated my work as a political scientists was to investigate whether belief systems, political attitudes and the "inner life" of individuals can be "measured". I understand "measured" as being able to understand and then aggregate the attitudes of multiple individuals. My answer to the issues raised by Converse and Apter in the epigraph above is in the method I developed to gather the data, which I use in the three papers of the dissertation. I am sure that the methods will evolve and be perfected over time but the basic answer is already there: after much experimentation with different survey and other methods during the three years I spent collecting survey data I would say that even if belief systems don't surrender easily and the inner life of men cannot be directly observed, one can get a pretty close when subjects in the study are willing to help investigators create a composite sketch. This is similar to what anthropologists and

psychologists have done for decades except at a larger scale and combining these field-based methods with large-n survey techniques. For the composite sketch to be somewhat accurate it is necessary to visit or know well the context in which the subjects of a study live. This allows for empathy (identification with and understanding of another's situation, feelings, and motives) to arise. I would argue that the belief systems and basic political attitudes are very difficult to interpret or so not "surrender" unless political scientists, like anthropologists, live where our subjects live, eat what they eat and experience what they experience, even if only for some time.

My methodological contribution in this dissertation is incorporating such a grounded approach, within the framework of a rigorously-designed large-n study.

The method I developed and propose to study political attitudes is a hybrid between quantitative (large-n survey research) and qualitative methods (ethnographies and participant observation). I developed it in part out of contingency, as data collection was expensive and my resources were limited. I perforce had to live in shabby hostels where immigrants might live, or rent a room in one of the modest neighborhoods I was surveying. Most importantly, I had to conduct hundreds of interviews myself. A few interviews may result in biasing the interpretation of results because the mind tends to recall colorful answers. However, doing hundreds of interviews had the effect of erasing biases as well as preconceptions. While I do not think political attitudes can be captured with a single measure, I believe that I was able to use survey questions to reveal a pretty accurate picture of attitudes at a particular point in time. Aggregating these randomly-selected individual "pictures" or snap shots provides a powerful tool that can contribute to our understanding of the basic political attitudes that are prevalent within a democratic polity, as well as when and how they form. The collage of pictures presented in this dissertation is, of course, of a particular moment in time and, had I the resources, I would have liked to recruit individuals to

a longitudinal study. However, the snap shot presented here provides a good map of the political attitudes and behavior of different immigrant and ethnic groups at an important moment in time: the years following the landmark 2008 Presidential Election and the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression.

INTRODUCTION

Are all immigrants in the United States willing and able to integrate successfully within a liberal democratic polity? This research question guides the three papers included in the present dissertation.

For the purposes of this study immigrants are thought to be politically integrated citizens in a liberal democratic country when they 1) exhibit a basic interest in the political system and have a basic understanding of their role as citizens in it, 2) participate in electoral processes as much as similarly situated citizens in terms of age, income and educational attainment and 3) are attached to the basic liberal democratic rules the game and country's political institutions representing them, like political parties. That is, when they adopt attitudes that reflect an understanding and attachment to a 'Liberal Republican' idea of citizenship[1] and exhibit behavior consistent with these attitudes.

In these three papers, I argue that all voting eligible immigrants and immigrant communities–regardless of their native origin and their ancestral religious affiliation— are willing and able to integrate politically so long as political institutions and contexts (especially local ones) provide them with the same exposure to the political system and institutions, and

[1] The "liberal" idea of membership to a polity stems from the ideal that citizenship "as properly a matter of choice, not inheritance or prescription, and as involving at root only a duty to abide by the laws of regimes in which human rights are honored and a multitude of private and public activities flourish." (Smith, 1985, p.1). The republican conception as defined by Rogers Smith (1985) involves the conviction that citizens: "cannot be truly free, and cannot have dignity, unless they participate actively in the political divisions that shape the common life of their people" and attaching a great value to "popular, or republican, institutions that promote extensive democratic participation; small, relatively homogeneous political communities, in which citizens feel themselves to be a great civic family; and a public morality of civic virtue, of services and sacrifices on behalf of the common" (Smith, 1985, p.2).

opportunities to participate in politics as the ones provided to all other citizens. I thereby challenge both the academic and popular perceptions that certain immigrant groups have anti-democratic and anti-liberal attitudes due to their shared cultural characteristics (i.e. religious affiliation or political socialization in a non-democratic polity) that persist even after migrating to a liberal democratic polity and are passed on to the second generation. I argue that the mechanism explaining the differences in attitudes and behavior found across some immigrant communities and the general population are the common experiences (exposure to the political system and opportunities to participate) of those living in a similar local political institutional context and to a much lesser extent their cultural or religious inherited characteristics. In particular, I argue, immigrants' basic political attitudes are shaped by the dynamics of electoral politics at the local level, especially by local parties' level of competitiveness, and hence by their incentives to mobilize immigrants to vote as well as the presence or absence of historical political events that are rich in information and establish a basic motivation and interest to participate in politics. I show that the persistent correlation between self-identifying as Asian or Latino and low levels of political participations observed in national level data since the 1960's is explained by the concentration of these immigrant communities in political and institutional contexts that have historically provided immigrants and minorities fewer opportunities to participate in political events and less exposure to the political system with respect to other places in the country.

Studying how local dynamics affect immigrant political integration is challenging because immigration is a network-driven process (as demonstrated by demographer Douglas Massey, 1987) and immigrants tend to concentrate in a few selected cities this has been very difficult to study empirically. For example, Irish Americans that have participated politically at

higher rates than other immigrant groups, are concentrated in localities with particular institutional features (cities with higher levels of political competition where political machines mobilized and socialized immigrants). Irish Americans are so concentrated geographically that it would be very difficult to obtain a large enough sample from Irish Americans living in the southwest to identify whether it is the influence of the local institutional context or group characteristics that are responsible for the historically high levels of political participation. Representative national surveys in United States have very few observations at the state and city level, and most certainly not enough observations of a single immigrant group to examine the question of local institutions and political contexts empirically. My research design attempted to differentiate these issues by gathering a representative sample of immigrants with similar characteristics (religion, country of origin and others) across different contexts so I could observe the impact of these different local institutional settings on political behavior. I collected a unique dataset (2076 observations) using addressed based random sampling in six distinct local contexts in the United States: Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, Phoenix, San Francisco, and San Jose. The insights provided by political scientists who have previously explored the relationship between local institutions and political attitudes and behavior (Key, 1966; Bridges 1997) as well as those from scholars who have focused on the political socialization of individuals (Niemi and Sobiezek, 1977) informed the research design of this study, the sampling strategy and questionnaire. The dataset contains a random and representative sample of immigrants and minorities living in these contexts alongside a general city sample to allow comparisons across and within immigrant groups as well as older immigrant communities, like blacks and whites living in these American cities.

Using this data collected I find evidence supporting the central argument of the dissertation: individual levels of behavioral and attitudinal measures that reflect an understanding and attachment to a 'Liberal Republican' idea of citizenship (operationalized as interest in politics, levels of political participation and strength of partisan identity) vary according to the local institutions and national political contexts individuals were politically socialized in. .

Data collection

Among all the longstanding international democracies, the United States of America not only has been host to the most diverse immigrants, but has had the longest experience with international migration. These features facilitated the data collection of a representative, although independent, local sample of fellow immigrants and of citizens whose parents were immigrants from similar backgrounds, living in different local contexts. I selected Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, Phoenix, San Francisco, and San Jose for two reasons, first, all cities had large immigrant populations (especially Latinos and Asians) and, second, that they varied along what I theorized to be key institutional and political configurations affecting the opportunities and exposure to the political system. These features are: 1) the historical development of the political institutions and the urban space, 2) electoral and governmental institutions and 3) local public opinion towards immigrants and racial/ethnic group stereotypes. The field dates as well as the population estimates obtained by the American Cities Survey in each city can be viewed in the Appendix of the dissertation. Unless otherwise noted all frequency distribution tables presented in the papers use the population weights which were constructed using the Census population estimate by race, age and gender in each city. The logistic regression and multilevel

logistic regression models did not include these weights as they control for city, race, gender and age.

An inherited political machine with local party workers who mobilize the voting-eligible immigrants in their neighborhoods even today serves to promote the political participation of immigrants. Bridges (1997) has shown that in New York and Chicago the traditional partisan infrastructure that was left behind by the powerful political machines of the nineteenth century continues to produce higher overall rates of turnout. Immigrants are more likely to be politically active if they live in cities where "party workers and leaders are present in neighborhoods, contact voters and are "responsive to voter's contacts" (p.75). Moreover, in the older cities with adequate public transportation and a functional urban infrastructure, door-to-door mobilization programs are easier to implement and as a result there is an increase in the voters' turnout (Green, Gerber, and Nickerson, 2003). The political parties have different mobilization strategies in a city like Los Angeles or like Houston, where many gated communities exist and where the neighborhoods are so spread out that they are only accessible by car. In those situations, in order to mobilize the registered voters the political workers will usually attempt to reach them by phone, e-mail, or regular mail. That is, the political parties in this kind of cities are less likely to engage in the door- to- door mobilization campaigns that have traditionally been carried out in order to reach the immigrant communities and seem to be the most effective in terms of mobilizing younger, poorer and less educated voters which characterize the Latino and some of the Asian voters.

The electoral and governmental institutions are linked to the exposure to the political system and opportunities immigrants have to participate in political events (including voting but also meeting candidates during campaigns and attending political rallies) because some of these

institutions were specifically designed to erode partisan politics and has effectively succeeded in doing so until the present day (Bridges, 1997). I focus on the institutional characteristics urban politics scholars have identified through numerous empirical studies that continue to have an effect on overall electoral turnout, form of government and type of elections (Alford and Lee, 1968; Karnig and Walter 1983; Hajnal, 2003; Bridges. 1997). The regimes of the Southwest cities that adopted these institutions, Bridges (1997) argues, are quite similar to the administrations described by V.O. Key in *Southern Politics* (1949): popular controversy in the political sphere is practically nonexistent and very few notable politicians have gained prominence in the region. I myself hypothesize that the local form of government and the local electoral institutions in the Southwest have had an overly negative impact on the electoral turnout of minorities and non-white immigrants. Their exposure to politics was severely diminished when the probability of being contacted by a party -- something which has traditionally helped immigrants understand their place in the local and the national political system – practically disappeared.

Finally, negative attitudes towards immigrants and minority groups may well prompt the passing of anti- immigration legislation at the local level. These prejudiced initiatives not only affect the undocumented immigrants, but also the voting-eligible citizens with the same ethnic ancestry. Native-born citizens may be arrested for giving a ride to an undocumented relative, or simply – but unfairly -- detained for the verification of their immigration status. It is unclear whether the passing of certain anti-immigration laws increases or decreases levels of political participation of voting eligible immigrants of similar backgrounds of the target group. These citizens may certainly feel they do not have a legitimate place in the national community and may decide to voluntarily marginalize themselves (Schildrkraut 2011 cites the preliminary

evidence that supports this). However, these local immigration laws may also trigger higher levels of participation when the immigrants from similar backgrounds mobilize to protest against them (the anti-immigrant Proposition 187 in California, passed in 1994 and voided in 1998, and the draconian anti-immigrant laws recently passed in Arizona and Alabama, have incited this kind of vigorous reaction.) The chosen localities are amongst the ten cities with the largest Hispanic/Latino and Asian population, according to the 2010 Census[2] and they vary across the institutional features described above. (Table 1).

Table 1. Political institutions in elected cities'

City	Historical legacy	Type of government	Type of election	States' anti-immigrant legislation
New York, NY	Machine	Mayor-Council	Partisan	Never Proposed
Los Angeles, CA	Reform	Mayor-Council	non-Partisan	Proposed once and rejected by Legislature
Houston, TX	Reform	Council-Manager	Partisan	Proposed twice and rejected by Legislature
Chicago, IL	Machine	Mayor-Council	Partisan	Proposed once and rejected by Legislature
Phoenix, AZ	Reform	Mayor-Council	non-Partisan	Passed by Legislature
San Francisco	Reform	Mayor-Council	Partisan	Proposed once and rejected by Legislature

Existing national-level surveys fail to generate sample sizes of minority groups at the local level that are large enough to enable this type of analysis. City-specific surveys employ

[2] An additional criterion was used to select the cities: the percentage of Mexican-origin population. This was done to control for country of origin. Three Californian cities were included in order to have a variation in the percentage of the Mexican population vs. other Latino groups. San Francisco was included in the sample for this reason and also because of its distinct political and social environment.

different methodologies and often cannot be mutually compared. Instead, my data collection effort implemented address-based sampling. The survey was carried out personally by means of visiting selected addresses. A letter was left behind for the persons who were not at home at the time of the visit. I traveled to all of these cities, coordinating a team of enumerators in each one, as well as conducting many of the interviews myself. This effort delivered a truly phenomenal 30 percent response rate[3], effectively providing the statistical foundation of the first dataset ever produced that could enable the testing of whether local institutions affect the political behavior of similar immigrants. The combined sample size obtained in all the cities was composed of 2,076 respondents. Comparing the demographics of the survey with the 2010 Census, the city samples were representative of the four main racial groups (non-Hispanic Whites, non-Hispanic Blacks, non-Hispanic Asians, Latinos of all Races, and Other) by age and gender in all the cities, with a few exceptions that are noted in the Appendix of this dissertation. Furthermore, the data collected for the study also constituted a representative sample in terms of the religious affiliations of all the racial/ethnic groups in each city. My three papers employ the data collected in the seven cities.

Findings

My dissertation is composed of three papers based on the above-mentioned dataset. The combined empirical results of all three show that religious affiliation, shared cultural values, and other inherited group characteristics do not determine the success or failure of the immigrant groups and the individuals within those groups to develop the motivation and the civic skills that are necessary in order to participate in a democracy, whereas local political institutions do.

[3] The most recent National Latino Survey and the Pew Hispanic survey report a .05% (AAPOR, RR1) response rate of all the contacts.

Particularly, in the United States of America, a country with a strong federal system, local political institutions play a definitive role in the development of attitudes that reflect an understanding and attachment to a 'Liberal Republican' idea of citizenship and exhibit behavior consistent with these attitudes –not only within the migrant population, but also within the general population. In these papers, I focus on the Latino voting behavior puzzle with the purpose of developing a new theoretical framework to study immigrant political integration.

My framework shifts the focus away from group inherited values as the main source of influence on basic political attitudes and instead argues that most attitudes are shaped by the political experiences immigrants have in the locality they reside in. The repertoire of experiences is determined by the immediate (local) institutional context. I argue that the formation of basic political attitudes, such as the interest to participate in any given election, particularly for those of lower socioeconomic status and less politically active families is linked to an individual's institutional environment because, 1) certain types of institutions such as nonpartisan elections and a Manager as opposed to an elected mayor, obscure the individual's ability to identify winners and losers clearly and experience or make the connection between electoral results and local policy outcomes such as allocation of resources in different neighborhoods; 2) institutions affect the overall level of political competition, on the one hand impacts the likelihood that local parties will contact him or her as well as the and quality of the contact and 3) institutions through political competition and other rules which enhance the role of politicians as public figures and leaders rather than mere bureaucrats impact an individual's exposure to political events (a rally, a campaign event, or any other political act is a more common occurrence in places where there are active political parties than places where parties and politicians are less active); the combination of all of the above increases the saliency of politics vis-à-vis other aspects of

people's lives. The specific features that encourage or discourage political mobilization and socialization for political parties at the local level are described in detail in the theory section of the first paper. The second paper shows that in localities where the political institutions do not provide enough exposure to the system religious institutions provide opportunities to develop civic skills and an interest in politics. The last paper explores the effects of political socialization on participation and development of a basic interest in politics and finds that the negative effects of the lack of exposure to the political system at the local level is neutralized during times when national political events are highly salient and widely covered by the media.

WHERE THERE'S A WILL, THERE ISN'T ALWAYS A WAY
The Impact of Local Political Institutions on Latino Political Participation

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Abstract

Are some immigrants unable or unwilling to integrate into a democratic polity? The persistent low levels of political participation among Latinos in comparison to other native born citizens in the United States has been interpreted by some scholars and politicians as evidence that certain immigrant groups are less capable of integrating politically due to beliefs embedded in their religious affiliation or country of origin culture. I challenge popular and scholarly cultural based explanations and argue that the negative correlation between political attitudes and behavior and immigrant group membership are driven by the shared experiences with the local institutional context. This correlation and the popular notion that Latinos vote less than similarly situated blacks and whites has persisted overtime for two reasons: first, simply because a greater proportion of Latinos have settled in localities where institutions tend to inhibit political competition and depress turnout, biasing representative national samples; second, because the smallest geographical unit one can study with existing survey and Census (CPS) data does not allow for exploration of political behavior at the individual level beyond the state. This is problematic for studying groups like Latinos, because 50 percent of their population is

concentrated in three states and less than ten cities. To explore the relationship between local institutional context and political attitudes and behavior of Latino immigrants with respect to other groups, I implemented a multi city survey (the American Cities Survey) which contains representative black, white, Latino and Asian group samples drawn independently for each locality and multiple attitudinal and political behavior measures at the individual level, along with socioeconomic and demographic measures in six distinct local institutional environments. Using the American Cities Survey, Census 2010 and 2012 NES data, I find that the results found at the national level are not replicable at the local level, because in localities where institutions provide incentives for political party competition the probability of a citizen of Latino origin voting in the 2008 Presidential election is equal to that of blacks and whites of similar age, income and education. In other words, the evidence presented here suggests that the correlation found at the national level between Latino immigrant group membership and apolitical attitudes and behavior is of a contingent, perhaps even spurious nature, artifice of geographical concentration of members of this group in local institutional environments that depress political activity. The theoretical framework and findings of this paper reveal that immigrant political attitudes and behavior towards the host country's political system is shaped mostly by individual experiences with this system, and not by prior or inherited cultural or religious beliefs from their (or their ancestor's) country of origin.

Introduction

Are some immigrants unable or unwilling to integrate successfully into a democratic polity? The persistent low levels of political participation among Latinos[4] in comparison to other native born citizens in the United States[5] has puzzled scholars since the 1970's (when formal barriers to political participation disappeared in most places). Latino political participation, especially voting behavior, is not explained by the socioeconomic or demographic characteristics of the group[6] at the national level. The fact that this group has voted at lower rates than whites and even other minorities, like blacks, has been interpreted as evidence that Latinos are less willing and capable of integrating politically[7]. It has also led to a resurgence of anti-immigrant arguments that date back to the mid 1800's[8], which advocate the exclusion of certain immigrant groups because they could be potentially harmful to the health of the American democracy, due to their

[4] This ethnic group includes persons of Cuban, Puerto Rican, Mexican, Central American, or Southern American origin, as well as any other culture in the Spanish historical sphere, regardless of their race. I use Latino and Hispanic interchangeably to refer to a person who belongs to this group.

[5] This has puzzled scholars because socioeconomic differences explain for the most part political participation differences between blacks and whites. See De la Garza, 2001; Wong et al., 2011; Dawson, 1994; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1994.

[6] Their low participation rates cannot be explained by socioeconomic factors, since they persist when compared to other black or white American citizens of similar income, education and age. See De la Garza, 2001; Wong et al., 2011; Dawson, 1994; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1994.

[7] For the purposes of this study, immigrants are thought to be politically integrated citizens in a liberal democratic country when they 1) exhibit a basic interest in the political system and have a basic understanding of their role as citizens in it, 2) participate in electoral processes as much as similarly situated citizens in terms of age, income and educational attainment, and 3) are attached to the basic liberal democratic rules of the game and the country's political institutions representing them, like political parties.

[8] In 1835 Alexis de Tocqueville perceived the two main ports of entry for immigrants at that time, Philadelphia and New York, as being invaded by a "dangerous" population of poor blacks and Europeans whom, he warned, would "bring to the United States our greatest vices, and lack any of the interests which might offset their influence". This abrupt and considerable rise of arrivals from Europe, perceived as significantly different from established population, in that they were not "British," but largely Irish and German, as well as Roman Catholic, led to an "immigration crisis" and a similar rhetoric that ultimately resulted in the Chinese Exclusion Act and the quota system. Zolberg, 2006, Chapter 5.

inability to acquire the necessary civic skills. This notion was absent from the political and academic immigration debate in the United States and Europe in the aftermath of World War 2, the civil rights movement and the Immigration Act of 1965, which eliminated the quota system that put a limit on the number of immigrants from different regions of the world. Evoking the experience of the US with multiple and diverse immigrant groups, and the fact that the vast majority became politically active regardless of their racial, ethnic, religious or cultural background, there seemed to be a consensus until the 1990's that all could integrate into the democratic polity when given the opportunity (Zolberg, 2006). However, the fact that Latinos, one of the oldest and most numerous immigrant groups in the US, a democracy with some of the most culturally tolerant laws, remain politically maladjusted has rocked the previously established consensus that immigrants, particularly non-refugee immigrants looking for better economic opportunities, did not pose a threat to a democratic polity.

In 2004, influential political scientist Samuel Huntington argued in his book *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* that Latinos remain politically isolated in the United States because their religious tradition, Catholicism, instills in them the idea that "poverty is a virtue necessary for entrance into Heaven," which has resulted in their "lack of initiative, ambition and self-reliance." Further, according to Huntington, because Latinos are closer to their ancestors' country of origin than other immigrants (i.e. European and Asian), they are less willing to develop an American identity or sense of patriotism towards the United States. In Huntington's pessimistic view, Hispanics:

> Threaten to divide the United States into two peoples, two cultures, and two languages. Unlike past immigrant groups, Mexicans and other Latinos have not assimilated into mainstream U.S. culture, forming instead their own political and

> linguistic enclaves and rejecting the Anglo-Protestant values that built the American dream. The United States ignores this challenge at its peril.[9].

Huntington's statements, along with the failure of the socioeconomic status model of voting behavior to explain Latino political participation, have had repercussions in the research agenda dealing with immigrant integration in the US and European democracies that experienced a surge in immigration during the 1990's. Although mostly relying on anecdotal evidence, Huntington's book in addition to the low levels of political participation of Latinos, especially Mexican-Americans, , opened up Pandora's Box because it implied that the faith in the long-term success of multiculturalist policies[10] was too risky, and a democracy's territorial integrity or institutions could suffer. Huntington argued that immigrants possessed deeply embedded and rigid religious beliefs and cultural values that prevented their development of democratic attitudes and patriotism, which were passed on to the native born generations, and this was the root cause of low levels of political participation in US born Latinos. The core of Huntington's argument and the evidence in his book have been used by politicians and academics in the United States and Europe to advocate "a reassertion of ideas of nation building, common [religious] values and identity, and unitary citizenship-–even a call for the return of assimilation" (Kymlicka, 2012)[11].

Huntington's book, and the anti-immigrant rhetoric in the US political right and almost all the democracies that experienced a surge in non-white immigration since the 1990's, had a profound impact on the immigrant research agenda. Much of the work of the past decade has

[9]Huntington, 2004, p.30.
[10] Multiculturalism advocates legal and political accommodation of ethnic diversity as the best way to promote harmonic political immigrant integration immigrants, especially of non-Western ones (Kymlicka, 2012) and often used the United States as an exemplary case of its success.
[11] Huntington's argument about the danger that multicultural policies entail for the survival of the polity and the impact it had have not served to protect the liberal-democratic institutions but actually served to undermine them the very existence of the polity led to policies that infringe upon basic liberal principles the European and American political systems were built upon.

been a reaction to this anti-immigrant view to try to understand whether what drives low voter turnout of some immigrant communities is the inability to develop an attachment to the democratic institutions and ideals of the host country. Can they have multiple religious and cultural identities and still be loyal citizens? And, will accommodation and inclusion of cultural and religious practices result in the erosion of democratic attitudes? (Kymlicka, 2012). These are the questions present in much of the work being on immigrant political attitudes and behavior and the political debates in Western democracies with high numbers of non-Christian immigrant communities. The focus on immigrant identities and loyalties to explain their political integration, especially in the United States, contrasts with the dominant approach to study immigrant and Latino political behavior in the United States that emerged in the aftermath of the Civil Rights Movement. Latino and immigrant political behavior scholars focused mostly on the opportunities, formal and informal barriers for political participation, especially for the second and further up generations.[12] The combination of Huntington's work, the announcement in 2000 by the US Census that Latinos had surpassed African Americans as the largest minority as well as their low levels of political participation put the spotlight has once again been put on the cultural, religious and other shared group characteristics as a prominent factor explaining political integration.

Immigrant political behavior scholars have since provided ample evidence to disprove the mechanisms Huntington attributes Latino political maladjustment to, such as lack of patriotism, or support for democratic institutions (Schildkraut, 2011). Using national representative samples some studies have found that "at all levels of acculturation, Mexican-Americans are no less likely and often more likely to endorse values of individualism and patriotism than are Anglos" (De la Garza, Falcon and Garcia, 1996, p.335). Others have shown that there is not a statistically

[12] For a review of the main studies that constituted the Latino Politics and Immigrant politics literature on voting behavior see Rodolfo de la Garza, (2004).

significant correlation between being Catholic and having anti-democratic or unpatriotic attitudes (Jones Correa and Leal, 2001). However, none have been able to provide us with a model that explains the persistent negative correlation between voting and being Latino or Asian at the national level when basic characteristics such as age, income and education are held constant. Studies that use nationally representative samples and control for these and other characteristics find that Latinos have persistent lower levels of turnout since the 1960's, when such data became available.

In this paper, I focus on the Latino voting behavior puzzle with the purpose of developing a new theoretical framework to study immigrant political integration. My framework shifts the focus away from inherited group values as the main source of influence on basic political attitudes and instead argues that most attitudes are shaped by the political experiences immigrants have in the locality they reside in. The repertoire of experiences is determined by the immediate (local) institutional context. I argue that basic political attitudes, such as the interest to participate in any given election of any individual, particularly those who are of lower socioeconomic status, are shaped by the institutions in that locality, which determine: 1) an individual's ability to identify winners and losers clearly in each election and experience or make the connection between electoral results and policy outcomes such as allocation of resources in different neighborhoods; the overall level of political competition, which impacts 2) the likelihood that local parties will contact them in their neighborhood and gain their loyalty and 3) the frequency of exposure to political events, even if parties ignore members of their group, as living in a locality where political events happen frequently increases the saliency of politics vis-à-vis other aspects of people's lives (Lasala, 2013c).

In addition to explaining the Latino political behavior puzzle at the national level, the focus on local institutions and political dynamics exposes some of the weaknesses of the existing data used by political scientists to draw inferences regarding the variation across groups in voting behavior. As developed in detail in the methods and data section, the smallest geographical unit one can identify and draw inferences from existing data is the state (including the 2006 Latino National Survey, the 2010 Census Current Population Survey, the National Election Studies 2012 and other specialized immigrant communities' political behavior surveys). This is problematic because if local institutions have an impact on the political socialization of individuals and communities, and if racial or ethnic groups are heavily concentrated in a dozen cities within a few states, like Latinos (over 50 percent of the Latino population, according to the 2010 Census is concentrated in only ten cities[13] and three states), state level data is insufficient to understand differences across groups. Using voter files is also problematic because it excludes the portion of the group that is not registered to vote which, in the case of Asian and Latino citizens, is more than half of this electorate[14].

To explore intra-group variation in distinct local institutional contexts, I designed and implemented a door-to-door survey study, which resulted in a unique dataset (the American Cities Survey) with observations collected using address-based random sampling in seven local political and institutional contexts that had a high concentration of foreign born population: New York, Chicago, Houston, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Jose and Phoenix. The American Cities Survey was designed with the purpose of ensuring a random and representative sample of immigrants and minorities living in these cities—the total number of cases in the study is 2,070.

[13] New York, Los Angeles, Houston, San Antonio, Chicago, Phoenix, El Paso, Dallas, San Diego and San Francisco Bay Area.

[14] See Pew Hispanic and Census Report "A Record 24 Million Latinos Are Eligible to Vote, But Turnout Rate Has Lagged That of Whites, Blacks" October 1, 2012. (http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/10/01/the-geography-of-the-latino-vote/)

I find that patterns of participation found at the national level are explained by the level of concentration or dispersion of racial and ethnic groups, as well as immigrant groups in localities with distinct institutional and political features: in contexts where local institutions have historically exhibited greater levels of turnout, Latinos or any other group with similar characteristics (young, poor and uneducated) will be more likely to become politically active and vote than in contexts where local institutions inhibit electoral competition. In addition to the survey, I also conducted ethnographic work in predominantly white, black, Asian, Latino and first generation immigrant neighborhoods of each city. My qualitative and quantitative data offers strong support to the hypothesis that Latinos (who are similar across age, gender, country of origin, religious affiliation, income and education) living in cities with institutions that inhibit political competition vote less, while the opposite happens in cities that have greater levels of political competition.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section I provide a brief overview of previous research on the Latino political participation puzzle. In the following section I develop the theoretical framework that I propose to explain immigrant and minority political integration. I also describe my data collection based on the survey of seven cities, and the measures used for the main independent and dependent variables as well as the statistical analysis strategy. The remaining sections present my findings and discussion of the results. As said, the main finding is that Latino and other voter turnout varied across cities and that this variation seems related to the local political institutional context.

1. The Latino Political Participation Puzzle

Since the 1960's, anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists have tried to explain why American citizens who have an ancestor from a Spanish speaking or Latin American country participate at lower rates than whites and blacks in all elections (Figure 1 below). The basic socioeconomic model explaining most of the differences in political participation among blacks and whites[15] has failed to explain Latino political behavior, especially voting. Some Latino political behavior studies have found that even age, which has been found to have a straightforward positive association with voting in blacks and whites, has no effect on Latinos (Hritzuk and Park 2000). Educational attainment, too, does not seem to boost Latino turnout in the same manner that it does in the case of whites and blacks (Arvisu and Garcia, 1996). This is somewhat puzzling, since the civil rights movement was successful in reducing the formal, and most of the informal, barriers to political participation and had a significant positive impact on the levels of political participation among blacks. The overall political participation of Latinos was expected to increase as well, especially for those who were better educated and wealthier.

The scholarly works in the Latino political behavior literature that have tried to explain why the socioeconomic model does not account for the differences in political participation can be grouped into three categories: first, those that focus on the group's (or national subgroup's) original political culture or religion, which are based (much like Huntington's arguments) on the idea that Latinos have especially resilient political attitudes or beliefs that persist through generations and have prevented them from integrating. Second, we have theories of low levels of participation that focus on the consequences of co-ethnic concentration, which explore whether living in a majority-minority Latino community or neighborhood, or in a minority-minority one

[15] See De la Garza (2004) for a summary of contradictory findings with respect to age, income and education and their effect on Latinos, also Wong et al. (2011).

boost or inhibit Latino turnout. Third, the theories that contend that Latino low voter turnout is due mostly to the differences in the mobilization efforts made by political parties towards Latinos *vis-à-vis* blacks and whites.

In the following paragraphs, I first discuss the theories and findings of these works in detail and then explain why they have failed to solve the low voting behavior puzzle, and propose an alternative explanation, which will be tested with the data in the American Cities Survey.

1.1 Culture, religious affiliation and country of origin

In the 1950's and 1960's anthropologists and sociologists asserted that the low levels of political participation at the national level stemmed from Mexican Americans' "cultural dysfunction."[16] According to Menchaca (1994, p. 44), the cultural dysfunction thesis:

> Advanced ethnographic studies that were widely circulated in academia and came to be used as cultural traits that produced factionalism, suspicion, fatalism, invidiousness and peasant like apolitical attitudes. The authors argued that, as a consequence of these negative attitudes, Mexican Americans [and other similar Latino groups] were unable to develop organizations that could be used on behalf of their political advocacy.[17]

The work of Menchaca (1994), and many other Latino scholars that began their academic careers in the aftermath of the Civil Rights movement, strongly criticized and provided ample evidence against cultural explanations. The original ethnographic studies on which these explanations were based (Arthur Rubel 1966 and William Madsen 1964) consisted in interviews in two South

[16] See Menchaca 1994, p.44 for a literature review of this position. This view was based on two ethnographic studies of two South Texas communities (Arthur Rubel 1966 and William Madsen 1964), which were discredited by the 1970's, especially through the work of Americo Paredes in 1978, due to many inconsistencies and to the fact that many of the interviews took place in bars while both the researcher and subject were intoxicated.

Texas communities, which were widely discredited by the 1970's—especially by the work of Americo Paredes in 1978—due to the fact that many of the interviews took place in bars while both the researcher and subject were intoxicated, among other inconsistencies. More generally, Latino political behavior scholars criticized the cultural explanation because of its unsubstantiated half-truths and its perpetuation of stereotypes. Instead, they showed that, in bi-racial communities, Latino low political participation stemmed from the existence of informal barriers through which white elites "manipulated local laws and often used intimidation to discourage Mexican Americans from participating in local politics," thereby preserving their monopoly over the city government (Mechaca, 1994, p.48). Scholars also documented the efforts of Mexican American communities in Texas to overcome those barriers by organizing political interest groups that would support co-ethnics running for local offices, and by challenging existent barriers before courts. In a court case in Watsonville, California, for instance, Mexican Americans were able to prove that the city government had "historically and intentionally used illegal methods to ensure that Mexican Americans were not elected into office" (Menchaca, 1994, p.49). In the aftermath of this litigation, the city switched to single member districts and several Mexican Americans were elected.

Latino scholars also criticized the cultural explanation for leaving out the competing perspective and research which posited that "racism and discrimination had produced the social, economic and political structures that obstructed the full political participation of Mexican Americans" (Menchaca, 1994). Although the structural explanation became popular in the early 1970s, it was submitted to renewed scrutiny when many of the structural barriers faced by Latinos were eliminated through the 1975 Voting Rights Act, Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project (SWVRP), and its Puerto Rican counterpart, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense

and Education Fund (PRLDEF) (de la Garza, 2004). Though these reforms promoted the political participation of traditionally discriminated Latino groups through various means, Latinos continued to participate less than their white and black counterparts well after the 1970s. Consequently, cultural explanations eventually resurfaced, culminating in Huntington's challenge to the body of work and empirical findings in the Latino politics literature of the previous decades.



Figure 1. Percent Voted by Race & Hispanic Origin of Citizen Population (1972- 2012). Elaborated with U.S. Census Data.

As explained in the introduction, Huntington (2004), like anthropologists in the 1960's, attributed the low levels of political participation of Latinos to a set of resilient, inherited beliefs that prevent them from acquiring the civic skills that are necessary for participating in a democratic political system.[18] According to Huntington, these beliefs stem, first, from Catholicism, whose religious leaders inculcate in communities anti-democratic and a–political beliefs. Second, these beliefs stem from the historical relationship between Mexico and the United States: because of the massive loss of territory suffered by the former in the 1847 War, Mexican Americans and their descendants have inherited the resentment of their forefathers towards Americans.

Huntington's empirical evidence for these claims is mostly anecdotal, and, as mentioned earlier, political behavior scholars who have conducted large-N surveys with nationally representative samples have shown that Latinos are as loyal and patriotic as other Americans, and even more so than white Americans (de la Garza, Falcon and Garcia, 1996; Schildkraut 2011). This, however, did not stop Huntington's argument about Latinos' inability and unwillingness to integrate politically from becoming highly influential. This is likely the case because the argument provides an attractive explanation to the Latino political participation puzzle, which remains elusive. We still do not know why it is that Latinos, especially native born ones, exhibit lower levels of participation than most immigrant groups have—even those who came or fled from non-democratic regimes, were poor, uneducated, and practiced non-Christian religions(Portes and Rumbaut, 2006; Zolberg 2006).

[18] Huntington (2004) sees the Asian Americans' and other immigrants' success at overcoming a low income and gaining a higher educational attainment by the second generation as indications of their "willingness" to integrate. In this context, he also cites the factor of the long transoceanic distance that separates them from their country of origin.

While most Latino political behavior scholars do not engage in cultural explanations directly, many seem to embrace them at least in part. Indeed, empirical studies group Latino immigrants by their country of origin (Cuban, Puerto Rican and Mexican), on the grounds that previous experiences in their countries of origin define their political experience in the United States.[19] This is evident in the research design and data collection strategies of the Latino National Survey and the Pew Hispanic surveys, the largest and most widely available datasets, both of which are conducted by the field's leading scholars.[20] While previous experiences in the country of origin may affect the first generation, as this may effect access to citizenship, the strategy of grouping second generation immigrants by country of origin is problematic, because it implies that there is a connection between the political attitudes of parents towards the host polity that are transmitted intact to the second generation. It is also problematic when studying the first generation because there is no supporting evidence that political attitudes are static, especially after a big shock like migration to a different country, and although some groups certainly have distinct political experiences due to their national origin, such origin per se does not seem to define their experience of the American political system, as much as the political conditions and opportunities that they face when they arrive. For instance, the Cubans' experience is distinct from that of other Latinos because many were given refugee status and had an easier path to citizenship, which made them immediately attractive to political parties who engaged with them and contributed to their socialization into the polity.

[19] For a discussion on Cubans see Moreno (1996); for Puerto Ricans see Melendez (2003) and Cruz (2003).
[20] The principal investigators of the 2006 Latino National Survey include Luis Fraga, from the University of Washington; John Garcia, from the University of Arizona; Rodney Hero, from the University of Notre Dame; Michael Jones-Correa, from Cornell University, and Gary Segura, from the University of Washington; the PI's of the 1989 Latino National Survey, conducted in-person, include Rodolfo de la Garza, Angelo Falcon, and Chris and John Garcia.

An additional problem of using the country of origin as a primary explanatory factor of the political behavior of immigrants is that it assumes that the beliefs and opinions formed therein are not updated or susceptible to change when their political environment changes by settlement in the US. This assumption is in line with the Michigan School's dominant account of voting behavior (*The American Voter*, Campbell *et al*., 1960), according to which adults have anachronistic and unchangeable opinions. This stance has been challenged by much empirical work showing that even basic or core attitudes change, and that all individuals respond to actual political realities (Key, 1966; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson, 2002). But the applicability of the stance that political beliefs are formed early in time and resistant to change is particularly problematic in the case of immigration. Indeed, even prominent advocates of this position, such as Converse (1969), Zaller and Feldman (1992), Zaller (1992), and Miller and Shanks (1996), accept that certain experiences and/or historical events (e.g., joining the military, the Civil Rights movement) can alter even basic or core political attitudes. Immigration seems to be an experience of the sort, since it is a transcendental life event that radically breaks prior social relations and roles and is therefore likely to transform even highly stable political behaviors:

> Immigration is one of the most stressful events a person can undergo … it removes individuals from many of their relationships and predictable contexts ... Immigrants are stripped of many of their sustaining social relationships as well as of the roles which provide them with culturally scripted notions of how they fit into the world.[21]

[21] Carola Suarez Orozco (2000), "Identities under siege: immigration stress and social mirroring among the children of immigrants" in Antonius C. G. M. Robben, Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco (2000) *Cultures under siege: collective*

Many immigrant political behavior scholars have tended to retain the assumption of the Michigan School concerning the persistent influence of early socialization. However, recent studies have found no empirical evidence for the resistance hypothesis: pre-immigration beliefs and actions do not appear to be resistant to change (White et al., 2008) in the United States and elsewhere. Now, if immigrants' sociopolitical attitudes and notions of how they fit into the world may evolve, then they are likely to be influenced by the specific local political context in which they settle. It is reasonable to assume, then, that immigrants from the same country of origin who are concentrated in the same (or a similar) institutional context or have similar experiences with the host political system, will have political attitudes that may be akin. Perhaps the most dramatic case in the United States is that of African Americans, who developed similar political beliefs and attitudes as a result of their common experience of being enslaved and excluded from the polity formally until the 1960's. This experience resulted in a sense that the political self-interests of individual members of this group are linked to the interests of the race, what Michael Dawson (1994) has identified as a sense of "linked fate." Even though no other immigrant group has had a similar negative experience for such a sustained period of time, and political attitudes may not have developed into a sense of "linked fate," in the absence of the previous context which sustained previous belief systems, new ones develop based on the political experiences in the host country. This paper's starting point is the observation that in order to understand the second and higher generations' basic political attitudes (such as whether they believe host country politics are consequential to their lives and perceived opportunities to participate and

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violence and trauma, Cambridge University Press. See also, Cynthia Garcia (2005) "The Psychological experience of immigration: a Developmental Perspective" in Carola Suárez-Orozco *et al*. (2005*). The new immigration: an interdisciplinary reader*, Routledge.

affect policy outcomes), one must look at the shared experiences, not at shared beliefs. Especially when speaking about non-elite, non-refugee immigrant communities[22].

This approach (sorting immigrants by experiences with the host country political system rather than country of origin or culture) is challenging because immigration is a network-driven process (Massey, 1987) and groups tend to concentrate in a few localities. Very few immigrant groups originating from the same country are spread out evenly in the host country. This is difficult because if one wanted to study, for example, how political attitudes of Latino groups vary in distinct local environments using a representative sample at the national level, (i.e. the National Election Studies) it would be impossible: most Cubans would come from Miami, Puerto Ricans from New York and Mexican Americans from Houston and Los Angeles. To disentangle the effects of the local conditions from the cultural and religious beliefs that may be influencing these behaviors we would need a representative sample of each group from distinct local institutional contexts. In the next section I discuss the works of scholars who have focused on environmental conditions or shared experiences.

1.2 Concentration, Discrimination and Mobilization

Beyond explanations grounded in country of origin, Latino political behavior studies and, more generally, voting studies have tried to explain why Latino turnout does not fit the socioeconomic model by looking at the effects of contextual variables like election-specific party or Latino organizations, political mobilization and the demographic makeup of their electoral district

[22] Elite political refugees fleeing the establishment of a regime that would persecute them or has taken over their property is a different case, which constitute a very small number of immigrants compared to the massive movement experienced in the last few decades. These immigrants, evidently, view the host country as a temporary refuge, they are highly politicized and possess well-formed and more stable political attitudes (as individuals who come from a much politicized family in the US, see Scholzman, Verba and Nie, 2012). Most of the interest in politics of these migrants (e.g. Cuban and Chinese/Taiwanese elites in the aftermath of the Revolution) is tied to their home country politics.

(minority-majority) or concentration.

Scholars have looked into the types of communities Latinos live in (minority-majority or minority-minority district) because in theory, communities within ethnic enclaves may develop group solidarity, consciousness and social capital that may help to overcome the obstacles of organization, and thereby enhance turnout levels (Uhlaner 1989; Leighley 2001; Bridges, 1997; Erie, 1990). However, empirical studies focusing on concentration have yielded contradictory results in different states and counties. For example, while Leighley (2001) has shown that there is a positive correlation between Latino concentration and turnout in minority-majority districts in Texas, De la Garza et al. (2001/2002) found the opposite relation in a longitudinal study of Houston (1992-1998) with individual level data concerning local, national and congressional elections. In a prior study, de la Garza et al (1993) had also found that concentration led to lower levels of turnout in Los Angeles, Miami and Houston. This suggests that the effect of concentration on overall turnout are likely contingent on the situation of the particular state and county (Leighley, 2001; Barreto, Segura & Woods, 2004, de la Garza *et al*., 2002) and may be due, as I argue in this paper, to the fact that concentration works to elicit participatory behavior only under certain institutional conditions.

Another factor that has been considered relevant in eroding political participation of Latinos at the local level is discrimination, or the existence of negative racial and ethnic stereotypes. The prevalence of negative stereotypes is sometimes linked to the actual existence of immigrant populations that prefer to remain distanced from the political system, "keeping to themselves," particularly during periods of aggravated racial profiling, when casual detentions may lead to deportations of illegal immigrants, or to serious harassment of legal ones by law enforcers. In contexts where anti- immigration legislation is passed at the local level, even native-born citizens

may be arrested for giving a ride to an undocumented relative, or detained until their immigration status is verified. Citizens who experience discrimination may feel they do not have a legitimate place in the national community and may decide to voluntarily marginalize themselves by abstaining from voting (Schildrkraut 2011 cites preliminary evidence that supports this). However, hostile attitudes towards minority groups may also have the opposite effect: it has been documented that the passing of certain anti-immigration laws--such as California's Proposition 187 (passed in 1994 and voided in 1998), HR-4437 in 2006 and the draconian laws recently passed in Arizona and Alabama—triggered higher levels of participation, as immigrants from similar backgrounds mobilized to protest against these laws. Consequently, discrimination does not seem capable, on its own, to explain the Latino participation puzzle.

A final factor that has become an increasingly popular candidate to explain the Latino puzzle is the mobilization of Latinos by national parties during presidential elections. In 2002 Leighley found that only 15% of Latinos, compared to 45% of whites, were asked to engage in campaign activity. More generally, Wrinkle et al. (1996), Shaw et al. (2000), and de la Garza et al. (2002b) have shown that mobilization is a major predictor of voter turnout, even after controlling for socioeconomic status (De la Garza, 2004, p.101). Field experiments have dominated this type of study and they present impressive results regarding the responsiveness of Latinos to door-to-door non-partisan Get-Out-the-Vote Campaigns in some counties in California[23]. For example, in *Mobilizing Inclusion: Transforming the Electorate through Get-Out-the-Vote Campaigns,* Michelson and Garcia Bedolla, (2012) teamed up with multiple Latino

[23] "These experiments indicate that door to door canvassing is the most powerful method of turning out voters, that phone calls from volunteer phone banks can also significantly increase turnout, and that mailers (without the inclusion of social pressure messages) and other indirect methods tend to be ineffective. Experiments also suggest that the quality of a canvassing or phone banking campaign --the sincerity and commitment of those who make the contact with voters-- is crucial to its success Green and Gerber 2008; Michaelson, Garcia Bedolla and Green 2009; Nickerson 2007)" in Michaelson and Bedolla (2012), p 11.

NGO's through the James Irvine Foundation's California Votes Initiative (CVI), a multiyear effort to increase voting rates among infrequent voters, particularly those in low-income and ethno racial communities in California's San Joaquin and Sacramento Valleys, as well as targeted areas in southern California, including parts of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside and San Bernardino Counties.

The scripts used by door-to door canvassers in these projects were designed by the research team based on previous experimental research on canvassing (Green and Gerber 2008; Michelson, Garcia Bedolla and Green 2009; Nickerson 2007). The CVI project also utilized local organizations in these canvassing efforts, and were quite successful in the sense that people who had the conversation were more likely to vote. Based on this study experience and their findings, Michelson and Garcia Bedolla developed a theoretical model to explain their success: the Sociocultural Cognition Model[24] theorizes that the canvassing conversation changes the behavior of unlikely voters because it is "a narrative-based sociocultural interaction, which provides a set of social cues that lead the targeted individual to adopt a new cognitive schema as a 'voter,' which is what leads him or her to choose to vote." In other words, the increased voter turnout is explained, in their view, as the result of a particular type of sociocultural interaction, namely, the conversation between the canvassers and the targeted voter (p. 8).

Their findings are a consistent with many urban politics scholars, sociologists, demographers and historians who before them have noted that one of the key characteristics of effective political machines in the United States was their ability to get poor, immigrant voters to the polls by having party workers essentially have similar conversations or hold rallies that

[24] "We did not set out to "test" the impact of the cognitive schemas on voting behavior. Our initial research was meant to determine which GOTV strategies were most effective in mobilizing a particular voting populations. [...]What was found was a bit of variation in terms of GOTV effectiveness across individuals and campaigns. [We] developed to explain the variation and provide a theoretical explanation for why such a short conversation with a canvasser would change individual voting behavior." Michaelson and Bedolla, p.10

provided a framework through which these potential voters could interpret politics and relate it to their lives. However, I do not think their Sociocultural Cognition Model is helpful in solving the Latino low voter turnout puzzle. While their theory and findings do a phenomenal job in explaining why certain types of interventions, in very specific local institutional and political contexts[25], are more likely to get people to vote, we cannot conclude that Latinos (and other similar immigrant or minority groups) have voted less in the United States for the past 50 years due simply to the absence of such interventions, that is, the absence of co-ethnic non-partisan organizations placing the larger political picture in context for these voters.

While I agree that mobilization is an important part of the story, mobilization is one of the things that happen more regularly and effectively in certain local political institutional environments. Thus, the local political structure has an indirect effect on behavior through mobilization. As Garcia Bedolla and Michelson (2012) argue, political competition increases the probability of conversations between co-ethnics where one is able to explain and put in context the political system for the other or give cues that elicit certain behavior; there are always more relevant cues in places where there are clear lines of popular division, identifiable politicians and policy outcomes. In addition, a local institutional structure also has a direct effect on political attitudes and behavior because it allows potential voters to be more likely to experience local political events and identify with the winners or losers of an election, and to experience local policies as a direct consequence of voting outcomes. Even if we accept the premise that voting

[25] Their study took place right after the biggest political event affecting Latino national identity and their interpretation of their place in the political system, the 2006 immigration bill HR-4437 commonly known as the Sensenbrenner Bill. This bill criminalized undocumented immigrants and their relatives, friends, neighbors, doctors and priests for driving, housing or treating them. Although this was a bill affecting all Latinos in the United States, California Latino leaders and Spanish speaking media, especially in the area the study took place, were the main organizers of the mobilizations and media campaign that followed it. Moreover, the canvassing and the CVI is a direct consequence of the environment generated in the aftermath of HR-4437. This law triggered the largest spontaneous and organized marches in the history of the United States, most of which, including the largest one of over 500,000 people, occurred in the area they conducted the study. I am not sure that the canvassing conversation would have had similar results in other areas and other time periods.

behavior is driven primarily by mobilization, this does not answer key questions to solve the Latino low turnout puzzle: Why is it that political parties are not competing more aggressively to mobilize these voters, given the ample evidence experimental research has provided about how effective mobilization is? And if the answer is that parties don't need to or don't want to, the question remains as to why Latinos, or Mexican Americans, who have suffered the consequences of racial profiling and discriminatory laws, not unlike African Americans, have not been able to overcome persistent low levels of turnout as other minority groups have.

In the *Annual Review of Political Science* (2004), Rodolfo de la Garza concluded, after extensively reviewing the existing literature and empirical data on Latino electoral participation, that the daunting question of Latino electoral participation demands "new and perhaps unique models that will take us past the logjam we currently confront."[26] This paper attempts to contribute to that task, by offering a theoretical model that is based on local political institutional contexts and that may help unravel the enigma observed at the national level.

2. The local institutional context

The central argument that I use to explain the Latino participation puzzle is that all immigrants are "willing" and "able" to integrate, in the sense that they are receptive to the new social and political context in the host country. However, there isn't always a way for them to integrate politically, because not all immigrants have the same political experiences (partisan contacts, opportunities for political mobilization and socialization) in the US political system. The local institutional environment defines the types of political experiences that groups are more or less likely to face. As said, although the decision of national political parties to invest

more or less resources in the mobilization of Latinos for a given election is relevant, the way and extent to which such investment influences their participation depends on the exposure of Latinos to political events. The overall probability that residents experience rallies, campaigns and other political events, or come into contact with a party worker or a "Get Out the Vote" campaign, is dependent upon the local institutions and whether they promote or discourage political competition. The more such institutions promote competition, the more relevant political events will happen in a given context, therefore causing more minority groups that have large proportions of individuals with characteristics associated with lower political participation and interest (such as poorer, younger and less educated members) to become knowledgeable and interested in politics.

My argument is derived from some of the findings of the Latino and urban politics and sociology literature, as well as from my ethnographic research. . The broader purpose of this framework is twofold: 1) to provide a model that will explain the persistent differences in turnout across native and foreign born blacks, whites, Latinos and Asians in the United States, and 2) to incorporate key insights from the socialization and public opinion literature into the study of the political integration of immigrants. Following the lead of the recent literature on mobilization and concentration, my framework shifts the focus away from inherited beliefs, country of origin and cultural characteristics towards political events and contexts. However, unlike the mobilization and concentration literature, my theory focuses on the local level, and thus aims to explain why the effects of these variables on Latino turnout are contingent upon state and city contexts.

The local institutions in which I am mainly interested are those that urban politics and American Political Development scholars in the United States have identified to have a relevant

effect on overall levels of turnout.[27] Those institutions consist, on the one hand, of local political arrangements that at some point in history promoted or inhibited partisan politics and that have been hypothesized as having long-lasting effects on competition; and, on the other hand, of the rules that have generated a greater or lesser development and integration of the urban space.

Concerning the first type of institutions, the urban politics literature shows that, during the Reform era, Southwestern cities decided to establish municipal charters and to hold non-partisan elections. This system was specifically designed to erode partisan politics, and it has effectively succeeded in doing so until the present day. Through numerous empirical studies (Alford and Lee, 1968; Karnig and Walter 1983; Hajnal, 2003; Bridges, 1997), urban politics scholars have come to the conclusion that the adoption of a City Manager instead of an elected Mayor, together with the practice of non-partisan elections, have a negative and long-lasting effect on political mobilization by parties, and inevitably cause the decline of general electoral turnout. The regimes of the Southwest cities that adopted these institutions, Bridges (1997) argues, are quite similar to the administrations described by V.O. Key in *Southern Politics* (1949): for one thing, popular controversy in the political sphere is practically nonexistent; for another, very few notable politicians have gained prominence in the region. In contrast, Bridges (1997) argues that in New York and Chicago the traditional partisan infrastructure that was left behind by the powerful political machines of the nineteenth century continues to produce higher overall rates of turnout. Immigrants who live in cities where the political parties still have "party workers and leaders to get out the vote, be present in neighborhoods, contact voters and be responsive to voter's contacts" (p.75), are more likely to be politically active.

[27] Other local institutions may be more relevant in other polities for explaining exposure to the political system and political competition. Thus, my argument is consistent in being context-dependent.

As for the second type of institutions, the urban politics literature has also observed that the older cities have more adequate public transportation and a functional urban infrastructure, which facilitates door-to-door mobilization programs that have traditionally been carried out in order to reach immigrant communities. Hence, better public services provision increases voter turnout via local mobilization (Green, Gerber, and Nickerson, 2003). In contrast, in cities like Los Angeles or Houston, where neighborhoods are so spread out that they are only accessible by car, and many gated communities exist, political parties are less likely to engage in these door-to-door mobilization campaigns; instead, in order to mobilize registered voters, political workers will usually attempt to reach them by phone, e-mail, or regular mail. These forms of mobilization are likely to exclude poor groups, and hence immigrant communities with a high level of poor members.

In sum, a local institutional context that encourages political competition and mobilization may ameliorate the negative effects on political engagement of socio-demographic characteristics such as poverty, youth, and low educational attainment. On the contrary, a local institutional political context that does not encourage political competition and mobilization may generate overall lower levels of political participation, and certainly creates an apolitical environment that adversely affects the social aspirations of the immigrants and the ethnic and racial minorities.

I hypothesize that the local form of government and the local electoral institutions in the Southwest have had an overly negative impact on the electoral turnout of immigrants. Their exposure to politics was severely diminished when the probability of being contacted by a party–something which has traditionally helped immigrants understand their place in the local and the national political system–practically disappeared.

The enigmatic problem of Latino political participation may be explained by the coincidence of a local institutional context that depresses turnout and the geographical concentration of Latinos in cities whose local institutions discourage political participation and partisan mobilization in most immigrant neighborhoods. Figure 2 clearly shows that national representative samples of Latinos may be over representing the attitudes and behavior of the Latinos in the Southwest, since most of this population lives in that area.

Now, one could say that what is really driving turnout is concentration alone. But the beneficial aspects of concentration for immigrants and ethnic minorities have only been observed under certain local institutional conditions, such as strong political party machines and competitive elections. Also, the effects of mobilization by national parties may only modify basic political attitudes such as the habit or interest to vote if Latinos live in a battleground state and county, and parties repeatedly (over the course of several elections) made an effort to mobilize and socialize Latino voters. Even in those contexts, however, local political institutions have an important effect in developing the knowledge and interest in politics of mobilized voters, by defining whether politics in general is a salient issue for the residents of the locality or not. In any case, as the following section shows, my model tests the effect of geographical concentration and other variables that may alternatively explain the political behavior of Latinos.

Figure 2. Latino Population as a percentage of total population by county. United States Census 2010.



The theoretical framework I propose shifts the focus from the immigrants' inherited beliefs and cultural characteristics to the general political environment in the localities where they live, which is determined by the existing political institutions. This framework also incorporates the fact that immigration is a network-driven phenomenon (Massey 1987, 1997) and considers the effects of geographic concentration of certain ethnic or racial communities and how this may influence the results obtained in national samples. A key aspect of studying the possible relationship between local institutions and political participation (especially voting in presidential elections) is obtaining a truly representative sample of an immigrant community that does not oversample one region, but instead obtains an independent sample from each institutional context that is theorized to have an impact on voting behavior of native and foreign born blacks, whites, Latinos and Asians.

Hypotheses

The main goal of this paper is to examine whether Latino immigrants' (similar in terms of cultural background, generation, age, gender, income, and education) political attitudes and behavior vary across different local institutional contexts or follow similar patterns to what is observed at the national level. Latino immigrants are the focus of my study because a large enough number of them live in different institutional and political local contexts across the US territory, thus facilitating the study of the main research question, since it is possible to obtain a reasonable sample within each of the chosen local contexts. I advance that Latino immigrants' political attitudes will vary in different cities, because Latinos attitudes and belief systems, like those of any other immigrant group, are quite permeable and are shaped by the national and local political conditions in the host country. While some of the similarities may be attributed to their group experience with the national institutions, which has varied over time, I would argue that their direct experience with local political institutions carries a stronger influence for the reasons detailed above. The hypotheses that are tested in this paper are:

H1: The political behavior and attitudes–measured by the voting behavior in the 2008 presidential election and interest in politics–of similarly situated Latino immigrants vary across localities with different institutions.

My expectation is that the pattern observed at the national level is not replicated at the local level and also that in areas where Latinos are concentrated–Southwestern reform cities—Latinos of all generations and country backgrounds vote less than their counterparts residing in Northeastern or Midwestern machine cities. The null hypothesis is simply that holding all demographic and

socioeconomic characteristics constant, the probability of voting for Latinos in the 2008 election does not vary across distinct local institutional contexts. Showing that the political behavior of similarly situated Latino immigrants–in terms of ancestry, generation, education, gender, and income–varies across different local contexts attests to the fact that Latino immigrants' political behavior *cannot* only be attributed to common cultural inherited beliefs and attitudes. Also, that the beliefs and attitudes of this group are not rigid, but fluid.

H2: The political behavior of similarly situated Latino immigrants in the 2008 election varies across different local political conditions with respect to the behavior of blacks and whites residing in the same city.

Voting patterns in the 2008 election[28] observed at the national level of Latinos with respect to similarly situated blacks and whites will not be replicable at the local level except perhaps in places where the institutional context is such that political activity is depressed. Studies that use 2008 representative national data, including this one (see Figure 5) find the familiar pattern: controlling for socioeconomic status and estimating a multivariate regression model to predict the probability of voting for each racial and ethnic group, Latinos have an overall lower probability of voting than other groups (lower intercept); also that the relationship between

[28]Attentiveness and interest in Presidential elections change over time, particularly among the low socioeconomic status individuals. I use the 2008 election to test this theory because we can assume, based on the events preceding it and post-election data that all racial and socioeconomic groups were aware of the election and interested in its outcome. This is ideal because the expectation would be that turnout and political interest would not vary much for all racial groups across localities.

socioeconomic status and voting is different. The slope[29] of the regression line predicting voting, holding socioeconomic status constant, is also different. My expectations are that:

a. In cities where local political institutions promote political competition: the predictive power of socioeconomic variables (income and education) for Latinos will be similar to the predictive power of these variables for blacks and whites living in that environment. The baseline probability or intercept will be similar to that of blacks and whites and the slope will be as steep as it is for blacks and whites (higher levels of education and income will correspond to higher levels of turnout).
b. In cities where local political institutions restrict political competition: the predictive power of socioeconomic variables (income and education) for Latinos will be different from the predictive power of these variables for blacks and whites living in that environment. The baseline probability or intercept will be lower to that of blacks and whites in the same city and the slope will be flatter than in cities that promote political activity and with respect to the slopes calculated for other groups living in the same city.
c. Using aggregate data, but including, along with the basic socioeconomic model, city contextual variables or group level predictors (such as the type of local institutions, a public opinion measure of prejudice or negative stereotypes towards Latinos and election specific party mobilization efforts), the slope and intercept of the probability of voting in the 2008 election for Latinos, holding socioeconomic and demographic characteristics constant, will be similar to that of blacks and whites.

[29] While for blacks and whites the probability of voting increases monotonically with higher levels of socioeconomic status, the relationship between voting and socioeconomic status for Latinos is not as straightforward.

2. Data. Why another survey?

Why another survey? And, why not the US Census Current Population Survey, CPS, which contains a sample of 60,000 households to explore whether Latinos' voting patterns, holding income, education, age, gender and nativity vary? The utilization of the CPS for obtaining voting estimates at the city, or even at the county level is impossible because, as stated on the Census, CPS stud page:

> The sample size does not allow reliable estimates to be obtained at the county level. In fact, not all counties are included in the sample, and data are not available for most counties that are sampled due to confidentiality laws (http://www.census.gov/cps/about/faq.html)

The other option would be to use actual voting data from the board of elections and city level data from the board of elections in cities where local institutional conditions varied. However, official city Board of Elections turnout is neither broken down by race/ethnicity and nativity, nor basic demographic characteristics. Voter files would be ideal if all or at least most Latinos were registered to vote. The problem is that using such methods for explaining the behavior of Latino and other groups like Asians excludes hold or more than half of voting eligible Latinos and Asians. Whereas it may make sense to use these methods to explore what drives the non-Hispanic white population to vote because 75 percent of the non-Hispanic white population is registered according to the 2010 US Census, this method is problematic when over half of the Latino electorate is excluded from the sample. In addition, voter files do not provide information about whether the person is a naturalized or a native born citizen.

Already existing major surveys containing large enough samples of Latinos and detailed demographic information and voting behavior and attitudinal measures are only representative at the state level and don't have large enough samples of cities. As we can see in Table 1 below,

The 2012 NES and the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS) have large Latino samples but their smallest geographical unit available was the state. This is problematic because over 50 percent of the Latino population, 23,636,123, is concentrated in only ten cities and three states, so it is impossible to explore with this data whether the voting behavior of similarly situated Latinos, blacks and whites on all these dimensions varied across local institutional contexts in the 2008 election. This is a problem in states like California where there are cities like San Francisco with local political institutions that resemble the older and highly politically active cities of the Midwest and Northeast and San Jose and San Diego which look more like traditional Southwestern cities with very mild political competition. Additionally, the LNS does not have data on the 2008 Presidential election which is, as mentioned before a good point in time to gauge whether there is variation in the behavior of Latinos across cities and also, it does not provide large enough samples of other groups (blacks and Asians) living in the same context, thus I am unable to explore my hypothesis (H2) regarding the behavior of Latinos with respect to blacks and whites in the same locality.

Table 1. CPS, NES and Latino National Survey Total number of respondents that were of Latino/Hispanic origin by state. Includes native and foreign born Latinos.

	Census (CPS)	LNS 2006	NES 2012
State	N=	N=	N=
California	4,256	1200	316
Texas	2,798	800	220
Florida	1,038	800	120
New York	886	800	48
Illinois	574	600	27
Colorado	547	400	18
New Mexico	516	400	49
New Jersey	493	400	12
Arizona	474	400	43
Nevada	425	400	8
Georgia	241	400	10
Washington	211	400	26
DC-SMSA	180	400	
North Carolina	171	400	11
Iowa	164	400	2
Arkansas	68	400	2
Other states	4,001	0	95
TOTAL	17,043	8,600	1,007

This lack of individual-level cross-city survey data, especially in relation to immigrant groups, has hindered the study of Latino political engagement more than that of whites and blacks because of their high concentration in a handful of cities. To investigate whether there is a

correlation between low levels of political participation and local institutional context, I collected a representative and independent sample of different localities with political institutional features--as identified in the previous section of this paper–that manifestly varied. I selected cities among the ten cities with the largest Hispanic/Latino population, according to the 2010 Census[30] (Table 2, below) that varied across the institutional features presented in the theory section (Table 3) and where Latinos constituted a significant proportion of the population but still, not a majority. The cities selected are: New York, Chicago, Houston, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Jose and Phoenix. San Jose was excluded from the study due to the low response rate (small sample size) for the questions utilized in this paper.

[30] An additional criterion was used to select the cities: the percentage of Mexican-origin population. This was done to control for country of origin. Three Californian cities were included in order to have a variation in the percentage of the Mexican population vs. other Latino groups. San Francisco was included in the sample for this reason and also because of its distinct political and social environment.

Table 2. Rank of selected localities among the cities with largest Hispanic/Latino population (total number of individuals) according to data from the 2010 Census.

City	**National rank**	**Total population**	**Hispanic/Latino population**	**Latino population as a % of the city's total population**
New York, NY	1	8,175,133	2,336,076	30 %
Los Angeles, CA	2	3,792,621	1,838,822	47 %
Houston, TX	3	2,099,451	919,668	44 %
Chicago, IL	5	2,695,598	778,862	30 %
Phoenix, AZ	6	1,445,632	589,877	41%
SF Bay Area, CA	10	945,942	313,636	33%

Table 3. Selected cities' political institutions.

City	Historical legacy	Type of government	Type of election
New York, NY	Machine	Mayor-Council	Partisan
Los Angeles, CA	Reform	Mayor-Council	non-Partisan
Houston, TX	Reform	Council- Manager	Partisan
Chicago, IL	Machine	Mayor-Council	Partisan
Phoenix, AZ	Reform	Mayor-Council	non-Partisan
San Francisco, CA	Reform	Mayor-Council	Partisan

3.1 Design and implementation of the survey instrument

This section describes the sampling method and implementation of the survey which ensured a high response rate among immigrant and low socioeconomic status or disadvantaged communities. I drew two samples of each city. The first sample consisted of 500 to 5000 addresses drawn randomly from the list of all deliverable addresses (see Table 2 below for the specific number of households contacted in each city). Using the US Census data (American Community Survey) and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) software I identified the zip codes in each city that had the highest concentration of:

1. Native-born Latinos.
2. Foreign-born Latinos.
3. African Americans of low income
4. African Americans of middle or high income
5. Asian Americans
6. Mixed-race ethnicities (the most racially diverse neighborhood (s) in each city).

From these zip codes I selected 200 addresses and designated them 'high priority' addresses, at which interviewers could try more than once to contact and recruit a person from this household. I do not account for the fact that these addresses had a higher probability of participating, because the design takes into consideration that these individuals are the least likely to participate in surveys (especially with no monetary incentive). The raw sample looks very similar to the Census 2010 estimates of race, gender and age groups. Thus, I am treating this sample as a city random sample where everyone had the same probability of being selected

(except hard to reach groups, which were contacted twice). In all city samples (except in New York City[31]), every selected address was visited by an interviewer. In each home, the adult with the closest birthday was asked to participate in the study[32]. As shown in Figure 3, all addresses were later geocoded and placed on a map of the respective city. The dots in this Figure illustrate the general sample that was drawn for one of the cities (Houston). The dark triangles represent the households selected in the 'high priority' sample.

[31] Part of the data from New York is from the City Neighborhood study (with Robert Shapiro and Tom Ogorzalek), which served in part as a pilot study for the American Cities Survey. In this study we mailed a letter to the selected addresses.

[32] In some neighborhoods with high incidence of criminal activity interviewers were directed to recruit participants by means of street intercepts, using a formula that ensured a random selection. Few cases from this type of recruitment method were kept in the final sample (N=102 Asians, given the small number of Asians in the general sample).



Figure 3. Houston geocoded sample by means of GIS. Oversamples from the selected zip codes/ neighborhoods are geocoded and placed in a street map (dark triangles); addresses selected from the general samples are represented by blue/green dots. Similar maps were generated for each city. These base maps were then used to produce the specific area maps for the research team. An example of an actual area map is shown in Figure 4.



Figure 4. Houston, area 9.1 -- ¨African American neighborhood¨.

Using maps similar to the one shown in Figure 4, teams of two interviewers would cover an area of approximately this size in a day (or 4 hour shift). Each respondent received a recruitment letter (a letter informing him or her of what the project entailed) and was given the option of answering the survey by himself or of permitting the interviewer to ask the questions and record the answers. As many as 40 percent of the total in-person sample preferred to write down the answers by themselves and then place the survey in a sealed envelope. If nobody

answered the door at the selected homestead, the interviewer left the survey in the mailbox, together with a return envelope. Table 2 shows the total sample obtained by each method.

3.2 Sample size and Response Rate (AAPOR RR1)

Although the city sample sizes may seem small (Table 4 below), they are representative of each locality in terms of race, age and gender of the population residing in each of the city areas according to the 2010 Census Most importantly, the response rate is much better than the average 15 percent most similar national phone based surveys report. Comparing Tables 1 (NES 2012, above) and 4 (ACS below) we can see that the NES 2012 in-person response rate was 38 percent whereas this rate in the American Cities Survey was on average 70 percent. Also as you can see in Table 4, half of the sample was recruited in-person whereas 65 percent of the sample in the NES was recruited online and the response rate for this method was 2%. I attribute the successful response rate to the contact strategy and mostly to the commitment and sincerity of the local student surveyors which, as much of the Get-Out-the-Vote experimental research has demonstrated (Green and Gerber 2008; Michelson, Garcia Bedolla and Green 2009; Nickerson 2007), makes a difference in the willingness of respondents to participate in a study. Also, my study is better equipped to understand non-voters from low income minority and immigrant communities, because it dealt with non-response bias effectively and gathered a good sample of these groups rather than weighing a small number of observations. Given the bias that the random digit dialing as well as internet surveys introduce in terms of income, educational

background, and other factors, as well as the low response rate these kinds of surveys have in comparison to door-to door surveys, I am confident that even though relatively small, the city samples are representative of each group in every city.

Furthermore, when comparing the American Cities Survey (ACS) data to the Latino National Survey (also comparing Table 1 and Table 4), we can see that the LNS only collected 800 observations for the whole state of New York; the American Cities Survey (ACS) collected 884 for New York City alone, including 220 Latinos. The LNS collected 1200 observations for the state of California, and the ACS collected 247 for Los Angeles and 266 for San Francisco, including174 Latinos from both cities. The LNS collected 1,200 observations from all cities and localities in Arizona and Texas, the ACS collected 189 from Phoenix and 154 from Houston (over 100 Latinos in these localities). Finally, The LNS collected 600 observations from the state of Illinois and the ACS collected 278 from Chicago alone.

Table 4. Total sample size and response rate by city.

City	*In-person*			*Contacted in-person, or at address (mailbox)*			*Total Number of Cases*
	# of Attempts	Interviews	RR1	# of Attempts	Interviews	RR1	
Chicago	200	107	54%	1000	171	17%	278
Houston	200	95	48%	500	59	12%	154
Los Angeles	200	179	90%	700	68	10%	247
New York*	700	479	68%	5000	405	8%	884
Phoenix	200	124	62%	400	65	16%	189
San Francisco	200	153	77%	700	113	16%	266
Total N=	1550	1,126	70%	8,450	892	12%	2,018

**Some of the NYC sample was obtained through a pilot study in New York City (done by the author in collaboration with Thomas Ogorzalek in 2010.*

Finally, in all selected cities Latinos make up a similar percentage of the population (between 30 and 47 percent) which allows us to make comparisons that these other surveys do not because Latinos in those studies live in localities with different levels of concentration.

3.3. Measures

Individual level variables

The dependent variable, vote in the 2008 presidential election, was measured by the response to the question: "In 2008, John McCain ran for President on the Republican ticket against Barack Obama. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in that election?" For this dichotomous variable, No=0 and Yes=1. Respondents who were not voting-eligible due to their immigration status were excluded from the sample. See Appendix for question wording of all remaining individual questions that were used as measures of income, education, race, gender and nativity.

Group (city) level variables

Local institutional environment

To measure the main independent variable, local institutional environment in each city, I conducted a principal components factor analysis on the localities' institutional features that were theorized to have an effect on voting behavior of all residents, including Latinos. As shown in Table 3 below, I assigned the code "0" to cities that have governmental, electoral, and immigration institutions that could discourage minority political participation, according to the literature in urban politics and Latino political behavior, and the code "1" to the cities where

institutions provide incentives to parties to encourage minority political participation and political competition in general. I then created an index using the city level characteristics that, according to urban politics scholarship, dampen or boost the political participation and engagement of minorities and voting-eligible immigrants**.** These items (machine legacy, urban development, type of government, and immigration state legislation) loaded on one factor justifying the construction of a single scale (Cronbach's alpha was .8). The scale was a simple additive index of the number of number of institutional features in each city that are considered to be conducive to a more active political environment

Table 5. Local Institutions Scale

City	Historical legacy (Machine=1)	Type of government (Mayor-Council=1)	Election Type (Partisan=1)	State anti-immigrant legislation (Absence =1, Rejected by Committee=.5 Rejected by House=.25)	Urban Development (1=Neighborhoods, sidewalks, public spaces & transportation)	Total score
New York	1	1	1	1	1	5
Chicago	1	1	1	0.5	1	4.5
San Francisco	0	1	1	0.5	1	3.5
Los Angeles	0	1	0	0.5	0	1.5
Houston	0	1	0	0.25	0	1.25
Phoenix	0	0	0	0	0	0

In addition, I included two group level variables as controls:

Local stereotypes

Some have argued that hostility towards a particular racial, ethnic or immigrant group could result in the group member's political apathy; other thinks that this generates greater cohesion and solidarity among group members and willingness to participate. To make sure that a local hostile

environment was not a bigger factor than the local political environment, I introduce in the model exploring variation with group predictors a measure of discomfort towards Latinos. All white respondents were asked:

How comfortable on a scale of 1 to 7 would you be living in a neighborhood where your neighbors were MOSTLY …?

	←UNcomfortable						Comfortable→	Don't Know
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Black	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
White	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Latino	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Asian	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Mexican	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O

Election specific mobilization efforts.

The mobilization literature would predict that local variation in the behavior of Latinos could be due to the differences in mobilization efforts by the parties in the 2008 election. That is, national and local parties invested more time and energy in mobilizing Latinos in Chicago and New York than in Houston, Phoenix and Los Angeles. This is consistent with my argument, because I would expect parties to be more active mobilizing during a particular election in cities where they have a better infrastructure to mobilize, particularly given that all of these localities are in non-battleground states. However, I expect that the institutional context has a positive, significant and independent effect from the election-specific mobilization efforts of political parties during the 2008 election constant. To control for election-specific mobilization efforts, I included self-reported contact with a party:

As you know, the political parties try to talk to as many people as they can to get them to vote for their candidate. Did anyone from one of the political parties call you up or come around and talk to you about the campaign for President in 2008? (Yes=1)

3.4 Models

The models used to test the hypotheses simply estimate the probability that an individual who self- identified as Latino, Asian, black, white or other, voted in the 2008 presidential election, controlling for basic socioeconomic characteristics (educational attainment, household income), gender, and whether he or she was foreign or native born.

Model 1: Classic logistic regression
The first model is a simple classic logistic regression model. The general model for a voting-eligible citizen *i* is:

$$(1) \quad \Pr(y_i = 1) = \text{logit}^{-1}(\alpha_{[i]} + \beta * race_{[i]} + \beta * SES_{[i]} + \beta * age_{[i]} + \beta * male_{[i]} + \beta * bornUS_{[i]}); \quad \text{for } i = 1, \ldots, n,$$

where *Pr* (*yi* = 1) represents the probability of that given his/her race, a person will vote in the 2008 presidential election, controlling for basic socioeconomic characteristics: income, age, education, and gender. Model 1.0 uses pooled data from all cities and Models 1.1 through 1.6 use data from each city sample separately. (Model 1.1 uses the New York City sample; Model 1.2 the Chicago sample, Model 1.3 the San Francisco sample, Model 1.4 the Houston sample, Model 1.5 the Los Angeles sample, and finally Model 1.6 uses the Phoenix sample.)

Model 2. Multilevel logistic regression

The model for the analysis of the relationship between an individual's ethnic or racial background and his/her political integration is a varying slope intercept logistic multilevel model. This model predicts turnout on the basis of a socioeconomic model (age, gender, income, and education), but allowing the effect of race/ethnicity to vary for different localities or cities at the individual level. The general model for an individual voting-eligible citizen *i* is

$$(2) \quad \Pr(y_i = 1) = \text{logit}^{-1}(\alpha_{j[i]} + \beta_{j[i]}\, city); \qquad \text{for } i = 1, \ldots, n,$$

where *Pr* (*yi* = 1) represents the probability of voting in the 2008 presidential election in a given city (*xi*, more generally)*; j* indexes the race of the person *i*. The second part of the model, the multilevel component, is the model for all α_j's and β_j's. As discussed in Gelman and Hill (2007, p.257) the above model seems a complete pooling, except that the α_j's and β_j's are assigned as probability distribution,

$$\alpha_j \sim N(\mu_\alpha, \sigma^2_\alpha) \qquad \text{for } j = 1, \ldots, n$$
$$\beta_j \sim N(\mu_\beta, \sigma^2_\beta) \qquad \text{for } j = 1, \ldots, n$$

This model was chosen in addition to the city by city regressions for two reasons. First, it allows us to estimate the relationship between the local environment and the turnout of each racial/ethnic group, with estimates for the larger groups coming largely from their own data, and the estimates from the smaller groups relying more on the pooled estimate. Second, it allows us to estimate the patterns of variation between groups (in this case, the racial and ethnic groups), while considering the hierarchical nature of the data (individuals within each ethno racial group). Models 1.1 through 1.6 have the disadvantage of smaller sample sizes in some cities (e.g., the

foreign born voting-eligible Latinos in some localities are fewer in Phoenix than in Chicago) and the slopes are estimated and interpreted, but some have a very large standard. Therefore, it is useful to have a model that relies on the pooled data in order to test H1 and H2. Models 1 and 2 are analyzed together in order to gauge whether there actually is intra-group variation in the manner hypothesized.

Classic logistic regression with group level predictors

This model is also a simple classical logistic regression model. The general model for a voting-eligible citizen *i* is identical to Model 1, except that it includes the group level predictors:

(3) $\Pr(y_i = 1) = \text{logit}^{-1}(\alpha_{[i]} + \beta * race_{[i]} + \beta * SE\ S(age, gender, income, education)_{[i]} + \beta * party\ mobilization\ in\ 2008_{[i]} + \beta * political\ institutions_{[i]} + \beta * negativestereotype_{[i]});$ for $i = 1, \ldots, n,$

where *Pr* (*yi* = 1) represents the probability of voting in the 2008 presidential election, given the citizen's race and controlling for basic socioeconomic characteristics (income, age, education, and gender), as well as for the group level variables or the local level characteristics that would theoretically explain intra-group variation in turnout amongst Latinos. The theory anticipates that once these predictors are included in the original model, the national negative correlation between race and ethnicity disappears for Latinos. As described before, the group level predictors are: the political parties' local mobilization strategies for the 2008 presidential election; the local political institutions (the city's form of government and type of election, and the state's anti-immigration laws or initiatives), and the local group stereotype for Latinos.

Adding the group level predictors should improve inference for coefficients α and β and for the fit of the model.

4. Findings. Did Latino Turnout Vary by City in 2008?

In this section, I use the American Cities Survey data to explore the extent to which native and foreign individuals, belonging to similar cultural, racial and ethnic background (blacks, whites, Latinos and Asians), were less or more likely to vote in the 2008 election depending on the institutional conditions of their city. Specifically, I investigate whether Latino baseline probability of voting in this election varied by city, and if it varied according to the theory. More formally, I test Hypothesis 1, which simply postulates that the voting behavior of similarly situated Latino (native and foreign born) immigrants varies by city. I specifically look at turnout in the 2008 Presidential election because it was an election where political parties fought for the Latino vote and more aggressively tried to mobilize them. This election is ideal to test the local level hypothesis because there were somewhat constant levels of mobilization across all groups, which will facilitate observing if there was variation in turnout at the local level. In other words, if turnout still varies within groups across cities holding demographic factors constant in the 2008 election, I would argue there is enough evidence to support H1. The general expectation is that in the cities where the political institutions foster immigrant political participation (New York, Chicago, and San Francisco), the fact that Latinos are less educated, younger, and poorer will matter less. In contexts that provide more opportunities for socialization and mobilization such as New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, the probability that an individual of Latino origin votes in the 2008 election should approximate that of Whites and Blacks. Also, the

baseline probability of voting should be higher for all groups. First, I examine the relationship between voting and local institutional context using simple bivariate tabulations of the American Cities Survey data to see if Latinos (and others) were less likely to vote in cities with institutions that discourage political participation. I also used 2012 NES survey data to provide a comparison with national data and estimates of over-reporting, which are common in survey data. Second, I analyze the data with the classic socioeconomic model by city, using a multivariate binary logistic regression for each city regressing vote in the 2008 election on race, educational attainment, household income, race, gender, age, nativity and homeownership.

Table 6 compares the percentage of people in each group who voted in each of the local institutional environments (cities) arranged in order of their score in the scale that was estimated to measure the degree to which institutions provided incentives to parties to encourage minority political participation and political competition in general. The scale of politicized institutional environment ranges from 0 (not politicized) to 5 (politicized and rich in opportunities for immigrants to experience and participate in political events, as described above in Table 5).

Table 6. Did you vote in the last presidential election (2008)? % Yes

	CPS 2008	NES 2012	American Cities Survey Data							
Group	National	National	NY	Chicago	SF	LA	Houston	Phoenix	All Cities	
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	N
Blacks (Native)	66	85	88	86	89	82	95	75	87	212
Whites (Native)	66	81	95	97	98	95	94	86	95	620
Latinos (Native)	49	61	85	79	65	67	23	68	70	152
Asians (Native)	NA	NA	80	100	78	95	-	-	85	66
Latinos (Foreign Born Citizens)	67	67	80	76	68	56	79	34	71	117
Asians (Foreign Born Citizens)		NA	75	58	49	54	48	-	58	95

As shown in first column of Table 6, in the NES national sample the percentage of people who reported voting on Election Day is greater among African Americans, 85 percent. Native born Latinos were the least likely to vote (61 percent). Unfortunately, the NES groups all individuals that self-identified as non-Latino, white or black as "Other" (including Asians, Pacific Islander, Native Americans). However, as we can see in columns 2 through 8, (data from the American Cities Survey) there is a lot of variation across cities, particularly among native and foreign born Latinos. There is supporting evidence of the local institutions affecting turnout hypothesis in the sense that on average, Latinos living in cities that are hypothesized to have institutions that support immigrant political activity were more likely to vote. The positive correlation between voting and living in a politically active city is striking given that the states these cities (with higher Latino turnout) were located in--New York, Illinois and California--were not battleground states, but in fact were Democratic strongholds, which tends to be the party most Latinos identify with. A similar pattern is observed for foreign born Asians and whites, but this relationship does not exist among African Americans. The proportion of people

who reported voting in each city may seem too high, and there is, indeed over-reporting or bias (people that vote are more likely to participate in surveys) as indicated in Table 7a and b below. However, the over-reporting is minor across cities, compared to the actual turnout and other major surveys, including the 2012 NES. With the exception of Houston and Chicago, where over-reporting was higher and lower, respectively, but in the opposite direction of what would affect the results, any over-reporting appears constant across all city samples. Also, the NES and other surveys' over-reporting in the same states was on average 25 percent (See last row in Table 7 below).

Table 7. Actual Voter Turnout vs. Reported

City	**Chicago**	**Houston**	**NY**	**Phoenix**	**SF**	**LA**
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
American Cities Survey N=1755	77	74	75	64	67	60
Actual Turnout*	73	53	59	47	59	45
Difference (ACS-Actual City Turnout)	**4**	**21**	**16**	**17**	**8**	**15**
State	**IL**	**TX**	**NY**	**AZ**	**CA**	
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	
NES 2012 (N=1947)	72	76	80	68	81	
Actual Turnout*	57	46	51	49	50	
Difference (NES- Actual State Turnout)	**16**	**30**	**29**	**19**	**31**	

** City and state board of elections official number of total ballots as a percentage of Voting Eligible population. On average NES overestimated turnout by 25%; ACS by 14% which is closer to the 10% overreporting for these states in the CPS. The N is larger here than table 6 because I included those respondents that self-identified as "other".*

Respondents in the American Cities Survey were also asked about their interest in politics as an additional measure to understand basic political attitudes of city level political

engagement by group. As we can see in Table 8, Latinos and even a subgroup of Latinos with the same country background, Mexicans, living in New York, Chicago and San Francisco, are on average more politically engaged than those living in Los Angeles, Houston and Phoenix. In fact, in the case of Mexicans and Latinos overall levels of political engagement are almost monotonically decreasing as we move from the most favorable (New York) to the least favorable institutional context (Phoenix).

Table 8. Are you interested in politics? % Yes

Local Institutional Environment	Native born only	Native and Foreign Born			
	% Black	%White	% Latino	% Asians	% Mexican
New York	**64**	**48**	**57**	**64**	**57**
Chicago	**70**	**80**	**69**	**91**	**57**
San Francisco	**70**	**80**	**55**	**77**	**61**
Los Angeles	**83**	**78**	**45**	**77**	**47**
Houston	**81**	**75**	**50**	**55**	**43**
Phoenix	**58**	**71**	**39**	**-**	**36**
N=	**166**	**498**	**436**	**242**	**111**

An alternative explanation to the institutional context hypothesis would be that Latino communities in New York, Chicago and San Francisco are disproportionately comprised of individuals who are better educated, wealthier and more settled (native born), characteristics associated with higher turnout. I control for these variables in the logistic regression analysis and see whether the results from the bivariate analysis hold.

The first model is a simple classic logistic regression model where $Pr\,(yi = 1)$ represents the probability of that, given his/her race, a person will vote in the 2008 presidential election, controlling for basic socioeconomic characteristics: income, age, education, and gender. Model

1.0 uses pooled data from all cities and Models 1.1 through 1.6 uses data from each city sample separately. (See Table 1 in the Appendix for logit coefficients). In addition to the city by city regressions, I also pooled the data from all cities to estimate a varying slope intercept logistic multilevel model. (See Appendix and Table 2 for the results of Model 2). I estimated this multilevel model in addition to the city by city regressions for two reasons: first, because it allows us to estimate the relationship between the local environment and the turnout of each racial/ethnic group, with estimates for the larger groups coming largely from their own data, and the estimates from the smaller groups relying more on the pooled estimate. Second, it allows us to estimate the patterns of variation between groups (in this case, the racial and ethnic groups), while considering the hierarchical nature of the data (individuals within the racial or ethnic groups). City-by-city regressions have the disadvantage of smaller sample sizes in some cities (e.g., the foreign born voting-eligible Latinos in some localities are fewer in Phoenix than in Chicago) and the slopes are estimated and interpreted, but some have a very large standard error. Therefore, it is useful to have a model that relies on the pooled data. The slopes for Latinos varied in all cities and were statistically significant in all cities, except in New York and Chicago, where there was a very small negative logit coefficient.

The results of all models are summarized in Figures 5 through 9 by plotting the probability of voting in the 2008 presidential elections against educational attainment for each of the major racial/ethnic groups holding income, age, gender, and nativity constant. Note that only the immigrants who are U.S citizens (either naturalized or born in the U.S.) are included in the analysis, also the base category for race in all the models is black (foreign born, low income, low education, male and less than 25 years old). The expectation is, as discussed earlier, that the

baseline probabilities of voting for Latinos will vary across cities and will be greater in the northeast than in the southwest.

The logistic regression using all cities Table 1 in the appendix (Models 1.0 and 1.01) replicate what has often been found with national level samples: the coefficient for Latinos and Asians is negative and significant even when including age, income, education, nativity, and gender in the model. Figure 5 plots the predicted probabilities of voting for all groups, as estimated by using the combined data from all the city dataset (Figure 5 right) next to the same model using NES 2012 data (Figure 5 left). In this Figure, we can see that blacks and whites are at least 20 percent more likely to vote than Asians and Latinos in all cities combined as well as at the national level (when all the city samples data are combined -- holding income, educational attainment, and nativity constant. The coefficient for Latino (Model 1) corresponds to a negative difference of -0.79 in the logit probability of voting, even when income, education, gender, age, and nativity are controlled. As we can see in Figure 5, this translates to a 34 percent predicted probability of voting in the 2008 presidential election for Latinos who were male, reported a household income of less than $10,000, aged 18 to 25, and did not complete high school. The predicted probability of voting in the same election for a similarly situated black citizens was 53 percent using the American Cities Survey, and 33 percent using the NES 2012 data. For whites it was 53 and 21 respectively. Also, as other Latino political behavior scholars have noted, we can see in Figure 5 (Model 1) that the effect of educational attainment varies by group: 83 percent of male Blacks and male Whites who had a college degree were likely to vote; but Latino college graduates were almost 13 percent less likely to vote in the 2008 presidential elections. The point of this analysis is to show that much information is lost when using aggregate data. As we shall

see in the following figures, a very different picture emerges in each of the cities, and the lack of explanatory power of the socioeconomic model varies considerably by city.



Figure 5. Left: NES 2012 Data. Estimated logistic regression lines Pr (y_i= 1) = logit^{-1} ($\alpha_{[i]}$ + β*race $_{[i]}$ + β*$X_{[i]}$) of education predicting the probability of voting in 2008, holding constant income and age at 0 (household income less than $20,000; 18-25 years old). Right: same model on pooled data from the American Cities Survey. Only the slopes for black, white and Latino citizens are shown

The findings of the logistic regression using the American Cities Survey but running separate regressions for each city as well as the multilevel model, which estimated whether the slope for each race/ethnicity dummy varied by city, show support for the two hypotheses presented in the previous section. As shown in Table 9 (city regressions), the logistic coefficient is positive (although insignificant) in New York and Chicago and negative and significant in the case of Houston. Since these are logit coefficients and cannot be interpreted directly, I transformed the logit coefficients in to predicted probabilities for native-born Latinos in each of the cities at different levels of educational attainment–holding age, income, gender and nativity constant and

plotted them in Figure 6 (below Table 9). As shown in Figure 6, poor, uneducated, young and male Native-born Latinos living in New York City were about 80 percent likely to vote in the 2008 election, whereas similar Latinos in Houston and Los Angeles were less than 20 percent likely to vote. Another interesting thing to note in Figure 6, is that education (for the male young and poor) does not uniformly boost the probability of voting. It is only significant in San Francisco and Los Angeles. Education does not matter much to compensate the low probability of voting in Houston or Phoenix. The results of Chicago are somewhat intriguing, however, this may well be a function of the fact that the majority of the younger native born Latinos in Chicago are second generation immigrants who, as the Latino Ethnographic Survey of 1993 (Menchaca, 1994) revealed, may have become disillusioned with politics, as younger Mexican Americans did when they realized the political machine did little to improve the conditions of Mexican American neighborhoods like Pilsen. Age was also the most significant variable in Chicago: when the probabilities of voting are plotted against age rather than education, Chicago's Latinos probability of voting reaches 80 percent at age group 35-44. The probability for the young, poor and uneducated voting in Phoenix is higher than that of Los Angeles, which makes sense given that Latinos with these characteristics in Phoenix are mostly second generation immigrants many of whom have undocumented parents that have been the target of the anti-immigrant legislation.

Table 9. Logistic regressions: effect of race/ethnicity and SES on political behavior

Dependent variable: Turnout in 2008 (Yes=1)

Sample	All Cities		New York	Chicago	San Francisco	Houston	Los Angeles	Phoenix
Model	(1.0)	(1.01)	(1.1)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(1.4)	(1.5)	(1.6)
Intercept (base: Black)	0.12 (-0.27)	-0.57 (0.35)	0.36 (0.56)	**-2.72** (1.17)	0.34 (1.34)	-0.24 (1.32)	-1.05 (0.95)	-1.95 (1.07)
White	0.01 (-0.27)	0.07 (0.27)	0.11 (0.43)	0.56 (0.76)	0.29 (1.24)	-1.60 (1.09)	0.29 (0.76)	-0.01 (0.72)
Hispanic	**-0.79**** (-0.25)	**-0.50**** (0.25)	0.27 (0.52)	0.52 (0.81)	-1.34 (1.18)	**3.24**** (1.14)	-0.72 (0.67)	0.09 (0.72)
Asian	**-1.50***** 0.28	**-1.07***** (0.31)	**-1.07***** (0.49)	-0.59 (1.13)	-1.67 (1.19)	**-2.90**** (1.39)	-0.50 (0.82)	
Other	-0.37 (0.38)	-0.22 (0.39)	-0.38 (0.52)	0.45 (1.23)	-0.56 (1.54)	14.23 (2000.69)	14.42 1007.06	1.29 (1.31)
Income	0.06 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.10)	0.29 (0.21)	0.06 (0.16)	0.26 (0.24)	-0.07 (0.17)	0.13 (0.18)
Education	**0.44***** (.06)	**0.41***** (0.06)	**0.36***** (0.10)	0.32 (0.21)	**0.48***** (0.18)	0.25 (0.24)	**0.71***** (0.20)	0.25 (0.19)
Age	**0.25***** (0.05)	**0.29***** (0.05)	0.05 (0.09)	**0.67***** (0.21)	0.23 (0.15)	**0.87**** (0.34)	**0.34**** (0.17)	**0.57***** (0.17)
Gender (Female= 1)	0.16 0.17	0.20 0.18	0.23 (0.30)	**1.49**** (0.57)	-0.32 0.47	-0.80 (0.72)	0.01 (0.47)	0.04 (0.48)
Nativity (Born US=1)		**0.71** (0.21)	**0.71***** (0.33)	1.31 (0.78)	0.35 (0.59)	1.32 (0.99)	0.40 (0.60)	1.04 (0.70)
N=	1359	1350	495	230.00	197	126	170	132
k=	9	10	10	10	10	10	10	9
Residual deviance	949.2	931	329.4	107.2	124.6	62.7	125.4	118.2
Null Deviance	1139.0	1129.1	373.5	158.1	164.6	95.9	172.9	146.2
Difference	189.8	197.3	44.1	51	40.1	33	47.4	28

Notes: The dependent variable is the self-reported turnout in 2008. The base category for race/ethnicity is "Black or African American". White represents non-Hispanic Whites who self-identified as such. All immigrants and citizens not eligible for voting were excluded from the sample.
****p < .01 **p <.05*



Figure 6. Left: Estimated logistic regression lines Pr (y_i= 1) = logit^{-1} ($\alpha_{[i]} + \beta^*race_{[i]} + \beta^*X_{[i]}$) of race, predicting the probability of voting in 2008 at different educational attainment levels. Right: Estimated logistic regression lines Pr (y_i= 1) = logit^{-1} ($\alpha_{[i]} + \beta^*race_{[i]} + \beta^*X_{[i]}$) of race, predicting the probability of voting in 2008 amongst different age groups. Only the slopes for native born Latinos are shown.

Table 10 below presents the results of multilevel model chosen in addition to the city by city regressions to estimate the relationship between the local environment and the turnout of each racial/ethnic group while considering the hierarchical nature of the data (individuals within each ethno racial group) confirmed these results. Models 1.1 through 1.6 have the disadvantage of smaller sample sizes in some cities and a very large standard. However, as shown in Table 10, the multi-level model confirms that the slope of the Latino dummy and its predictive power differs by city even among Latinos who are similar in terms of age, income, gender, education and nativity.

Table 10. Varying intercept and varying slope multilevel model: Effect of race/ethnicity by city on political behavior (turnout in 2008 presidential election)

Dependent variable: Turnout in 2008 (Yes=1)								
Sample	All Cities		All Cities					
			New York	Chicago	San Francisco	Houston	Los Angeles	Phoenix
Model	1.Classic Logistic		2. Varying Intercept, Varying Slope Multilevel Logistic Regression					
Intercept (Black base category)	**0.12** (-0.27)	**-0.57** (0.35)	**-0.60** (0.35)	**-0.60**	**-0.60**	**-0.60**	**-0.60**	**-0.60**
Black			**-0.52*** ** (0.14)	**-0.55** ** (0.14)	**-0.60** ** (2.2E-05)	-0.43 (0.35)	**-0.71** (0.19)	**-0.72** ** (0.21)
White	**0.01** (-0.27)	**0.07** (0.27)	**0.03** (0.12)	**0.21** (0.12)	**0.09** (2.2E-05)	-0.06 (0.32)	**-0.07** (0.17)	-0.09 (0.19)
Latino	**-0.79** ** (-0.25)	**-0.50** ** (0.27)	-0.05 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.12)	**-0.36** ** (2.2E-05)	**-0.98** ** (0.35)	**-0.77** ** (0.16)	**-0.83*** * (0.18)
Asian	**-1.50** 0.28	**-1.07** (0.31)	**-1.02** (0.15)	**-0.99*** * (0.15)	**-1.01** (2.2E-05)	**-1.22*** * (0.36)	**-1.00** (0.20)	
Other	-0.37 (0.38)	-0.22 (0.39)	-0.03 (0.19)	-0.23 (0.19)	**-0.13** (2.2E-05)	0.04 (0.45)	0.00 (0.25)	
Income	0.06 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.07 0.06	0.07 0.06	0.07 0.06	0.07 0.06	0.07 0.06	0.07 0.06
Education	**0.44** (.06)	**0.41** (0.06)	**0.40** -0.07	**0.40** -0.07	**0.40** -0.07	**0.40** -0.07	**0.40** -0.07	**0.40** -0.07
Age	**0.25** (0.05)	**0.29** (0.05)	**0.28** -0.06	**0.28** -0.06	**0.28** -0.06	**0.28** -0.06	**0.28** -0.06	**0.28** -0.06
Gender (Female=1)	0.16	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
(Native born=1)	0.17	0.18 **0.71**	-0.17 **0.73**	-0.17 **0.73**	-0.17 **0.73**	-0.17 **0.73**	-0.17 **0.73**	-0.17 **0.73**
		0.21	-0.21	-0.21	-0.21	-0.21	-0.21	-0.21
Observations	**1359**	**1350**	**1350**	**1350**	**1350**	**1350**	**1350**	**1350**
k=	9	10						
Res. .deviance	949.2	931						
Null Deviance	1139.0	1129.1						
Difference	189.8	197.3						
Deviance			927.40					

As explained previously it is difficult to interpret logistic coefficients substantively and see what the models predict in terms of the probability of voting for Latinos in each of the cities and how this may differ from other similarly situated black, white and Asian citizens in the same cities. Thus, in order to facilitate the analysis and interpretation I plot the predicted probabilities for other groups in some of the cities where Latino political behavior seemed to be different from what is observed at the national level or even in the aggregate. This will also allow us to gauge whether the data is supportive of H2 (**The political behavior of similarly situated Latino immigrants in the 2008 election varies across different local political conditions with respect to the behavior of blacks and whites residing in the same city.)** These plots explore if higher intercepts and steeper slopes are a Latino-only phenomenon in cities like Chicago or New York or is a general behavior in a given institutional environment, or a local institutional and political environment one. Conversely, if flat slopes and low intercepts (meaning that education does not boost voter turnout) is a Latino only phenomenon in some cities or a general pattern. In all these figures, the top plots summarize the predicted probabilities of the independent city regressions, and the bottom plots the results from the multilevel model. The multilevel model uses the information about individuals of similar race and ethnicity from other cities in order to calculate the estimates when the samples are small. For this reason the differences between groups obviously diminish. The top plots are more accurate in terms of modeling the behavior of each group in a particular city; however, the bottom plots that summarize the results from the multilevel model are kept because they demonstrate that differences exist within the groups across cities even when using partial pooling. Following each figure, a short description of the most significant results in the selected cities is given.



Figure 7. Top: Estimated logistic regression lines of city sample Pr (y_i= 1) = $logit^{-1}$ ($\alpha_{[i]}$ + β*$race_{[i]}$ + β*$X_{[i]}$) *of Race/ethnicity predicting the probability of voting in 2008 at a different educational attainment level (Income and Age at 0 =Household income Less than $20,000 and 18-25 years old). Right: Same model with income and age at their mean. Bottom: Estimated logistic regression lines of Multilevel Model (Model 2), Pr* (y_i= 1) = $logit^{-1}$ ($\alpha_{j[i]}$ + β*$race_{j[i]}$ + β*$X_{j[i]}$) *of Race/ethnicity predicting the probability of voting in 2008 at different educational attainment levels.*

New York was by far the city where the probability of voting in the 2008 elections was the highest for Latinos, and also the city where their behavior most resembled that of similarly situated Blacks and Whites. The third column in Table 1 in the appendix (Model 1.1) confirms that in New York–except for Asians—the predictive power of race was not significant; other variables explain the variation. Education and nativity were the only significant variables; as Figure 7 shows, the differences across educational attainment levels are very small. It can be seen in the top left plot that the predicted probability for native born Latinos in New York of voting in 2008 is 80 percent for the poor, young, and uneducated males (Model 1.1). The top-right plot utilizes the same model and sample, but the results represent the probability of voting at different educational levels, when other variables are held at their mean. The results of the varying intercept slope model (Model 2) are shown in the bottom right and bottom left of Figure 4.2. The city level data clearly reveal an unusual situation in the aggregate data: Latino political participation in New York is not puzzling. Foreign born Latinos reported voting at higher rates than native born Asians. This is certainly not the case in other cities.



Figure 8. Top: Estimated logistic regression lines of city sample Pr (y_i= 1) = logit^{-1} ($\alpha_{[i]}$ + β*race $_{[i]}$ + β*$X_{[i]}$) of Race/ethnicity predicting the probability of voting in 2008 at different educational attainment levels. (Income and Age at 0 =Household income Less than $20,000 and 18-25 years old.. Right: Same model with income and age at their mean. Bottom: Estimated logistic regression lines of multilevel model (Model 2) Pr (y_i= 1) = logit^{-1} ($\alpha_{j[i]}$ + β*race $_{j[i]}$ + β*$X_{j[i]}$) of race/ethnicity predicting the probability of voting in 2008 at different educational attainment levels.

Latinos in Chicago also behaved much like Whites and Blacks. The top plot shows that Asians reported voting at higher rates than foreign born Latinos in Chicago, whereas in New York the opposite was true. The plots below do not confirm this pattern but, as explained, these models use partial pooling (taking information from the behavior of Asians in other cities), so the behavior of Asians is more accurately portrayed in the top plot. The low predicted probabilities in the top left may seem odd, given the higher than average voter turnout in Chicago, and the expectations that in cities with mayoral and partisan elections, as well as a historical legacy of political machines, the turnout should be higher. The reason for this is that educational attainment was insignificant in Chicago; what really seemed to matter there was age. The qualitative interviews both the author and the interviewers conducted in the older Mexican neighborhoods of Chicago apparently indicated that Mexican Americans who grew up in an era when the political machine was more active in the neighborhoods were more connected to their political party and more interested in politics. Older Latinos in Chicago (particularly the Puerto Ricans and the other non-Mexican Latinos) regretted that the younger, native-born Latino generation was not as politically engaged as they themselves had been. The older Chicagoan blacks expressed a similar concern in their group's case.



Figure 9. Top: Estimated logistic regression lines of city sample Pr (y_i= 1) = logit^{-1} ($\alpha_{[i]}$ + β*race $_{[i]}$ + β*$X_{[i]}$) of race/ethnicity predicting the probability of voting in 2008 at different educational attainment levels (income and age at 0 = household income less than $20,000 and 18-25 years old). Right: Same model with income and age at their mean. Bottom: Estimated logistic regression lines of multilevel model (Model 2) Pr (y_i= 1) = logit^{-1} ($\alpha_{j[i]}$ + β*race $_{j[i]}$ + β*$X_{j[i]}$) of race/ethnicity predicting the probability of voting in 2008 at different educational attainment levels.

In the 2008 election, blacks in Houston voted at higher rates than any other group but this is probably due to their particular history and to the fact that Black churches have filled the void of political parties left in the South and the Southwest. The relevance of this phenomenon will be analyzed in another paper, but for now it may be sufficient to say that the higher Black turnout in these cities is not surprising, given the nature of the 2008 election (for the first time in US history an African American had a strong chance of winning the Presidency), as well as the enthusiastic involvement of the Black churches in the mobilization of African Americans. What is surprising is that Latinos in Houston reported having voted at lesser rates than the Asians there. A possible explanation is that Texas is not a swing state–but then, neither are Illinois or New York.

Asian Americans in the city of Houston reported voting at higher rates than in any of the other cities. This is due to the fact that many of the naturalized Asian immigrants in Houston were war refugees. As explained in the theoretical section of this dissertation, refugee communities are more likely to immediately attract the interest of the host country's national parties, because politicians know these particular immigrants can readily be socialized and mobilized. As show in Figure 9 (and Model 1.4), Houston is the only city where foreign born Asians were more likely to vote than native-born Asians. It is worth mentioning that during the week we spent collecting the data in this city, it soon became evident that it would be very hard for us to approach people at their homes and for any political party to conduct a door-to-door mobilization campaign. I quote below an email sent by one of the interviewers who resigned after the first day of field work there. This student was Caucasian and had grown up in Houston. He volunteered to lead the research team in the Southeast portion of the city, in the mostly white neighborhood where he had grown up.

> I'm really sorry to do this to you, but I can no longer participate in the research program tomorrow or Sunday. I did not know what this project would entail, and after a few hours of surveying I now know I am not cut out for research in the field. We surveyed an area where I live, but I was surprised that my presence angered so many people. I have never had adults scream at me, accuse me of being a liar, or had the police called on me before. The hostility and suspicion made me very uncomfortable, and I am glad law schools do not ask us to survey/interview subjects.

Other interviewers left after similar incidents. There seemed to be a very negative attitude towards anyone who approached a home whose owner had no previous knowledge of the visit. However, "No Trespassing" signs were not visible in 90 percent of the houses we visited. We did not encounter this kind of hostility in any of the other cities, even in the mainly White wealthy neighborhoods. The contrast between the basic infrastructure–pavement, lighting, sidewalks, public transportation–in the minority neighborhoods in Houston and the infrastructure in the mostly White neighborhoods surpassed anything we were able to see in any of the other cities we surveyed.

The figures shown above (7 through 9) in combination with the US Census map showing the Latino population shown previously, provide enough evidence to asses that the negative correlation found at the national level between voting and being of Latino ancestry is due to the fact of the Latinos' concentration in localities that discourage the mobilization of parties, and therefore inhibit the general levels of turnout. The differences in the intercepts and the slopes for each city provide sufficient information to show that there is variation across cities in the voting behavior of similarly situated individuals of the same racial and cultural background. Higher intercepts and flatter slopes for Latinos in New York show that, as expected, they were more likely to vote in an environment that provided them with greater contact with politics. On the other hand, lower intercepts and flatter slopes, like those in Houston, correspond with an

institutional environment that has historically depressed turnout (Bridges, 1997). The predicted probability curves of native and foreign born Latinos resemble those of whites or blacks in the cities, like New York and Chicago, which provide greater opportunities for political socialization; the opposite happens in Houston and Phoenix where the political institutions do not promote overall turnout.

Findings 5. What explains intra-group variation across cities?

To find out whether the institutional environment helped improve the socioeconomic model's predictive power in the case of Latinos, I estimated the initial logistic regression of vote on race, income, education, nativity, gender and age (socioeconomic model) presented earlier, including the group level predictors that were hypothesized to have an effect on Latino turnout. As mentioned earlier, the Asian sample is unreliable, not only because it is very small and not representative of the Asian population in most cities. A large proportion of the Asian sample consists of newly arrived immigrants who did not speak much English (the survey was translated into Chinese) and most of these immigrants said they were voting-eligible citizens, which does not seem likely. When the research teamed inquired about this with local community leaders and community centers serving the Asian population, they learned that even the US Census had trouble getting people from these neighborhoods to answer the basic form. I am including them in the model as a control, but I do not think that the estimates are reliable. Tables 11 and 12 below present the results obtained from Model 3 (all cities combined like in Model 1, but including the scale of political institutions and other city level indicators, and whether people were contacted by a political party to get to the polls) that are hypothesized to have an effect on

immigrant political behavior. This model tries to gauge whether as expected, when including city contextual variables or group level predictors such as the type of local institutions, a public opinion measure of prejudice or negative stereotypes towards Latinos and election specific (holding constant whether the person was contacted in that particular election and mobilized by party workers) the slope and intercept of the probability of voting in the 2008 election for Latinos will be similar to that of blacks and whites. In short, this model will explore whether including local institutions in the model increases the fit of the model and helps us understand if this is an important piece in the puzzle of why Latinos at the national level, have persistently voted at lower levels than blacks and whites.

The local institutions that have fostered the political participation and voting behavior of Latinos have been governmental, electoral, historical, and also legal. As explained before, an index was created to summarize whether a city with certain characteristics would boost or would depress electoral turnout. Two other measures were included as controls. Local negative stereotypes (measured as the percent of non-Hispanic whites who said they would be "uncomfortable" living in a mostly Latino neighborhood[33]) and the parties' mobilizations efforts in 2008 Presidential election.

[33] "*How comfortable on a scale of 1 to 7 would you be living in a neighborhood where your neighbors were mostly Latinos.* "The measure is the percentage of white respondents that answered 1 or 2 (very/extremely uncomfortable).

Table 11. Logistic model with group level predictors. Effect of race/ethnicity by city on political behavior (turnout in Nov. 2008 elections), political institutions, public opinion, and parties' mobilization strategies.

Sample	All Cities		All Cities
	(Model 1.0)	(Model 1.01)	**(Model 3)**
Intercept	**0.034**	**-0.68**	**-1.1****
(Black)	(.27)	(0.35)	(.43)
White or Caucasian	**-0.06**	**0.007**	**0.01**
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Latino or Hispanic	**-0.79****	**-0.51***	**-0.42**
	(-0.25)	(0.27)	(.28)
Asian	**-1.46****	**-1.0****	**-01.04***
	0.28	(0.31)	(1.06)
Other race/ethnicity	**-0.39**	**-0.23**	**-0.27**
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(.39)
Income	**0.05**	**0.06**	**0.06**
	(0.5)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education	**0.43*****	**0.40*****	**0.39*****
	(.06)	(0.06)	0.07
Age	**0.22*****	**0.25*****	**0.24*****
	(0.05)	(0.05)	0.05
Gender (Female=1)	**0.14**	**0.17**	**0.15**
	0.17	0.18	0.17
Nativity (Native-born=1)		**0.71*****	**0.76*****
		0.21	0.21
Contacted/Mobilized	**.83*****	**0.83*****	**0.82*****
	.19	0.19	0.21
Group level Variables			
1. Local political institutions			**0.13****
			(0.05)
3. Public opinion(% Whites with negative stereotypes of Latinos)			-1.07
Observations	**1359**	**1350**	**1350**
k=	9	10	17
Residual deviance	949.2	931	918
Null Deviance	1139.0	1129.1	1129.1
Difference	189.8	197.3	211

****p < .001, **p < .05., *p < .1 of the logistic regression coefficient and marginal effects of this coefficient, holding all other variables at their means*

Table 12. Marginal probabilities[34] of Model 3		
	Pr (Vote 2008)	SE
White (0= Non-White)	**0.01**	0.02
Latino	**-.04****	0.03
Asian	**-0.12****	0.4
Other	**-0.02**	0.04
Income	**0.004**	0.01
Education	**0.03*****	0.01
Age	**0.02*****	0.00
Gender (0=Male)	**0.01**	0.02
Native (0=Foreign Born)	**0.08*****	0.03
Party mobilization	**0.07*****	0.09
Local political institutions	**0.011****	0.005
Local public opinion	**0.002**	0.004

The key explanatory variable, 'Political institutions', is the index which sums up how positive or negative each city is for immigrant civic skill development. In the data and methods section, I explained how each of the cities was coded. This variable is positive and significant even when holding the mobilization and contact measure constant. Individuals were more likely to vote in the cities that have a Mayor instead of a City Manager, partisan elections instead of non-partisan elections, a Machine political legacy instead of a Reform political legacy, an urban environment that facilitates door-to-door GOTV mobilizations, and less restrictive immigration laws at the state level. The last city variable, the percentage of Whites who reported they would feel uncomfortable living in a Latino-majority neighborhood, is negative but insignificant. Surprisingly, the interaction of this measure with Latino origin was also insignificant. This shows that Latino participation is influenced mostly by the political institutions at the local level and the party mobilization strategies. The degree to which white residents in the city expressed

[34] An estimate of marginal effect represents the tangent to the probability curve (i.e., it represents the slope, or change in the dependent variable for one unit increase in the independent variable, if the probability curve were linear at that point). The value of the marginal effect depends on the level of all the variables in the model. The marginal is the instantaneous rate of change, and in general does not equal the actual change for a given finite change in the independent variable, unless it is in a region of the probability curve that is approximately linear.

dislike of living near or in neighborhoods that were mostly Latino (a measure of a local opinion that sustained a negative stereotype about the group) did not seem to be significantly related to whether Latinos voted in 2008 or not. This is consistent with what de la Garza (2004) has argued before based on data from the LNS, experiencing discrimination personally does not seem to boost the probability of voting for Latinos. In fact some of the most racist and over the top written comments about Latinos came from Chicagoans of all races, but mainly whites. The opposite was true in Californian cities, however, Latinos in Chicago seemed much more politically engaged which I interpret as a strong signal that local institutions matter very much for minority groups to be able to integrate politically, much more than changing the view of the majority about them first.

As shown in Figure 10, below, once these city characteristics are accounted for, the basic socioeconomic model also explains Latino voting behavior; indeed, the persistent negative correlation is no longer there. Latinos of similar education, age, income, nativity, and gender were as likely to vote in the 2008 presidential election as similarly situated White and Black native-born citizens. However, the local institutions do not seem to explain the overall negative correlation between voting and being a citizen of Asian ancestry. Future research should investigate whether this negative correlation is more pronounced in certain Asian American communities than in the rest, and if it is linked to institutional discrimination. An issue with Asian American respondents is that they would often skip the question of whether they were voting-eligible citizens or not, thus part of the negative correlation may be due to the fact that many of them were not citizens. Thirty percent of Asian respondents answered the survey in Chinese, an indication that they probably were not voting-eligible citizens.





*Everything held at mean, not contacted, native

*Figure 10 Above: Estimated logistic regression lines Pr (y_i= 1) = $logit^{-1}$ ($\alpha_{[i]}$ + β*$race_{[i]}$ + β*$X_{[i]}$) of race predicting the probability of voting in 2008 at different educational attainment levels. Below: Estimated logistic regression lines Pr (y_i= 1) = $logit^{-1}$ ($\alpha_{[i]}$ + β*$race_{[i]}$ + β*X_{I} + β*$institutions_{[i]}$ + β*$stereotype_{[i]}$)) of education predicting the probability of voting in 2008 with group level predictors included in the model.*

6. Conclusions

Latino voting patterns in the 2008 election observed at the national level of Latinos with respect to similarly situated blacks and whites is not be replicable at the local level. In cities where local political institutions promote political competition like New York and Chicago the effect of socioeconomic variables (especially education) for Latinos is similar to the effect of these variables for blacks and whites living in that environment. In New York, the baseline probability or intercept for Latinos was similar to that of blacks and whites and the slope as steep (higher levels of education and income will correspond to higher levels of turnout). In cities where local political institutions restricted political competition (Phoenix and Houston) the predictive power of socioeconomic variables (income and education) for Latinos was different from the predictive power of these variables for blacks and whites living in that environment. The intercept in Houston was much lower to that of blacks and whites in the same city and the slope will be flatter than in cities that promote political activity and with respect to the slopes calculated for other groups living in the same city.

The correlation that is observed at the national level between Latinos and low levels of political participation is of a contingent, perhaps even spurious nature. As shown in Table 9, once institutional features that according to the factor analysis measure an underlying construct which for the purposes of this paper was designated as the local political institutional environment, the predictive power of race declines. The political participation of Latinos in the 2008 election is better explained by a combination of the local political institutional environment and socioeconomic factors. The political behavior and attitudes–measured by the voting behavior in

the 2008 presidential election and interest in politics–of similarly situated Latino immigrants varied across localities with different institutions even when holding constant nativity, education, gender, and income. This variation does not seem related to common cultural inherited beliefs and attitudes but to the types of institutional environments that Latinos are concentrated in. The persistent low-voter turnout of Latinos at the national level is possibly explained by the fact that immigration is a network driven process and that most Latinos have settled in localities whose institutions inhibit the electoral turnout of the population in general and the ethnic minorities in particular. It is not possible to compare the particular extent to which the different immigrant national groups integrate into a liberal democratic polity, unless those groups have been socialized similarly and within the same period by the local political institutions.

The findings of this paper suggest that using aggregate data can be misleading even when the population of the ethnic or group in question in the sample is representative of the population at the national level. If local institutional environments are not taken into consideration the results will be biased towards the behavior of the most numerous portion of the group living and having been socialized in a particular environment. This conclusion is not exclusive to Latinos in the United States but to all immigrant groups in western democracies because all are heavily concentrated in a city and influenced by the political dynamics in it. My findings regarding immigrants and immigrant communities of Latino origin challenge the conventional wisdom that immigrant communities exhibit low levels of political participation and civic skills due to inherited religious and cultural traits. The mechanism explaining the differences in attitudes and behavior found across localities some immigrant and minority groups, like Latinos are the different experiences most members of a group have had with the political system. In particular,

I argue that Latinos voting behavior in the United States differ in the amount of exposure to the political events and the opportunities to participate in them with respect to blacks and whites because they are concentrated in geographic regions where the local institutional environment curbs political competition, incentives for parties to mobilize immigrants and poor minorities in general, and this results in less political events and opportunities to participate.

In contrast with Samuel Huntington's influential argument about the reasons behind Latinos lagging in political participation, the empirical findings of this paper show that the in the harmonic political integration of immigrant communities is associated with the exposure to political events and the opportunities these events create for immigrants to learn and participate in the host country. Once certain key political features at the local level are taken into account, the negative correlation that has been established between the act of voting and the fact of being Latino disappears. In addition, my findings are also relevant for political socialization[35] and public opinion scholars because they show that the immigrants' cultural attitudes and behavior are not as stable as some scholars have argued: they vary in accordance with the national and local political institutions of the host nation, rather than with the mindsets that were developed in the sociopolitical environment of their country of origin (or in their ancestor's country of origin.) Furthermore, in countries like the United States, where the local political institutions are so diverse, the overall levels of political participation depend on the concentration of a certain group in a location where the institutions either encourage or discourage the political participation of the citizenry in general, and the political participation of immigrants in particular.

[35] The political socialization literature is unique in that unlike other political behavior or public opinion research that studies changes in the political views or actions of individuals it is concerned with understanding when the baseline attitudes are formed and how this impacts the stability or volatility of these attitudes and behaviors through a person's life span (See Stoker and Bass, 2013; Niemi and Sobieszek 1977 for an overview of this literature and its key debates).

Integrating immigrants successfully into a democratic political system is a matter of central concern to the United States of America (and surely to other democratic countries in the developed world). This paper brings together key insights from the academic literature on public opinion urban politics and on political behavior, in order to motivate a well-founded inquiry into the effects of local conditions on the attitude formation and political behavior of immigrants in the USA. By collecting data in six different political environments, the author of this paper was able to differentiate the question of "national origin" from the problem of "local political institutional effect", in this way attempting to broaden the understanding of how local context influences immigrant behavior. Once the local political environment's key characteristics (political parties' mobilization strategies, city and state political institutions, and local public stereotypes about specific immigrant groups) were accounted for, the socioeconomic characteristics effectively explained the voting behavior of all the sampled immigrant groups. The framework and results presented here will hopefully help move the research agenda beyond proving/disproving whether identities matter for political integration. Identities matter, yes, but identities are shaped by the local institutional context, common ancestry is only picking up, in some cases, shared experiences with the institutions and political context of the host country.

Appendix

Question wording

Race/ethnicity. The advantage of collecting data in person was that the respondents could be asked an open-ended question about how they self-identified, as opposed to forcing categories on them. For the mail-in survey the following question was asked (the instructions allowed the respondents to circle multiple options.)

Q. Which best describes you?

Black White Asian Hispanic/Latino Other (specify) _____

Often the respondents volunteered that they were White, but added they were Mexican too; or that they were Black but had ancestors in Latin American. The country of origin of both parents was inquired of them in order to code the variables that resulted from the main question. For this paper, the respondents were classified as non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic White, Hispanic/Latino of all races, Asian, and Other. The Other category includes the respondents who specified they were Pacific Islanders, Native Americans, or who specified a country that is not found in the African or Asian continents. Below is the combined frequency distribution of all the cities.

Income. This construct was measured as total household income via the following question:

Q. In which of these groups did your total household income, from all sources, fall last year BEFORE TAXES? (Your household includes all the people who usually live in the same home.) (CIRCLE ONE):

Less than $10,000	$50,000-$60,000	$100,000-$125,000
.$10,000-$20,000	$60,000-$70,000	$125,000-$175,000
$20,000-$30,000	$70,000-$80,000	$175,000-$250,000
$30,000-$40,000	$80,000-$90,000	More than $250,000
$40,000-$50,000	$90,000-$100,000	

Education. This construct was measured as the respondents' educational attainment by means of six categories: Less than High School (coded 0), High School (1), Some college (2), Associate's degree (3), Bachelor's degree (4), and Graduate degree (5).

Q. What is the highest grade in school that you finished? (CIRCLE ONE):

Did not attend school

1st grade	5th grade	9th grade	Associate's degree
2nd grade	6th grade	10th grade	College, no degree
3rd grade	7th grade	11th grade	Bachelor's degree
4th grade	8th grade	12th grade	Graduate degree

Age. This construct was measured with the question: **How old are you? (In years).** The response was recoded as follows : 18-24= 0, 25-34=1, 35-44=2, 45-54=3, 55-64=4, 65-74=5, >75=6.

Gender. This variable was measured with the question: **Are you male or female?**

Nativity. In order to find out whether the respondents were native or foreign born, they were asked: **In what country were you born? Inside the US Outside the US (Please specify) _____.**

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SOULS TO THE POLLS!

The Impact of Catholicism on Hispanics Political Attitudes and Behavior, a Revisionist Interpretation

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Introduction

What role does religion play in the political integration[36] of an immigrant? Until the 1990's, the United States, one of the most diverse nations in the world, represented the realization of the idea that all immigrants, regardless of the world religious tradition they were affiliated to, were capable of integrating within a liberal democratic polity. During that decade the surge in the proportion and diversity of foreign-born populations in the United States and Western European democracies reignited debates[37] and fears about the influence of immigrant religious institutions and beliefs. The fear is that some religious beliefs may prevent the development of democratic political attitudes and attachment to the host country's liberal democratic institutions and thus, the political integration of immigrant communities. Huntington in his 2004 *Foreign Policy* article "The Hispanic Challenge" (containing mostly excerpts of his book *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity)* argued that the premise that religious immigrants

[36] For the purposes of this paper political integration is defined as the process by which immigrants develop attitudes and behavior that signal certain attachments to democratic institutions, such the interested in the host country's politics, the development of a partisan identity, and the turning out in local and national elections at similar rates than similarly situated (in terms of income and education) native-born citizens.
[37] For a discussion and a review of the literature on this matter see Will Kymlicka, 2012. *Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future.* Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.)

from all the major world religious traditions can develop democratic attitudes was incorrect, challenging the assumption that all major immigrant groups had been able to integrate politically even in the United States, a country that due to its origins and institutions has accommodated immigrant's demands regarding their religious practices:

> Americans like to boast of their past success in assimilating millions of immigrants into their society, culture, and politics. But Americans have tended to generalize about immigrants without distinguishing among them and have focused on the economic costs and benefits of immigration, ignoring its social and cultural consequences. As a result, they have overlooked the unique characteristics and problems posed by contemporary Hispanic immigration. The extent and nature of this immigration differ fundamentally from those of previous immigration, and the assimilation successes of the past are unlikely to be duplicated with the contemporary flood of immigrants from Latin America[38].

Huntington ascribed the inability of Latinos to integrate to their deeply seated religious beliefs, which prevented them, unlike other immigrants, from adopting the core Protestant values that shaped/ defined American political culture. Huntington argued that the religious beliefs espoused by Latino Catholics were incompatible with Western Christianity (notably Protestantism), the only religion, according to him, attuned to democracy (Huntington 1996, 2004a and b, for a discussion on Huntington's arguments regarding religion and democracy see Stepan, 2000). Huntington is perhaps the most well-known scholar to cite Latinos religious tradition (Catholicism) affiliation as the possible cause for political maladjustment, but other scholars before him have looked into theories involving religious affiliation too, mainly because low electoral participation rates amongst Latinos cannot be explained by socioeconomic factors (De la Garza, 1994; Verba, Schlozman, Brady and Nie, 1993).

For example, Verba *et.al.* (1993) in a study[39] seeking to explain the differences in political participation across major racial and ethnic groups found that religious institutions

[38] Huntington, 2004a, p.32.
[39] They use data from the Citizen Participation Study - a large-scale survey of the voluntary activity of the American public designed to oversample African-Americans and Latinos as well as political activists - to inquire about the

provide opportunities for those who would otherwise be resource-poor (in terms of income, and education) to develop skills that are relevant for politics (Verba *et.al*., 1993, p.457. In their view, the non-economic prospects available to individuals affiliated with religious organizations, such as the opportunity to exercise leadership and communication skills "affect political activity not through an impact on beliefs or cultural values, but through their effect on resources." (Verba *et. al.*1993, 458). Verba *et.al.* found in their study that, unlike blacks and whites in the sample, higher levels of church attendance for the 370 Latinos in their representative national sample (Verba *et al.*1993, p.459) were uncorrelated with levels of participation, they interpreted this finding as an indication that Latino Catholic churches provided less opportunities for Latinos to develop civic skills than other religious institutions due to the more hierarchical structure of Catholic institutions. Though Verba, *et.al.* (1993, 1995) offer a different causal mechanism (the characteristics of the institution rather than Catholic beliefs) their conclusion was also that being affiliated to and attending Catholic rather than Protestant religious institutions was somehow linked to the overall levels of low-Latino turnout. These influential works established Latino Catholicism as one of the possible factors explaining the low levels of political integration for Latinos in the United States.

Huntington's theories and arguments (although mostly based in anecdotal evidence) spread like wildfire for two reasons, first, they justified the nativist rhetoric amongst the political right of the democratic countries that were experiencing unprecedented levels of diversity due to immigration in the 1990's, Huntington provided "proofs" that regardless of the time spent in a democracy or how many generations they had lived in it some immigrants due to their rigid beliefs could not integrate, this was a powerful argument which justified their nativist and racist

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extent and sources of differences in levels of political activity among African-Americans, Latinos and Anglo-Whites. Verba *et.al.*, 1993, p.454)

rhetoric in some of these countries. The second reason has to do with the undeniable fact that even though most voting-eligible Latinos have been in the country for more than one generation, native-born Latinos continue to exhibit lower levels of political participation than blacks and whites[40] and the Latino political behavior scholarship was unable to provide an alternative explanation (See De la Garza, 2004). However, despite his lack of solid empirical data, Huntington's provocative stance that Latino Catholicism is associated with anti-democratic attitudes and behaviors has been largely unexamined with survey data. With very few exceptions (Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001) the American politics literature on political behavior has not empirically analyzed the relationship between Catholic self-identification and church attendance and Latino participation. And, in the few cases where scholars have explored the relationship between religious affiliation and participation (such as Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001; Leal, 2013) they have used national-level surveys, which exhibit the problematic feature of over representing the Southwest (Lasala, 2013a).

This study attempts to fill-in this lacuna, by exploring the relationship between religious affiliation (and attendance) and the political integration of first, second and higher generation Latinos. Using the American Cities Survey, a novel survey conducted at the city level on the political participation of Latinos, as well as secondary sources, I explore three questions: first, does religious affiliation affect the political integration of contemporary Latino communities and thus explain low levels of Latino turnout? Second, are higher levels of attendance at religious services or other activities at a Catholic church, as Huntington's and Verba and coauthors theories would predict, uncorrelated with political participation? And third, did the Catholic

[40] While Asian Americans have also participated at lower rates politically than most blacks and whites, the majority of the Asian American population is first generation while Latinos have been in the United States territory since the mid 1800's. See Elizabeth M. Hoeffel, Sonya Rastogi, Myoung Ouk Kim, and Hasan Shahid (2010) The Asian Population: 2010. 2010 Census Briefs. United States Census Bureau.

Church influence the political integration of Latino communities in the past, thus helping to explain the low Latino voter participation rates historically?

The findings of this paper challenge the notion that Catholic beliefs or participation in contemporary Latino Catholic institutions inhibit levels of political participation. Contrary to what Huntington's and Verba's theories would predict I find that Catholic Latinos are *more*, not less likely to be politically integrated and active than non-Catholic Latinos. Furthermore, I find great variation in political participation rates in different cities among Catholic Hispanics, indicating that the mono causal explanation of prior Catholic non-individualist socialization at the national level cannot explain the Latino political participation puzzle. I offer an alternative theory that helps explain such variation-- radically different forms of political socialization at the local level, in New York and Chicago versus Houston and Phoenix. In contrast with Huntington's theories I find that attendance in the Southwest is *positively* correlated with political integration. Latinos who attend church more often are more likely to vote than those who do not *only in* cities like Houston or Phoenix, where local political institutions do not serve to mobilize Hispanic voters? In cities like New York and Chicago in which local institutions provide adequate channels of participation, individual Latino political behavior does not vary by levels of attendance, nor does it differ from the participation of individuals belonging to other ethnic groups who are similarly situated. Thus, contrary to Huntington views and Verba and coauthors' findings in the 1990's, Catholic affiliation does not hinder the political integration of Latinos, but may actually be playing an important mobilizing role in certain contexts. That this trend is seen only in places where local institutions do not offer adequate channels of participation, implies that it is the lack of these institutions, rather than Latinos' anti-democratic beliefs, which explain their lower participation rates.

My findings are consistent with what Jones- Correa and Leal (2001) find at the national level, however, in contrast to Jones-Correa and Leal (2001) I also find that this relationship varies by locality, and argue that the dissonance between their findings and Verba's have to do with the fact that this relationship has varied over time. The role of the Catholic Church in the political life of Latinos before the 1960's was, unlike most other immigrant churches in the United States, a negative one in terms of slowing down the development of civic skills. Although I have no historical survey data to present, I review secondary sources that point to this fact and perhaps help explain the discrepancies in the results regarding the affiliation and participation among Latinos between Verba et al (1993) and Jones- Correa and Leal (2001).

My findings are not only of theoretical but also methodological relevance. They show that measuring political participation with aggregate national-level data may omit the effect of key variables that operate at the local level. In this case, understanding the participation of Latinos is only possible through city-level surveys that avoid the overrepresentation of places where the political integration of Latinos has been hindered.

1. Religious Beliefs and Democratic Attitudes

Much of today's debate in the United States and in Europe about whether certain religious beliefs and institutions are helping or hindering immigrant political integration are connected to broader conversations about the compatibility of certain religious traditions with democracy. Samuel Huntington (1996) has been the most influential proponent of the claim that certain religions are incompatible with democratic institutions or the development of attitudes attuned to this type of political system. However, his theory runs into problems when trying to

explain the survival and stability of American democracy, and the political vitality of immigrant groups living in the United States who practice religions that according to Huntington are ill suited for a democracy. Huntington (2004a) claims that all immigrants, with a few exceptions, have espoused the fundamental Anglo-Protestant values of the very first settlers who came to America in the Mayflower, which he refers to as the American "creed". "Key elements of that culture" says Huntington, "include the English language; Christianity; religious commitment; English concepts of the rule of law, including the responsibility of rulers and the rights of individuals; and dissenting Protestant values of individualism, the work ethic, and the belief that humans have the ability and the duty to try to create a heaven on earth, a "city on a hill." (Huntington, 2004a, p. 32). Latinos cannot adopt the creed and are simply unable to integrate according to Huntington because they have remained attached to the values of their own religious tradition, Catholicism. Huntington identifies the "Hispanic traits" or beliefs (which he adds are obviously "very different from Anglo-Protestant ones" (2004, p.44) that and explain why Catholic Latinos are incapable of incorporating into the political life of the United States:

> Mistrust of people outside the family; lack of initiative, self-reliance, and ambition; little use for education; and acceptance of poverty as a virtue necessary for entrance into heaven.[41]

Huntington's larger perspective about religion and politics (1996) is not at odds with the ideas of Karl Marx, who said that religion, with its emphasis on otherworldly pursuits, is like opium: It anesthetizes the believers, deadening their capacity to evaluate their actual condition and pursue their material well-being. Huntington's contemporary twist on the Marxist view is

[41] Huntington also identifies other beliefs, but these are not related to the integration of Latino Catholics but about Mexican immigrants, not Latinos in general. I do no discuss these other lines of reasoning.

that certain ‘opiates’ (like Protestant Christianity in the United States) do not ‘anesthetize’ their adherents, but in fact have the opposite effect. Christian religious traditions and values, Huntington argues, attune their followers with the social and political realities, inherently nurturing democratic attitudes.

In his book, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*, Huntington (2004) claims that the causal mechanism behind the differences in the political participation of other minorities, especially blacks, on one hand, and Latinos, on the other hand, is a dissimilar set of Christian beliefs --Protestant and Catholic -- that may be either compatible or incompatible with democratic citizenship. A closer look at the theological arguments and traditions of Protestant Christianity in the United States, reveal that these have differed quite a bit in the black and white Protestant churches overtimes. In fact, the theological arguments that were essential in politicizing blacks during the Civil Rights Movement differed quite a bit from what Huntington describes as the key political beliefs that allowed them to overcome formal and informal barriers to political participation (Harris, 2010). After reviewing the theological foundations of Afro-Christianity in the United States, Fredrick Harris (1999, 2010) shows that from the beginning the Africans slaves who were forced to adopt the Christian faith in America developed a religious worldview that was different from the “white-supremacist infused Christianity that offered biblical justifications for the capture and enslavement of Africans and their descendants” (Harris, 2010, p.259); one of the key differences between black and white Protestants has been the importance Afro-Christianity has granted to *a “collective-oriented* quest for freedom that not only liberates African Americans from political economic and social persecution in a white-dominated society, but also liberates the nation from its failings as a truly democratic society” (Harris, 2010, p.259). The Afro-Christian prophetic tradition that inspired and sustained the Civil

Rights Movement and was essential for the development of the civic skills and democratic inclinations of the black population (Dawson 2001, Verba *et. al.* 1993, Harris 1999, 2010) was not, as Huntington argues, based on dissenting Protestant values of individualism. That is, contrary to what Huntington maintains, black Protestantism has been successful in helping African Americans become one of the most politically active groups in the Nation, precisely because it has refused to fully assume the mainstream Protestant ideal of pure and unmitigated individualism. The basis of Black Protestant theological views emphasized *collective* well-being and social justice.

The assumption that all religions are univocal is at the base of Huntington's argument, but as Alfred Stepan cautions:

> We should beware of assuming that any religion's doctrine is univocally prodemocratic or antidemocratic. Western Christianity has certainly been multivocal concerning democracy and the twin tolerations. At certain times in its history, Catholic doctrine has been marshaled to oppose liberalism, the nation-state, tolerance, and democracy. In the name of Catholicism, the Inquisition committed massive human rights violations. John Calvin's Geneva had no space either for inclusive citizenship or for any form of representative democracy. For more than 300 years, Lutheranism, particularly in Northern Germany, accepted both theologically and politically what Max Weber called "caesaropapist" state control of religion.

I would also add that for the most part, immigrant religious institutions in countries whose institutional design permits the mutual respect and tolerance between religious communities and political institutions[42] tend to *support* rather than curtail immigrant political

[42] Stepan calls the guiding principles of this peaceful interaction between the State and the Church, the "twin tolerations": The first toleration is that of religious citizens toward the state. It requires that they accord democratically elected officials the freedom to legislate and govern without having to confront religious citizens toward the state. It requires that they accord democratically elected officials the freedom to legislate and govern without denials of their authority based on religious claims—such as the claim that "Only God, not man, can make laws." The second toleration is that of the state toward religious citizens. This type of toleration requires that laws and officials must permit religious citizens, as a matter of right, to freely express their views and values within civil society, and to freely take part in politics, as long as religious activists and organizations respect other citizens' constitutional rights and the law. In a democracy, religion need not be "off the agenda," and indeed, to force it off would violate the second toleration. Embracing the twin tolerations is a move that is friendly toward liberal democracy because the embrace involves a rejection not only of theocracy, but also of the illiberalism that is

integration. In a vital religious market place such as the one that has flourished in the United States, where there is plenty of competition, religious institutions are concerned about their competition - they worry about losing their affiliates to other religious institutions giving immigrants better services and addressing their issues more effectively.

Yet, another influential viewpoint in the debate about the role of religion in a democratic State which has influenced the discussion of immigrants and their religious practices has been advanced by the political theorist John Rawls. He maintains that an independent conception of justice, divorced from the different religious doctrines that thrive within a truly democratic polity, should shape political decisions and agendas. Rawls' answer in his *Political Liberalism* to the central question, "How is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?" [43] enjoins us to realize that public arguments about the place of religion in society are only valid when they deploy autonomous conceptions of political justice. Rawls' normative arguments have influenced the debates on whether the religious practices and beliefs of immigrants are an impediment to their integration within liberal democracies in democracies like France where the separation between Church and state is thought to be an essential belief to be able to integrate to a liberal democratic country. For example, Francois Fillon, the French Prime Minister, declared that in keeping with "modern society", Muslims and Jewish immigrants should consider relinquishing the ritual slaughter of animals. "Certain religions," Fillon told

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inseparable from aggressive, "top-down," religion-controlling versions of secularism, such as Turkish Kemalism or the religion-unfriendly *laicité* associated with the French Third Republic and its 1905 "Law Concerning the Separation of Churches and the State".

[43] John Rawls (1993) *Political Liberalism*, New York: Columbia University Press, p.4, p. 151.

Europe 1 Radio on March 5, 2012, would do well to abandon "traditions that don't have much in common with today's science and technology." [44]

The problem is that immigration is by itself one of the most harrowing events an individual can undergo in his or her lifetime (Suarez 2000), and certain public or private rituals help immigrants make the transition less traumatic. Being born in a country that does not consider you a worthy citizen due to your racial characteristics or ethnic religiosity is also distressing. In fact, sociologists Portes and Rumbaut[45] have found that non-white second generation immigrant children have in general a lower self-esteem than those who were born outside of the United States, because many second generation immigrants feel and are treated as "dangerous" foreigners until the groups is able to combat the negative stereotype and transform themselves into "good citizens". As Monroe (2003) has argued a society "on full boil like US" and much like Europe nowadays, where so many immigrants from vastly different backgrounds join:

> Images of us and them stay in almost constant motion. They set the agenda, spark social movements, and shape the political debate. When stereotypes shift, the politics change. We'll see entire groups wrench themselves out of one moral frame and into another. They get transformed --or they transform themselves—from a dangerous class into good people who got a raw deal, pushed down by bigotry or bad luck or big business[46].

It is useful for immigrants and for the American democracy as well to be able to have churches involved in helping immigrants achieve this transformation which is an essential part of the political integration process. It is difficult to develop strong attachments to a society and a country that keeps treating the native born members of the group as dangerous foreigners, religious institutions in America have for the most part been essential in helping native born

[44]"French elections: Prime Minister Fillon prompts halal-kosher row", *BBC News Europe*, March 6, 2012 BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17275842

[45] Portes, A. (Ed.). (1996). *The new second generation*. Russell Sage Foundation Publications.

[46] Monroe, 2003, p.12-13.

immigrants keep trying and also articulating the message through which eventually they are perceived as "good people who got a raw deal" by their countrymen.

In contrast to the argument that favors the exclusion of religion from public life in order to ensure the survival of liberal democratic institutions, and consistently with the proposition that allowing immigrant religious institutions to be present in the public discussion, Stepan (2012 & 2001) argues persuasively that in all the longstanding democracies in the world the containment or marginalization of the major religious conflicts that had been prevalent in previous centuries was achieved thanks to lengthy and often bitter public debates in which the question of religion was the dominant item in the political agenda. The results of a large-N survey (27,000) Stepan and coauthors Linz and Yadav (2011) conducted in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, reveal that in the countries where the national institutions guard against illiberal solutions, higher levels of religiosity (within *all* congregations) were associated with higher levels of support for democracy.

Nancy Rosenblum (2010), looking at the American democracy, also argues that allowing religious citizens to organize and contest publicly what they may consider as an imposition from the dominant majority is quintessential for the survival of a liberal democracy. She cites the Jehovah's Witnesses' petition to be exempted from saluting the American flag made as an example of a theological objection. Resorting to litigation on a religious matter is an indication of a religious minority's commitment to the respect of the Constitution. According to Rosenblum, the judicial resolution of the case which in 1943 exempted the children of this congregation from saluting the American flag highlighted the essential "democratic right of the politically powerless" (Rosenblum, 2010). This case, she says, exemplified the citizens' attachment and acceptance of the democratic "rules of the game", (Rosenblum, 2010, p. 400) although judicial

decisions have not always favorable to the petitioners of religious exemptions (Rosenblum 2010, p 400).

In line with the arguments of Stepan and Rosenblum, I propose that the national, as well as the local political institutional contexts, have influenced the role that Catholic institutions have taken in helping, being indifferent to, or harming the political integration of Latino immigrant communities.

2. Data

The collection of data at the city level was necessary in order to explore how religious affiliation factors in the political integration of contemporary Latino communities, and thus helps explain the present low levels of Latino turnout. As shown elsewhere (Lasala, 2013a) Latino political integration in the Southwest has been dampened due to hostile local institutions which have affected overall Latino levels of turnout at the national level. Thus, in order to explore how Catholicism and higher attendance in Catholic institutions relate to levels of political integration, the data must not over represent the Southwest like most national surveys do (Lasala, 2013a). Beyond the traditional public behavior national surveys, other large surveys that specialize in religion and politics also have similar problems. For example, the Pew Forum's *U.S. Religious Landscape Survey*, the largest dataset available on the religious preferences of American citizens and immigrants, does not have large enough samples at the city level by race and ethnicity to examine these questions. This survey, conducted from May 8 to August 13, 2007 among a

representative sample of more than 35,000 [47] adults is the only dataset with a large enough sample to capture the differences in the religious traditions by state and race among the native-born and the foreign-born immigrants. However, like most surveys, this one relied heavily on telephone landlines for geographical location and under-sampled first generation immigrants who had cell phones.

The differences between the political behavior of Protestant Christians and Catholic Latinos have been the subject of much discussion and much speculation. Specialized reports by the Pew Hispanic Survey have argued that there is a correlation between being Protestant, being more politically active, and being a follower of the Republican Party. The problem is that it is impossible to ascertain on the basis of these large-N national sample surveys whether this is due to the fact that there exists an affinity between Protestant beliefs and Republican views, or to the fact that national samples oversample Latino Catholics living in localities whose political institutions inhibit overall political participation. Other specialized surveys that focus on a particular ethnic group have similar problems. The Pew Hispanic Center conducted a survey of Latinos[48] in 2012. However, since this survey did not collect geographical information beyond the Census regions[49] and since it relied mainly on landlines, it under sampled poor and recent Hispanic immigrants who tend to concentrate in cities and are more likely to use cell phones. Furthermore, this survey only has data for Latinos, thus negating the possibility of examining the behavior of similarly situated Catholic and non-Catholic immigrants that is essential in order to understand the effect of religious affiliation.

[47] Additional over-samples of Eastern Orthodox Christians, Buddhists, and Hindus.
[48] There were 1,220 Latino respondents ages 18 and older, from November 9 through December 7, 2011. Of those respondents, 436 were native born (excluding Puerto Rico), and 784 were foreign born (including Puerto Rico).
[49] The bureau recognizes four census regions within the United States (Northeast, Midwest, South and West) and furthermore organizes them as nine divisions. These regions are groupings of states that integrate subdivisions of the United States for the presentation of data.

The data collected for the American Cities Survey, due to its research design based on address sampling and in-person interviews, had a better response rate among immigrant groups and was able to obtain a bigger sample for smaller geographies. While the 2012 and 2008 Pew Hispanic Center surveys only has 120 observations for all of the Northeast, the American Cities Survey has 238 in Manhattan alone and 884 in all of the five boroughs of New York City; 188 of these individuals are of Latino origin. Also, each city sample was drawn independently. (The sample sizes for all groups are representative at the city level according to the population estimates of the 2010 US Census).

2.1 Measures and operationalization

Dependent variables. I operationalized the dependent variable, political integration, with attitudinal as well as behavioral aspects of this construct.

Strength of the partisan identity, interest in politics. To measure the attitudinal aspects of political integration, or attachment to the host country institutions, I used a measure of the strength of the partisan identity, and one to get and political engagement or general interest in politics. The strength in partisan identity was measured by combining these two questions: *Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?* If the respondents mentioned a party, the interviewer would ask a follow up question: *Do you consider your attachment to that political party strong?* Those who answered "yes" to the second question were coded as "1", those who answered "No, not strong" or did not identify with any party were coded as "0"; those who answered "Don't Know" and "Refused" were coded as missing answers . This question was skipped in the case of the immigrants who were not citizens. Political interest was measured with the question: "Are you interested in politics?" The

"Yes" answers were coded as "1", the "No" answers were coded as "0", and "Don't know" and "Refused" as missing answers.

Voting The behavior aspect of this construct (political integration) was measured through self-reported voting behavior in the 2008 presidential election and the previous mayoral election. The questions that were asked in the survey are the following: *"In 2008, John McCain ran for President on the Republican ticket against Barack Obama for the Democrats. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in that election?"* And, *"Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in the last local election when the current Mayor was elected?"* Yes was coded as "1", No as "0". Ineligible, refusals, and DK were recorded as missing).

Independent Variables

Religious affiliation. The survey asked all the respondents in all of the cities an open ended question*:* "What is your religious/spiritual preference? (Please specify the denomination)". The open ended responses were coded in accordance with the distinctions made by the Pew Forum's U.S. Religious Landscape Survey. Some respondents only gave the name of their church. For example, a respondent simply wrote "Assemblies of God". This answer was matched up to the Pew Forum classification of different religious groups under particular traditions. In this case it was "Pentecostal, Evangelical Tradition". Although this entailed more work than simply giving the respondents pre-coded answers, it helped reduce measurement error substantially[50].

Table 1 below shows the distribution of the denominations as they are registered in the Pew Survey and in the American Cities Survey. Samples are representative of the national scene,

[50] Pre-tests in New York City showed that respondents were likely to circle a tradition even if they were no longer affiliated with it. Those affiliated with an Evangelical church tended to circle "Protestant" or "Other Christian" instead of "Evangelical Christian".

that is, they include foreign-born immigrants and citizens from all the racial and ethnic groups. Notice that the proportion of persons who are affiliated with evangelical churches varies a great deal across cities. Only in Houston and San Jose does the proportion of individuals affiliated with evangelical churches, 18 percent and 16 percent, respectively, come close to the national average of 26 percent. Also noteworthy is the fact that in all the cities there is a proportion of unaffiliated individuals that is higher than the 16 percent national average. Again, only Houston comes close to that range, with 16 percent of individuals whose responses were "not religious", "none", "agnostic", or "atheist". In San Francisco, 49 percent of the respondents said they were not affiliated, that is, 33 percent higher than the 26 percent national average. These distinctions by cities are vague, even with the Pew large N survey data; for example, in California 15 percent of the respondents were unaffiliated.

Table 1. Denominations and religious traditions, national vs. city level affiliation. All included in the sample (native and foreign born).

Religious Traditions /Denominations	**National N=35,000**	**Chicago N=255**	**Houston N=145**	**LA N=213**	**NYC N=707**	**Phoenix N=186**	**SF N=220**	**San Jose N=49**
1. Evangelical Churches	**26%**	**8%**	**18%**	**3%**	**3%**	**8%**	**3%**	**16%**
1. Non-denominational	**3%**	4%	17%	3%	0%	3%	0%	15%
1.2 Pentecostal	3%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
1.3 Baptist-NS	4%	0.01%	0.5%	1%	1%	3%	1%	0%
1.4 7th Day Adventist	0.5%	0.5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%
1.5 Southern Baptist	7%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%
1.6 Evangelical (Other)	8%	1%	0%	0%	2%	1%	2%	0%
2. Mainline Protestant Churches	**18%**	**14%**	**26%**	**16%**	**18%**	**25%**	**11%**	**17%**
2.1 Lutheran	3%	3%	6%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%
2.2 Methodist	5%	2%	6%	0%	0%	2%	0%	3%
2.3 Baptist-Prot. Tradition	2%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	1%	7%
2.4 Protestant (NS)	3%	2%	6%	2%	9%	2%	4%	7%
2.5 Episcopalian	1%	1%	6%	0%	0%	1%	1%	0%
2.6 Friend (Quaker)	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2.7 Other	2%	5%	6%	12%	8%	17%	4%	0%
2.8 Presbyterian	2%	2%	2%	2%	0%	0%	1%	0%
2.9 Reform	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Historically Black Churches	**7%**	**9%**	**9%**	**4%**	**1%**	**3%**	**2%**	**0%**
3.0 Black Tradition (Other)	3%	3%	2%	2%	1%	2%	1%	0%
3.1 Black Tradition (Baptist)	4%	6%	7%	3%	0%	1%	1%	0%
4. Roman Catholic	**24%**	**32%**	**17%**	**26%**	**32%**	**26%**	**14%**	**29%**
5. Mormon	**2%**	**0%**	**0%**	**0%**	**0%**	**4%**	**0%**	**0%**
6. Orthodox Christian	**1%**	**2%**	**1%**	**0%**	**0%**	**0%**	**1%**	**0%**
7. Jehovah's Witness	**2%**	**0%**	**0%**	**1%**	**0%**	**2%**	**0%**	**0%**
8. Other Christian	**0%**	**3%**	**1%**	**0%**	**1%**	**3%**	**0%**	**0%**
9. Jewish	**2%**	**4%**	**0%**	**11%**	**12%**	**2%**	**6%**	**0%**
10. Muslim	**1%**	**0%**	**2%**	**1%**	**2%**	**0%**	**0%**	**0%**
11. Buddhist	**1%**	**1%**	**3%**	**0%**	**3%**	**0%**	**6%**	**8%**
12. Hindu	**0%**	**0%**	**1%**	**0%**	**0%**	**0%**	**1%**	**0%**
13. Other (World Religion, Spiritual, New Age, Native American)	**1%**	**4%**	**7%**	**8%**	**1%**	**5%**	**7%**	**7%**
14. Unaffiliated	**16%**	**24%**	**17%**	**28%**	**27%**	**21%**	**49%**	**24%**
14. Unaffiliated (Agnostic)	2%	5%	1%	5%	2%	3%	7%	0%
14. Unaffiliated (Atheist)	2%	3%	3%	3%	1%	3%	9%	2%
14. Unaffiliated (NS)	12%	16%	13%	20%	24%	15%	33%	22%

Religious attendance

To measure the influence of Catholic and other religious institutions on the political integration of Latinos, the respondents affiliated with a church were asked: "How often do you attend temple/church or other religious or spiritual services?" They were given the following choices: "Never", coded as 0, "Once a year", coded as 1; "About once a month", coded 2; "Almost every week", coded 3, and "At least once a week", coded 4. Unfortunately, only in four of the cities (Chicago, Houston, New York, and Phoenix) were individuals asked a religious attendance question. Below are the frequency distributions by city of all (not just Latinos) in the sample. As shown in Table 2 below, in New York, the proportion of affiliated individuals who never attend religious services is the highest, 25 percent, and in Chicago it is the lowest, 13 percent. The city with the highest levels of religious attendance is Houston, where 52 percent of the respondents reported going to church at least once a week, followed by Phoenix, where 48 percent reported going to church at least once a week. In Chicago, 35 percent of the respondents reported going at least once a week.

Table 2. Attendance to religious services by city. (All in the sample including whites, blacks, Latinos and Asians)

Attendance	Chicago	Houston	New York	Phoenix
0 - Never	13%	19%	25%	17%
1 - About once a year	30%	12%	36%	21%
2 - About once a month	19%	18%	13%	15%
3 - Almost every week	22%	22%	06%	19%
4 - At least once a week	15%	30%	20%	28%
N=	278	154	200	189

3. Findings. Are Latino Catholics less politically integrated than Latino Protestants?

In this section, I examine Huntington's theory pertaining to religious affiliation and political integration using individual level data from the American Cities Survey. Table 3 (below) compares the percentage of Protestant, Catholic, other faith and unaffiliated Latinos who identified strongly with a political party and said that were interested in politics (attitudinal measures of political integration). These percentages and are presented alongside the percentages of Protestant, Catholic, other faith and unaffiliated members of other major racial and ethnic groups in the same cities to gauge whether Latino Catholics are actually less likely to be politically engaged and attached to key democratic institutions: political parties.

Table 3. Religious Affiliation and Political Integration
*(*Measured as the percent of individuals from each ethno racial and religious group who reported being strong partisan & interest in politics)

Party ID Strength*

Religious Affiliation	Black	White	Latino	Asian	Other	*N=*	*chi*
Protestant	**78**	**65**	**54**	**42**	**22**	*207*	*0.05*
Catholic	**90**	**62**	**56**	**53**	**0**	*151*	*0.05*
Other Faith	85	69	42	59	27	*99*	*0.13*
Unaffiliated	**72**	**61**	**27**	**40**	**22**	*173*	*0.04*

Political Interest

Religious Affiliation	Black	White	Latino	Asian	Other	*N=*	*chi=*
Protestant	**88**	**76**	**50**	**73**	**86**	*263*	*0.01*
Catholic	**90**	**70**	**75**	**53**	**74**	*168*	*0.06*
Other Faith	**44**	**90**	**53**	**66**	**33**	*113*	*0.00*
Unaffiliated	**47**	**80**	**35**	**69**	**87**	*238*	*0.00*

**Sample includes only those who said they identified with a political party, Republican, Democrat or other.*

As shown in third column of Table 3 above, there is no significant difference (both statistically and substantively) between the percentage of Latino Catholic citizens who reported having a strong party identification (56 percent) and Latino Protestants (54 percent. However,

the difference between Latino Protestants and Latino Catholics is noteworthy: whereas 75 percent of those who identified as Catholics said they were interested in politics, only 50 percent of Protestant Latinos said they were interested in politics. Table 4 (below) compares the percentage of Latino citizens who reported participating in the 2008 Presidential election and previous local election before. In other words, the attitudinal measures show that there is no supporting evidence for Huntington's claims about Latino Catholicism as being the key explanatory factor of lower levels of political integration amongst Latinos. Moreover, the attitudinal measures (voting in the previous general and local election) shown in Table 4, confirm this result.

Table 4. Religious Affiliation and Political Integration
(Measured as the percent of individuals from each ethno-racial and religious group who reported voting in 2008 and the previous local election)

Voted in the 2008 Presidential Elections

Religious Affiliation	Black	White	Latino	Asian	Other	*N=*	*chi=*
Protestant	**87**	**93**	**56**	**82**	**73**	*298*	*0.00*
Catholic	**99**	**97**	**82**	**90**	**100**	*221*	*0.00*
Other Faith	**74**	**95**	**52**	**89**	**100**	*138*	*0.00*
Unaffiliated	**76**	**92**	**59**	**76**	**100**	*269*	*0.00*

Voted in Previous Local Elections

Religious Affiliation	Black	White	Latino	Asian	Other	*N=*	*chi=*
Protestant	**62**	**80**	**35**	**57**	**29**	*283*	*0.00*
Catholic	**82**	**81**	**58**	**55**	**82**	***207***	*0.01*
Other Faith	**36**	**85**	**60**	**73**	**90**	*133*	*0.00*
Unaffiliated	**48**	**67**	**23**	**47**	**22**	*256*	*0.00*

Catholic Latino citizens who voted in the 2008 election exceeded that of Protestant Latino citizens by more than 20 percentage points. Only 56 percent of Protestant Latinos voted in

the 2008 Presidential election, whereas 82 percent of those who identified as Catholics reported voting. To rule out the possibility that Latinos who identify as Catholics were more likely to report voting and being politically engaged because they are disproportionately better educated, wealthier and older (characteristics associated with political participation), in the next subsection I control for these variables in the logistic regression analysis on the Latino sample only to gauge whether the results found in the bivariate correlation will hold.

The results of the logistic regression of the political integration measures on religious affiliation, confirmed the lack of support for Huntington's hypothesis about Latino Catholics being unable to integrate due to their religious beliefs. In contrast to Huntington's expectation, as shown on Table 5, below, I find that being Catholic had a positive or an insignificant effect on all measures of political integration holding income, education, age, gender and nativity constant on the Latino sample. The results of these four multivariate logistic regressions are presented on Table 5. As we can see in the first and third columns of Table 5, the marginal effects of the coefficients for Catholic religious affiliation in the logistic regressions using partisan id and of interest in politics were respectively negative and positive but small and negligible, less than 6 percent and statistically insignificant. (The marginal effect represents the tangent to the probability curve or the slope, or change in the dependent variable for one unit increase in the independent variable if the probability curve were linear at that point holding all other independent variables at their mean).

In the logistic regressions using political behavior measures as the dependent variables (columns 5 and 7) identifying as Catholic is associated with a statistically significant and *positive* increase in the probability of voting compared to those Latinos who identified as Protestants.

Comparing Latino Catholics with Latino Protestants, holding everything else at its mean we see an increase of 12 percentage points in the likelihood of voting in the 2008 Presidential election. The effect of Catholic affiliation is even stronger when using "vote in the last local election" as the dependent variable. Latino Catholics were almost 17 percentage points more likely to have voted in the last local election.

Table 5. Latinos. Marginal Effects of Religious Affiliation on (Pr) Political Integration
(DV are: Partisanship Strength, Interest in Politics, Vote in the 2008 and Local Elections =1

	Pr(Strong Partisan)		**Pr(Interested in Politics)**		**Pr (Voted 08' Election)**		**Pr (Voted Previous Local Election)**	
Independent Variables	*dy/dx*	*s.e.*	*dy/dx*	*s.e.*	*dy/dx*	*s.e.*	*dy/dx*	*s.e.*
(Base category = Protestant)								
Catholic	-0.025	0.089	0.067	0.058	**0.124***	0.068	**0.166****	0.080
Unaffiliated	0.139	0.132	0.063	0.103	**0.181****	0.074	**0.331****	0.125
Education	0.006	0.014	**0.019****	0.009	**0.042****	0.013	**0.052****	0.015
Age	0.005	0.003	0.001	0.002	**0.006****	0.002	**0.013****	0.003
Gender (1=Male)	0.088	0.081	0.005	0.054	0.066	0.067	**0.136****	0.076
Income (1=$10,000)	-0.015	0.011	-0.003	0.009	-0.008	0.009	-0.003	0.010
Native (1=US Born)	0.113	0.089	**0.108***	0.063	**0.113***	0.076	**0.197****	0.081
N=	168		357		205		213	
Pseudo R2	0.039		0.027		0.01		0.17	

*significant at .10 **significant at .05 or less

The influence of shared Catholic religious beliefs as proposed by Huntington does not explain the lower levels of political integration. The next section explores the question of whether levels of attendance, as theorized by Verba *et.al.* (1993) can help explain the levels of political participation of Latinos.

4. Findings. Are Latinos who attend church more often more likely to be politically integrated?

Verba et al found that the non-economic prospects available to individuals affiliated with religious organizations, such as the opportunity to exercise leadership and communication skills "affect political activity not through an impact on beliefs or cultural values, but through their effect on resources" (Verba *et. al.*1993, p.258). In their study, higher levels of religious attendance for Latinos were not as highly correlated with political activity. They interpreted this finding as an indication that Latinos attending Catholic institutions had fewer opportunities to develop civic skills or other skills that could be translated into political activity than those attending Protestant ones. Leal and Jones-Correa (2001) using NES and the National Latino Survey find that:

> All things being equal, those regularly attending church participate more than those who do not. Neither the centrality of religion in one's life, however, nor having had a personal religious experience are significant predictors of any form of political participation. What this suggests is that churches, whether Catholic or Protestant, offer significant encouragement for electoral engagement. When there is a difference based on religious affiliation, it indicates that Latino Catholics may receive greater encouragement than their Protestant counterparts [51]

The results of Verba *et.al.* may have been driven by the overrepresentation of Latinos living under local political institutional conditions that discourage political activity, but Leal and Jones-Correa's results (2001) are also based on national survey datasets. In this section, I explore whether Latinos with higher levels of attendance (holding religious affiliation constant) correspond to higher levels of political activity than similar levels of attendance to Catholic institutions as Leal and Jones-Correa (2001) have argued. I also explore my theory regarding the greater influence of religious institutions in the political socialization of immigrants in cities where political institutions tend to suppress political activities and events by including city dummies and interaction terms between attendance and city of residence. The data used here,

[51] Political participation: Does religion matter? In *Political Research Quarterly*, 54(4), 751-770.

there American Cities survey does not over represent the Southwest, so my expectation (given what was related in the previous section about the role of the contemporary Catholic church), is that higher levels of attendance regardless of the affiliation will be correlated with higher levels of political activity, especially in local institutional contexts that have depressed Latino and other minorities political participation like Houston and Phoenix (see Lasala, 2013a).

I estimated a logistic regression of the behavioral and attitudinal measures of political integration on attendance without controlling for the local institutional context. Respondents who said they were affiliated with a church, religious or spiritual were asked the follow up question: *"How often do you attend temple/church or other religious or spiritual services?"* They were given the following choices: "Never", coded as 0, "Once a year", coded as 1, "About once a month", coded 2, "Almost every week", coded 3, and "At least once a week", coded 4. As explained earlier only in four of the cities (Chicago, Houston, New York, and Phoenix) individuals were asked this question, thus Latinos from Californian cities and unaffiliated Latinos were excluded from the analysis.

Table 7 presents the marginal effects of attendance on partisan identity strength, interest in politics and vote in the 2008 and previous local election controlling for all the other variables included in the previous model plus the city dummies as well as statistically significant interaction terms. As shown in the first row, the sign of the "Attendance" scale coefficient is negative but statistically insignificant and very small, however this coefficient can no longer be interpreted by itself because I have included a statistical interaction between attendance and the city of residence. I will interpret the coefficient for each city below. The coefficient of Catholic is negative but also insignificant and very small for the attitudinal measures of political integration, it is positive and insignificant as well for the political behavior measures. Holding everything else at its mean value,

being Catholic rather than Protestant in these cities has no effect on the probability of voting in the 2008 Presidential election or previous local election, or on having a strong partisan identity strength and interest in politics.

Table 7. Marginal Effects of Religious Affiliation on (Pr) Political Integration (Measures of Political Integration are: Partisanship Strength, Interest in Politics, Vote in the 2008 and Local Elections =1

	Pr(Strong Partisan)		**Pr(Interested in Politics)**		**Pr (Voted 08' Election)**		**Pr (Voted Previous Local Election)**	
Independent Variables	*dy/dx*	*s.e.*	*dy/dx*	*s.e.*	*dy/dx*	*s.e.*	*dy/dx*	*s.e.*
Frequency of Attendance	0.000	0.069	-0.028	0.039	**-0.082***	0.044	-0.087	0.063
Catholic	-0.029	0.119	-0.013	0.076	0.020	0.083	0.065	0.114
Education	0.014	0.020	0.018	0.013	0.008	0.014	**0.042****	0.020
Age	0.007	0.004	0.002	0.003	0.004	0.003	**0.014****	0.004
Gender (1=Male)	0.066	0.111	0.030	0.074	0.058	0.080	0.094	0.110
Income (1=$10,000)	-0.018	0.015	-0.012	0.014	-0.009	0.010	0.001	0.014
Native (1=US Born)	-0.050	0.114	0.127	0.088	0.091	0.089	0.185	0.108
Chicago dummy	-0.166	0.243	-0.095	0.215	-0.323	0.248	-0.213	0.217
Phoenix dummy	-0.302	0.222	-0.287	0.159	**-0.859****	0.097	-0.297	0.203
Houston dummy	**0.498****	0.159	-0.223	0.252	**-0.766****	0.150	-0.347	0.229
Interaction (attendance*Phoenix)	0.092	0.106	0.064	0.063	**0.295***	0.087	0.125	0.094
Interaction (attendance*Houston)	-0.224	0.293	0.090	0.094	**0.223***	0.095	0.199	0.132
Interaction (attendance*Chicago)	0.065	0.106	0.098	0.080	0.110	0.070	**0.210***	0.110
N=	101		202		123		130	
Pseudo R2	0.1		0.05		0.22		0.19	

*significant at .10 **significant at .05 or less

The effect of attendance varies by city, especially with respect to voting in national elections. As the interaction terms for Phoenix and Houston indicate, attendance seems to suppress the negative

effect of living in Houston or Phoenix. The marginal probabilities for attendance needs to be interpreted taking into consideration the multiplicative interaction term. Table 8 below presents the predicted probabilities of voting in the 2008 Presidential elections for native born, male Latino Catholics in each of the cities. In the first row in Table 8 we can see that never attending church in New York and Chicago is associated with a very high probability of voting among native born male Catholic Latinos of mean income and education (95 and 53 respectively), in contrast, their counterparts living in Houston and Phoenix, were less than 10 percent likely to have voted. Latinos in all cities who attended church more frequently in all cities except New York were more likely to have voted in in the 2008 elections.

Table 8. Native Latino Catholics Predicted Probabilities of Vote in the 2008 Election by City

	New York	Chicago	Houston	Phoenix
0.Never	0.95	0.53	0.10	0.03
1.About once a year	0.91	0.07	0.32	0.19
2. About once a month	0.86	0.83	0.67	0.62
3.Almost every week	0.78	0.91	0.90	0.92
4.At least once a week	0.67	0.95	0.98	0.99
Observations	157	42	17	57

Prediction for Male, Native born Catholics. Everything else at mean (Income= 30-40K, High School, 30 Years old).

An interesting finding from Table 7 is the fact that the Houston residence dummy has a positive effect on party. This difference is not driven by members of a specific party, both Latino Democrats and Republicans who identified with a party, said they "strongly" identified with it. Blacks and whites is the same city also said they were strong partisans. Table 9 presents the differences in party affiliation for Latinos next to the city averages. Latinos in Houston are pretty evenly divided between the Democratic and the Republican Parties so the result does not seem to be driven by either.

Table 9. Percent of Latinos and All City Residents Affiliated with each Political Party
All n=1500, chi=0.000; Latinos n=341, chi=0.0003

		Republican	Democrat	Independent	Other Party
Chicago	Latinos	3	76	16	5
	All	8	67	20	5
Houston	Latinos	25	35	35	5
	All	22	42	32	4
Los Angeles	Latinos	5	49	10	35
	All	11	55	18	16
New York	Latinos	9	67	21	4
	All	11	62	20	7
Phoenix	Latinos	11	50	31	8
	All	25	33	36	6
San Francisco	Latinos	3	57	22	17
	All	6	55	30	9

Finally, attendance seems to be associated with higher levels of participation in local elections in all cities but it was only statistically significant in Chicago.

5. Why Are Catholic Latinos not as politically integrated as other Irish Catholics?

If church attendance in the Southwest is correlated with greater political activity, as demonstrated in the previous sections, why is it that historically the Catholic Church did not succeed in providing opportunities for "resource-poor" Latinos, "to develop skills that are relevant for politics" (Verba et al 1995, p.18) like black and Irish churches did? The short answer is that until the 1960's, when the Civil Rights Movement effectively changed the local political institutions in the South and Southwest, the relations of immigrants with Catholic institutions differed across regions. Whereas the Catholic institutions in the Northeast helped Irish and Italian immigrants mobilize and organize politically, in the Southwest they were

indifferent and sometimes even hostile to the political aspirations of Latino immigrants and citizens. They were also hostile to Mexican American and Hispanic aspiration to become ordained priests which curtailed social mobility and leadership development among Catholic Hispanics.

In the late 19th century, European Catholic priests and bishops were sent to found the first dioceses in the newly acquired territory of the Southwest, where many of the original Mexican residents still lived. They really were not immigrants, but former Mexican nationals who in accordance with the Guadalupe-Hidalgo Treaty were able to become U.S. citizens one year after the end of the Mexican-American War if they chose to remain in the territory. The Catholic churches throughout the United States at the time were dedicated to the service of the growing numbers of Catholic immigrants from Europe, and the clergy who arrived in the Southwest looked upon the region's Hispanic population as kind of temporary nuisance that would disappear within a few years (Leal, 2010). This disregard for Mexican Catholics had the contradictory effect of inspiring a surge of Hispanic indigenous traditions in the southwestern Catholic communities, for example, the *Penitentes,* a Catholic religious group, formed in the 1820's, that reenacted the crucifixion of Christ. This and other passionate displays of Hispanic religiosity both offended and alarmed the newly arrived Catholic bishops, who feared they "stirred anti-Catholic sentiment among Anglo protestants" (Leal, 2010). The Southwestern Catholic churches were particularly severe in the case of the *Penitentes,* denying its members basic liturgical services, such as Communion, until 1974.

The Mexican Revolution and the temporary workers' programs[52] caused a sudden surge in Mexican immigration during the first decades of the 20th century, taking the American Catholic Church by surprise. In the Southwest the church operated under a social and political institutional context very different from that of the Northeast, and it not only discouraged but obstructed the attendance of Mexicans in the white Catholic institutions, promoting instead the construction of new churches for the Hispanic communities (Leal, 2010). These white institutions were intent on enforcing a strict racial hierarchy and at the same time publicizing that Anglo Catholics were law-abiding, trustworthy citizens of European descent who respected the laws of the land. Thus, the Catholic Church in the Southwest remained silent while Hispanic immigrants and American citizens of Hispanic origin endured racial discrimination by the authorities and the citizenry during the first half of the 20th century. This discrimination became much worse during the economic crisis of 1929, an event that also resulted in the deportation 500,000 individuals who "looked" Mexican, among them thousands of native-born American citizens who were forced to leave the US.[53]

The Catholic Church was also disinclined to back the political integration of Hispanics in the Southwest because of the fact that the dominant Anglo congregation's economic interests were directly in conflict with those of the Latino immigrants, the majority of whom were farm workers. During the 1950's, when the farmworkers' movement led by Cesar Chavez recruited thousands of followers, the Anglo growers threatened to withhold money from the Catholic Church if the priests supported the popular crusade (Leal, 2010). Even though a few priests did

[52] Mexican nationals were recruited by American companies through the *Bracero* program, which brought temporary laborers to the United States. See Durand, J., Massey, D. S., & Zenteno, R. M. (2001). Mexican immigration to the United States: Continuities and changes. *Latin American Research Review*, 107-127.

[53] Kevin Johnson, "The forgotten 'repatriation' of persons of Mexican ancestry and lessons for the 'War on Terror'", 2005, Davis, California: *Pace Law Review*.

side with the United Farm Workers, during this period the Catholic Church as an institution tolerated and apparently furthered the enforcement of white supremacist policies. It refused to allow Hispanics to become ordained priests, arguing that "Hispanics were of such weak faith that they could not be priests. Priesthood, like the officer class in the Armed forces was for whites only."[54] The first Hispanic bishop in the U.S. was not ordained until 1970. The Catholic Church's role in the Southwest contrasted sharply with its part in the struggles of catholic immigrants in the Northeast. At the end of the nineteenth century the northeastern Catholic Church was a key element in the support of the struggles of Irish and Italian immigrants, allowing them to become ordained priests at a time when they were not considered White by mainstream white citizenry.

The changes in the political conditions of the 1960's, as well as the increase in the proportion of the Hispanic population in the United States, modified the relationship between the Church and Hispanic immigrants. Nowadays, Catholic churches seem to be playing a role that evokes the strategies of the black churches, whose prophetic tradition inspired the Civil Rights Movement. In the 1960's, John F. Kennedy, an Irish catholic, was elected President. The ecclesiastic authorities realized they had misjudged the supposedly anti-Catholic feelings of mainstream Americans, and decided to lift restrictions on the public displays of religiosity among Hispanics. Also, it became quite clear that the steady increase in the native and foreign-born Hispanic population over this decade and the next meant that soon Hispanic Catholics would outnumber European Catholics. The Catholic Church, like all religious institutions, must grow in order to survive, and in order to amplify its membership the Church had to turn towards the immigrant Hispanic population. The Second Vatican Council, held in 1962, triggered a series of reforms in order to officially establish Catholicism as the "preferential option for the poor"

[54] Leal quoting Sandoval, 2006.

(Leal, 2010, p.321). The Church passed from fearing the anti-Catholic sentiments of the Anglo majority to reclaiming its role as the spiritual guide of the Hispanic minority in the United States.

By the 1980's the role of the Catholic Church with respect to the political integration of immigrants began to resemble that of black churches in the 1960's. For example, during the mass migration of Central Americans to the United States that was provoked by the civil wars in their countries in the 1980's, hundreds of Catholic churches led the effort to provide shelter and protection to those refugees. Many American-born Catholics risked being arrested for harboring non-legal immigrants. The public debates that were activated by the Catholic churches' "sanctuary movement" were instrumental in facilitating the institutional changes that gave Central Americans who fled their countries certain institutional protections and the means to obtain legal residency (Garcia, 2004).

In more recent years, Catholic churches have increasingly promoted immigration reforms, denouncing the discrimination, racial profiling and disenfranchisement of Hispanics in a manner that resembles the protests led by the black churches during the Civil Rights Movement. For example, the leaders of the mobilizations against the Sensenbrenner bill, HR-4437, passed by the House in 2005, that would provide criminal penalties for aiding and abetting illegal immigration to the US, held meetings and organized mobilizations[55] in church facilities. They also delivered political announcements after Sunday mass. Furthermore, Catholic prelates often gave Hispanic activists advice on how to write public announcements and press releases, thus supporting their causes while promoting respect for democratic institutions and loyalty to the United States. The Hispanic leaders of the mobilizations often mentioned that the Californian Catholic priests who

[55] Interviews with Mexican American leaders (Mexican American Leaders in California Survey) conducted by the author under the supervision of Robert Shapiro. Interviews were conducted by phone between May and June of 2006. Participants were selected randomly from a list of 200 Mexican American community leaders compiled by the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Lasala, 2007.

counseled them had been mentored by black Civil Rights leaders who had been heavily involved in helping Cesar Chavez's farmworkers movement.[56]

In the past decade, certain religious institutions that serve other immigrant and minority populations seem to be playing a similar role to that of the Catholic church in denouncing anti-immigrant initiatives as well as racial and religious discrimination[57], and in organizing mobilizations against them. Of these, the "Souls to the Polls" (and its Spanish version "*Almas a las Urnas*") has been the best planned effort, thanks to the Interfaith Immigration Coalition. This coalition is an alliance of faith-based organizations committed to "enacting fair and humane immigration reform that reflects [the] mandate to welcome the stranger and treat all human beings with dignity and respect."[58] The participants in the Interfaith Immigration Coalition have jointly organized over 100 vigils in front of public buildings[59] during official acts, such as a Governor's State of the State address. Through the coalition, diverse religious institutions work together to promote just and equitable immigration policies, to educate immigrant communities, and to serve immigrant populations around the country. In this way, hundreds of national and local religious organizations foster immigration reform by asking their congregations to call their representatives in Congress. The religious and lay leaders of these organizations provide the phone numbers of elected representatives, the telephone scripts for the calls, as well as the training on how to approach local public officials. These initiatives clearly indicate that religious

[56] Ibid.
[57] An extensive review of similar efforts by religious and lay associations of Muslim Americans in Amaney Jamal, "Muslim Americans Enriching or Depleting American Democracy?" Wolfe, & Katznelson, I. (Eds.). (2010)...
[58]Interfaith Immigration Coalition's mission statement in http://www.interfaithimmigration.org

[59] For example: the Alabama Coalition for Immigrant Justice and Greater Birmingham Ministries organized a vigil with over 100 people outside of the state capital during Governor Bentley's State of the State address to "remind the public and decision makers that the struggle for immigrants' rights continues in a state that passed the most harsh anti-immigrant bill, HB 56, ever to be passed in the U.S. The organizing efforts of ACIJ helped to keep such laws from spreading to other states." Official document from The Interfaith Immigration Coalition (IIC) webpage http://www.interfaithimmigration.org.

institutions are mobilizing their members in a manner that encourages the development of civic skills and the engagement with mainstream political practices. They have also organized "neighbor to neighbor" meetings:

> This is a time when people of faith, lay leaders, clergy, allies and impacted community members meet with their Senator or Congressperson. The Purpose of Neighbor-to-Neighbor and In-District Visits is to persuade your senators and representative to vote for immigration reform that prioritizes family unity and provides a pathway to full citizenship. We want to put our faith into action to make sure your senators and representatives understand that their constituents and people of faith care about immigrants' rights.[60]

Besides the organization of these political activities, the Interfaith Coalition has provided local religious leaders with quotes from the Bible and with examples of sermons that may support these actions, offering Spanish translations of these texts to the pastors and priests who serve Hispanic communities.

6. Conclusions

Like Huntington (2004), James Monroe, in Hellfire *Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History*, (2003), provides an answer to the "primal question", that "a new nation, drawn from many tribes and races, always faces: Who are we?"(p.3) that involves summoning the religious beliefs of some of the original settlers, the Puritans. "We are a godly people, a model for the world, a city on a hill. Moral dreams define the nation's ideals; and inspire crusaders at home and abroad---from the revolutions of 1776 to the war on terror two centuries later." (p.3) However, unlike Huntington, Monroe goes on to say that there is a flipside to this characteristic of the American polity:

[60] *Ibid.*

> If moral fervor stirs our better angels, moral fever spurs out our demons. Frightening changes – a new economy, booming cities, still more strangers--- rouse fears of decline. Every generation blames a slacked virtued, un-American "them". […]A society on full boil keeps stirring up the same deep tribal fears: These others do not share our values. They do not understand our religious traditions. They will subvert the virtues that made us rise and prosper. What happens to the city on a hill when it yields power to Irish-Catholics or Chinese Heathens or Mexican-Americans or former slaves or Muslims? What happens if they convert (or marry!) our daughters? […]We'll see entire groups wrench themselves out of one moral frame and into another. [Immigrant groups] get transformed --or they transform themselves—from a dangerous class into good people who got a raw deal, pushed down by bigotry or bad luck or big business.[61]

In a country where there is still a lot of racial discrimination and unfounded prejudice, organized religion has given immigrants the strength to overcome the temptation to take justice into their own hands and instead to channel their energies into activities that will ultimately help them change negative stereotypes. Latinos have been trying to "wrench themselves out" of one moral frame and into another, however, their attempts, including the mobilizations in the aftermath of HR-4437 were interpreted by the media as "threats" by an organized mob of disloyal American citizens who were out advocating the rights of Mexicans. As one of the organizers of the mobilizations in California that surprised the whole country in 2005 revealed in an interview:

> I don't participate marching on the streets, but this time I decided to because I have had the same problem with the majority of white politicians all my life: because their last name is Smith or Schwarzenegger and my last name is [Hispanic last name] they think they are more American. Yes, I participate and give funds to the local Catholic Church's celebration of the Virgin of Guadalupe and attend the procession with undocumented workers who happen to have the same faith, but this does not make me less American. Listen: "Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal…" that's the Lincoln Gettysburg address, I know it by heart, many of them don't. I served my country during World War II when some of these politicians were not even born, or even living in this country, and it does not matter what I did or

[61] Monroe, 2003, p.4 & 12.

> the fact that my parents were born in California, I am still the one being stopped on the street and asked to show an ID by local police and I am always a suspect of not being loyal to my country.[62]

This study's answer to the initial question "What role does religion play in the political integration of an immigrant?" is that this depends on both the national and the local institutional political conditions. Overall, it seems that the contemporary religious institutions that serve immigrant and minority communities in the United States have helped Latino and other immigrants to integrate politically and overcome an immigration regime that severely disadvantages them and perpetuates the negative stereotypes of them as unworthy citizens. However, it is difficult to predict what will happen in political environments where the state intervenes in favor of one religion or tries to impose a hard separation between church and state to the point of viewing halal meat or an inoffensive cultural ritual as a "threat" to the modern liberal democratic institutions. After all, it is hardly coincidental that religious intensity and religious diversity have coexisted peacefully in the United States. For the most part religious institutions have the opportunity and incentive of choosing democracy over violence because the option of 'playing by the rules' in the courts has often been quite effective in terms of protecting a community's interests and preferences (the aforementioned Jehovah's Witnesses case is a good example of this, Rosenblum, 2010).

In most periods, the religious institutions that served immigrant communities in the United States have been powerful allies of the political system, in terms of integrating immigrants and reinforcing liberal democratic attitudes and behaviors, with notable exceptions in the case of Hispanics in the Southwest in the early century. One cannot help but wonder what would have happened if Cesar Chavez and other Latino leaders had had a similar structure of

[62] Phone interview with one of the 20 Mexican American leaders in California that participated in a CU survey. Participants were selected at random of a list of 200 community leaders in the state of California. This list was compiled by the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs through its Consular offices.

support from their religious organizations and more opportunities to develop their leadership skills and training as leaders within their congregations. While the Catholic Church in the United States did not "harm" American democracy by instilling undemocratic beliefs in Latinos or urging them to play outside the democratic rules of the game, they did not, unlike many other (Black?) churches, do much until recently to help Latinos become better integrated. A measure of integration too is the transformation of the negative stereotype of a group as being un-American to a being worthy and loyal American citizens. Latino leaders have not been able to successfully change the negative stereotype of being 'birds of passage', disloyal, politically apathetic or ignorant because their ancestor's country is right 'next door'. Perhaps the '*Almas a las Urnas'*(Souls to the Polls) and the Interfaith Coalition will help accomplish what many Latinos have failed to do for generations: etch in the American mind that they are and think of themselves as Americans. In the end Verba and coauthors might have been correct about the Catholic Church being implicated somehow in the low levels of Latino political integration. Whether it was the church's leadership pre the Second Vatican Council or its complicated sociopolitical situation in the United States before 1960 is a question worth pursuing in future research.

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DOES POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION EXPLAIN ETHNORACIAL DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION?

The Impact of Political Events on the Political Engagement of Blacks, Whites, Latinos and Asians in Six American Cities.

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Abstract

When and how do native and foreign-born Americans become engaged in (or disengaged from) politics? The answer to this question has been at the center of the theories and hypotheses that attempt to explain the persistent group differences in the political participation of blacks, whites, Latinos, and Asians. This paper explores the idea that the differences in the experiences with the political system and exposure to political events explains differences in political participation across these four ethnic groups, the paper uses a set of open-ended questions from the American Cities Survey. Open-ended questions without cues are an ideal instrument to explore political socialization influences at the individual level because they force individuals to think and to pass beyond top-of-the-head responses or ideas recently made salient (Zaller and Feldman 1992, p. 607). The open-ended probes for this paper were designed in this way and were asked of respondents at the beginning of the survey, thus offering the unique opportunity to distinguish those mechanisms inductively. In addition to the question asking about experiences that led to participation, it also included an open –ended question for those who report being politically disengaged. The responses to both questions contribute to three important aspects of political socialization: first, positive socialization influences that lead to political engagement

and how they may differ across groups; second, the absence of political socialization leading to political alienation, apathy, and third, negative socialization influences that led individuals to hold negative feelings towards politics in general and political participation in particular. I find that out of the ordinary political events have *long-lasting* effects on the political attitudes and behavior of all Americans regardless of race, ethnicity, and the way they were socialized by traditional socialization agents (family, school, and teachers). Living through times when 'politics is in the air' has a profound effect on the motivation to remain politically engaged and to participate in national and local elections, especially for those growing up in poorer and less politically active families such as second generation Latino and Asian immigrants.

Introduction

When and how do native and foreign-born Americans become engaged in (or disengaged from) politics? The answer to this question has been at the center of the theories and hypotheses that attempt to explain the persistent group differences in the political participation of blacks, whites, Latinos, and Asians. The Civil Rights movement was successful in lowering the formal and informal barriers to political participation, changing for good the pattern of the low levels of political participation among blacks that prevailed until the 1960's (Verba, Schlozman, Brady and Nie, 1993 & 1995). However, the political participation of Latinos and Asians has remained lower than that of blacks and whites. Since the 1960's, when large-N survey data became available in the United States, political behavior scholars have been puzzled by the differences in the political participation rates of individuals belonging to these racial and ethnic groups because

these differences persist among citizens of similar income, education, age, and other characteristics which for the most part explain the differences between blacks and whites (De la Garza, 2001; Wong et al., 2011; Dawson, 1994; Verba et.al., 1993,1995).

Since the basic socioeconomic model explaining most of the differences in political participation among blacks and whites has failed to explain Latino and Asian political behavior, especially voting (De la Garza, 2004), in the last decade, political behavior scholars have done an impressive amount of empirical research in order to uncover the causal mechanisms driving the differences in the political participation between Latinos and Asians vis-à-vis blacks and whites (Lee, Ramakrishnan, and Ramírez, 2012; Wong *et. al.,*2012; De la Garza, 2001). Their findings have resulted in an increased focus on the unique ways in which Latinos and Asians are socialized politically and the agents and influences that shape their fundamental attitudes. Some scholars have emphasized the differential contact -- in terms of its frequency and quality -- that Latinos and Asians have had with the institutions or agents that traditionally played an important role in socially integrating Americans into the political system such as political parties or campaign workers who spend less time in their neighborhoods mobilizing voters --ethnic enclaves that have large numbers of non-voting eligible residents (de la Garza et al. 2002; Wong et al., 2012). Others have turned to the neighborhood environment and the characteristics of co-ethnics living in that neighborhood in terms of income, educational attainment, social capital and political exposure (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006; Barreto and Woods, 2004; Wong et al*.,* 2011, Ramakrishnan, 2001). In addition, and concurring with hypotheses that have explored the immediate environment, scholars have argued that the reason why older Latinos at the national level seem more politically aware and active than younger ones is that native born Latinos and Asians been overall less exposed to the political system during childhood and adolescence and

develop political attitudes later in life (De la Garza and Jang, 2011). Wong and Tseng (2007), have argued also that second generation Asian Americans learn about the political system in school, challenging parental socialization models.

The common theme of the works in the Latino and Asian political behavior scholars of the last few years is an increasing focus on the political socialization agents and stages as a key explanatory factor of behavioral differences between these groups. However, Latino and Asian political participation studies rarely (i.e. Wong and Tseng, 2007) engage directly with the key findings and debates of the contemporary political socialization scholarship beyond the traditional model that assumes individuals are socialized politically during childhood by the "traditional" agents of socialization, such as parents and teachers and beyond events tied to an individual's life cycle or age-related changes[63], they assume that the basic political attitudes acquired at a relatively young age are stable throughout their life. They do not fully engage with the findings and models political socialization scholars use to explain when political views are acquired and stabilized and why. Socialization scholars rarely use the traditional model that assumes political attitudes and behavior are passed on by parents or teachers at a young age[64] and when they do, they incorporate the two models they have developed based on empirical findings (including longitudinal studies) to explain how political events change the political attitudes of individuals who live in a polity. The first model assumes a life-long openness to political phenomenon, so that when extraordinary political events happen, they have an influence on the political attitudes of all those individuals, regardless of their age (i.e., cutting across generations). This is the 'period effects' model (Jennings and Niemi, 1978). The second model assumes that

[63] For example, marriage (Stoker and Jennings, 1995) or parenthood (Jennings, 1979) or coming of age.
[64] Niemi and Jennings (1978) and other leading political socialization scholars have found that parental transmission of political influence which is a key assumption in the Latino and Asian political behavior scholarship applies to highly politicized families (Stoker and Bass, 2013; Schlozman, Verba, Brady, 2012).

political socialization or re-socialization (change of fundamental political attitudes) can happen only during the formative years (adolescence), between the ages of 13 and 20, when political events of a particular era disproportionately affect those coming of age. This type of model is known as the 'generational' model[65]. Both models have implications for the causal mechanisms driving the differences between blacks, whites and Latinos and Asians in political participation found at the national level, particularly the assumptions regarding the second generation's ability to develop basic political cognition, attitudes and behaviors even if raised in a hostile or non-political ethnic enclave or a non-politicized family.

The fact that political behavior scholars studying Latinos and Asians have not fully engaged with these models is quite problematic for two reasons. First, because even if the institutional, social and political immediate context of these individuals may result in the lack of political incorporation, as de la Garza and Jang (2011) argue[66], there is enough evidence to suggest that political events that are information rich and meaningful, particularly out of the ordinary ones have the ability to act as catalyst of political attitudes and behavior. Even though Latino and Asian political behavior scholars agree that the specific context of an election may have some temporary effect on the general levels of Latino political participation[67] (i.e. competitiveness of the election, mobilization efforts by the political parties) none have engaged

[65] Niemi and Sobiezek (1977) have pointed out that "often the notion of generational effects refers to a particular age cohort that was influenced by a particularly relevant event that such cohort carries with it through the remainder of its life cycle. It thus implies the viewpoint that young adults are particularly susceptible to strong influences. For example, one often hears of the "Depression generation", i.e. of individuals' who came of age during the Great Depression of the 1930s. These people are known to be more Democratic than people who came of age immediately prior to this point in time (Campbell et al., 1960:p. 154), and they are presumably different from earlier and later generations in the way in which they evaluate and interpret politics generally. Abramson (1974, 1975), Cutler & Kaufman (1975), and others have suggested a variety of other generational effects on partisanship, class-related voting, and attitudes" p. 216.

[66] "Their full incorporation into the U.S. political system can easily be hindered by the persistence of informal mechanisms and practices that politically and socially discriminate against minorities" (De la Garza and Jang , 2011, p.910).

[67] Wong, et al, 2012; Barreto and Woods, 2002; Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura, 2001

with the question of how and if period or generational effects found in the population[68] affect Latinos and Asians and permanently override the negative effects on political socialization of the local environment or not. Latino and Asian political behavior scholars have not fully engaged or dismissed the importance of living through national political events that may act as a catalyst for changing or molding basic political attitudes and behavior such as low levels of interest in politics and participation in elections. According to de la Garza and Yang:

> [It] t is still questionable whether these contextual catalysts would have persistent rather than occasional effects on levels of Latino turnout, as the expansion of political participation among Latinos is often interrupted by a number of factors, including social and residential segregation, lower levels of political efficacy and knowledge, and the possible incompatibility between policy issues salient to Latinos and conventional partisan cleavages in U.S. politics (Hajnal and Lee, 2004).

Second, the models and empirical findings using the period effects model as well as the generation model have shown that it is incorrect to assume that most whites and blacks in the population acquire political views during childhood and that these attitudes remain stable throughout their life. Moreover, part of the reason there is congruence between parent-child political behavior and attitudes is because "children and parents are influenced by the *same events*, by interpreting these events through the same media, and by evaluating them with similar frames of reference" (Jennings and Niemi, 1978, p. 217, emphasis added by me). Therefore, to explore the question of whether the differences in political socialization between blacks and whites *vis-à-vis* Hispanics and Asians are driving the present-day differences in political participation necessitates an empirical study that has large enough samples from the four racial and ethnic groups and investigates directly when and how individuals of these four groups become politically aware and integrate into the American political system and if there are

[68] This will be discussed in detail later but socialization scholars find that the generation that became of age in the midst of the Great Depression are more participative, similarly those who were young adults during the 1960's.

differences. Once this has been established, the next step would be to gauge whether these differences in political socialization lead to differences in participation. This paper presents the findings of a study conducted for the purpose of understanding when and how native born blacks, whites, Latinos and Asians become either engaged in politics or disconnected from it – that is, become either interested or disinterested in participating politically – across six local contexts: Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, Phoenix, and San Francisco; and also, whether there are significant differences in the way those individuals who reported being politically engaged were socialized across cities and politically and whether certain modes of political socialization are more likely than others to lead to greater political participation.

This paper will argue that out of the ordinary, historic political events have *long-lasting* effects on the political attitudes and behavior of all groups regardless of their immediate local context and socialization by the traditional model (family, school, teachers and age-related events), particularly the motivation to remain politically engaged and to participate in national and local elections. Although the local political environment provides more regular cues about the political system in general and may explain a greater proportion of the variation in political participation, the period effects model may be the key to the remaining unexplained variation when using local political and institutional variation models. Using the local variation model in conjunction with the period effects model may explain most of the differences in political participation between Latinos and Asians and blacks and whites living in the United States because national representative samples of Latinos and Asians contain a larger proportion of individuals living in the Southwest (especially California, Arizona and Texas) and of younger generations. Living in these contexts which discourage political participation may lead to less political engagement but also being socialized at a historical time that was characterized by

overall decline in political participation and disillusionment in the American political system may reinforce political alienation (Putnam, 1995; Abramson and Aldrich, 1982) The *native* and even foreign born Asian and Latino population is skewed towards the younger generations (see Figures 5 and 6 in section 5) which did not live through major historic political events such as the Great Depression, World War II, the Civil Rights Movement, Martin Luther King, John F. Kennedy and Robert Kennedy's assassinations, Vietnam, and other events that acted as catalysts for a deeply seated and stable interest in politics for blacks and whites in the United States.

To explore the idea that the differences in the age distribution explains differences in political participation across these four ethnic groups, because as the period-effects model posits, individuals are influenced by meaningful political events throughout their lives, the paper uses data from the American Cities Survey. This study designed and implemented by the author to elicit the individual experiences that would be able to identify what influenced the development of political interest the most. Through a set of open-ended questions I also explore the variation and explanatory power of the three political socialization models –traditional, generational and period effects-- across these four groups' blacks, whites, Latinos and Asians in the different local context or cities. These cities were chosen because they have characteristics associated with facilitating or obstructing Latino and Asian immigrant political incorporation described earlier (See Lasala, 2013a). Open-ended questions without cues are an ideal instrument to explore political socialization influences at the individual level because they force individuals to think and to pass beyond top-of-the-head responses or ideas recently made salient (Zaller and Feldman 1992, p. 607). The open-ended probes for this paper were designed in this way and were asked of respondents at the beginning of the survey, thus offering the unique opportunity to distinguish

those mechanisms inductively[69]. In addition to the question asking about experiences that led to participation, it also included an open –ended question for those who report being politically disengaged. The responses to both questions will contribute to three important aspects of political socialization: first, positive socialization influences that lead to political engagement and how they may differ across groups; second, the absence of political socialization leading to political alienation, apathy, and third, negative socialization influences that led individuals to hold negative feelings towards politics in general and political participation in particular.

In the first section I review both the relevant literature on the formation of this basic political attitude (interest in politics) and the main agents of political socialization and summarize the hypotheses offered by the political socialization literature which will be explored with my open-ended questions. In the second section I explain in detail the methods and measures used in the analysis, as well as the coding strategy of the open-ended answers which is consistent with the political socialization models and hypotheses. The results are presented in the third, fourth and fifth sections. The third section examines first the question of "when?" and the fourth "how?" individuals belonging to these four groups became interested in politics. The findings in this section are displayed by racial and ethnic group and by city to examine whether beyond the ethnic group variation there is variation across cities. To explore the question of whether the period effects model explains in part the differences between the four groups, in the fifth section I present the results of the bivariate correlation of a measure of stable political participation (whether the person voted in the past presidential and local elections, in only one of these, in both or in neither of the past elections) and the modes of political socialization. I also present a multivariate analysis which examines the predictive power of the period effects model

[69] This method was used by Zaller and Feldman (1992) to explore popular understandings of public policy preferences by combining open and close-ended questions.

(or the exposure to extraordinary political events) on the measure of political participation controlling for socioeconomic, demographic characteristics as well as local political conditions.

1. Political Socialization of Native and Foreign Born Citizens in the United States

The theoretical framework offered by the political socialization literature is useful in understanding the differences in political participation among blacks, whites, Latinos and Asians because it has identified the main agents of socialization for individuals living in the United States (mainly family, school, peer groups, political events or actors in the media, and unprecedented political events or "shocks" to the political system that may result in generational effects, Niemi and Sobieszek 1977) and has led to specific hypothesis about the impact each of these agents or events can have on the stability or instability of political attitudes. In this section I summarize the hypotheses offered by this literature and explain the ways in which my open-ended questions will explore their influence on the individuals belonging to each of the groups (blacks, whites, Latinos and Asians).

Political socialization studies may be broadly defined as "the research of the political education of the persons who live within a specific political system" (Greenstein, 1968 p.551). For the purposes of this paper, political socialization is defined as the "developmental processes by which [individuals] acquire basic political cognition, attitudes, and behaviors" (Niemi and Sobieszek 1977) and once they form or crystallize, what causes them to change. The political socialization literature is unique in that unlike other political behavior or public opinion research that studies changes in the political views or actions of individuals it is concerned with

understanding when the baseline attitudes are formed and how this impacts the stability or volatility of these attitudes and behaviors through a person's life span (Stoker and Bass, 2013; Niemi and Sobieszek 1977). The research agenda of the political socialization literature since then has been guided by questions like: "Are many adult changes only apparent, arising from differences among succeeding generations? Or are there well-defined stages to adult political development? Are most changes a reaction to events, especially major or catastrophic ones?" (Niemi and Sobiezek 1977, p.211).

Initially, political socialization studies were focused on political learning at the pre-adult age and the family as the primary source of influence. Scholars in the 1940's and 1950's claimed that the formation of basic political ideas and attitudes began during childhood. The family was an important source of political attitudes. Parental influence on children was revealed in their partisan identification and voting behavior upon arriving of age. (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954, Ch. 6-7, Campbell et al., 1960, Ch. 7). However, longitudinal studies in the late 1960's "substantially revised earlier conclusions about the family as an agent of political socialization", finding that there were "small or no correlations between political ideas of parents and their children" (Niemi and Sobieszek, 1977, p. 209)[70]. These studies influenced the political socialization literature in the 1970's when scholars shifted their primary focus away from childhood and the family's influence and began exploring the development of political attitudes in adolescence and adulthood. However, the importance of the family as a crucial agent in the

[70] As Niemi and Jennings (1977) have stated, "When Hyman in 1959 summarized existing political socialization studies, a conclusion of high rates of transmission from parents to children seemed warranted. Studies he cited showed correlations as high as 0.8 and 0.9 between the attitudes of parents and their offspring. Moreover, studies of partisanship, at least as typically interpreted, supported this conclusion (Maccoby, Matthews & Morton 1954; McClosky & Dahlgren 1959; Campbell et al., 1960:146-49). Reporting on a national sample of high school seniors and their parents, they found that correlations between the attitudes expressed by seniors and those expressed independently by their parents were below 0.40 for a variety of political issues, groups and values-with the sole exceptions of partisanship and candidate preferences. Their results were also supported by an imaginative sibling study by Hess & Torney (1967:97-99), which found that siblings were little more similar than matched pairs of non-siblings."

formation of political opinions is still being debated mainly because in the aggregate, despite the low rate of agreement between parents and their children, parents and the young's opinion are similar. Jennings and Niemi (1977) have suggested "the explanation for aggregate similarity coexisting with low pair similarity is much simpler. It may simply be that children and parents are influenced by the *same events*, by interpreting these events through the same media, and by evaluating them with similar frames of reference" (p. 217, emphasis added by me). Others scholars too have found supporting evidence of this argument because the type of communities children grow up have a long lasting effect in terms of political engagement. For example Pacheco and Plutzer (2008) find a negative effect between neighborhood poverty and civic engagement levels, while Gimple and Lay (2005) find children growing up in a politically rich and competitive environment are more politically engaged.

In order to examine this hypothesis alongside the parents' influence hypothesis, I separated the responses that directly address the family as the main influence in developing political interest, from the responses that mention political events directly or indirectly experienced during childhood (for example, attending a political rally or watching an event on TV). Even though the frame for evaluating the events may have been dictated by the parents, what stands out in the self-reported memory is the event itself (and not the parents' interest in politics) as the main influence on becoming politically engaged.

Education remains one of the biggest predictors of political participation in the United States (Schlozman et.al. 2012) for all groups except Asians. This is one of the reasons studies that focus on the influence of elementary, high school, and college education on the acquisition of political attitudes in the political socialization literature are useful for understanding group differences. Overall the political socialization literature that has focused on the effect of

classroom experiences has yielded mixed results. For example, elementary school education and civics classes in the United States have not demonstrated an effect due to early schooling that is independent from other early childhood influences, such as the family (Jennings and Niemi, 1978). However, Wong and Tsen (2007) have shown that second generation Asian American children learn about the American political culture through the school system, and that this not only socializes the children but also their parents. Studies focusing on classroom experiences during high school found an effect on political attitudes only when a teacher emphasized a particular point of view repeatedly (Lipset 1971) or when in was in combination with a vivid and information rich political event, such as a Presidential election. This is noteworthy because political socialization scholars have theorized that high school classroom experiences are undoubtedly important, since at the time individuals develop the cognitive capacity to deal with political ideas and are more susceptible to change.

High school peer groups have been found to have the most significant effect (Niemi and Sobiezek, 1977). However, it is unclear whether the influence of peers and the general environment in school is independent from the classroom experience itself (Niemi and Sobiezek, 1977, p. 233). In order to distinguish the different effects of the school (classes and teachers) and its environment (peer influence and networks), I sorted out the responses of the open-ended answers accordingly. Since the answers were two or three sentences long, the distinction could be easily established between the answers that referred to a teacher's influence or to a class (viz., a Civics class, an American History class, a Government class, etc.) – all of which I grouped under the category "School" – and the responses that referred to the college environment or to a peer in school who was very interested in politics – all of which I grouped under the category "peers or social network".

Whereas the early political socialization literature focused on pre-adult political socialization and what are known as the "traditional" agents of socialization, such as the influence of parents and of school and the persistence of attitudes, the next wave of studies in the late 1970's to the present have focused on less traditional agents, such as the political environment, the media as well as the alteration of political attitudes at mainly during adulthood. Theories and studies regarding the effects of political events and the political environment have been ubiquitous in the political socialization literature since the 1970's. Political socialization scholars use three models to explain how political events change the political attitudes of individuals who live in a polity. The first model assumes a life-long openness to political phenomenon, so that when extraordinary political events happen, they have an influence on the political attitudes of all those individuals, regardless of their age (i.e., cutting across generations). This is the 'period effects' model (Jennings and Niemi, 1978). The second model assumes that political socialization or re-socialization (change of fundamental political attitudes) can happen only during the formative years, between the ages of 13 and 20, when political events of a particular era disproportionately affect those coming of age. This type of model is known as the 'generational' model[71]. Both models have implications for the causal mechanisms driving the differences between blacks, whites and Latinos and Asians in political participation found at the national level, particularly foreign born citizens and the second generation's experience of political events which may be mitigated or exacerbated if they were raised in an ethnic enclave.

[71] Niemi and Sobiezek (1977) have pointed out that "often the notion of generational effects refers to a particular age cohort that was influenced by a particularly relevant event that such cohort carries with it through the remainder of its life cycle. It thus implies the viewpoint that young adults are particularly susceptible to strong influences. For example, one often hears of the "Depression generation", i.e. of individuals' who came of age during the Great Depression of the 1930s. These people are known to be more Democratic than people who came of age immediately prior to this point in time (Campbell et al., 1960:154), and they are presumably different from earlier and later generations in the way in which they evaluate and interpret politics generally. Abramson (1974, 1975), Cutler & Kaufman (1975), and others have suggested a variety of other generational effects on partisanship, class-related voting, and attitudes" p. 216.

Also, if as Miller and Shanks (1996) have suggested differences in political participation, especially turnout is generational, those who came of age during the New Deal in the 1930's participate at higher rates than those born later; this could explain why Latinos and Asians participate less too. The proportion of the Asian and Latino voting eligible immigrants socialized in the post New Deal era are more numerous than those who became of age during or after the Great Depression and the New Deal. Finally, the third model refers to changes during the adult life cycle: "as individuals move through adulthood and gain experience with the political system, they tend to develop greater political knowledge (Deli Carpini and Keeter 1997, Ch. 5), a stronger sense of party identification (Converse 1976), a richer set of party images and more consistent set of partisan and ideological orientations (Stoker and Jennings 2008)" (Stoker and Bass, 2013). Even though contemporary scholarship ascribes to this dynamic view, most of their evidence comes from survey data at one point in time.

The results of a longitudinal study by Jennings and Niemi, "The Persistence of Political Orientations: An Over-Time Analysis of Two Generations" (1978) was instrumental in showing the degree to which political attitudes and behavior change at all ages, and the fact that there was a life-long openness to change as a response to the political environment -- all of the day-to-day political phenomena -- especially when politics were at the forefront of the news, as happened in the 1960's 1970's and eventually during highly competitive presidential elections. In this study, Jennings and Niemi found high levels of instability in political attitudes, even among middle aged adults, in the absence of these life-cycle changes. Until then, changes in attitudes and behavior during adulthood were theorized to happen only because of what the literature referred to as 'life-cycle' explanations, such as aging, the recent completion of higher education, a recent

marriage, the birth of children, the settlement in a new community, and the undertaking of a new occupation (Jennings and Niemi, 1978).

In line with Jennings and Niemi findings, this paper advances the proposition that the observed correlation between age and participatory behavior in Latinos and Asians (as well as for blacks and whites) has less to do with life-cycle effects and more to the generational and period effects of living during a time when the political sphere was highly salient. Younger immigrants as well as older immigrants who came to the US or were born after the 1970's were socialized in an era where politics were perceived to be less consequential than in the previous decades. It is difficult to distinguish generational and period effects from life-cycle effects at a single point in time because politically active middle-aged adults may have also experienced an extraordinary political event in their childhood or while coming of age.

Political scientists who try to make sense of the general decline in political participation amongst Latinos and Asians, as well as the persistent levels of lower turnout over time, have often evoked these models in order to explain this phenomenon. For example, Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) argued that the adoption in 1969 of the 26th amendment (the change in voting age from 21 to 18) accounted for the general decline in turnout, because the young voters tend to be less politically active than the older ones. However, as the present paper will argue, while life-cycle effects may be partially responsible for more experience and exposure to the political system, political events that individuals experienced during the 1960's and 1970's such as the Civil Rights Movement and other out of the ordinary occurrences, such as the assassination of President Kennedy as well as the economic crisis and Presidential election in 2008 have an effect to *all* who have political views that are "weakly held, poorly integrated and resting on fragmentary knowledge" (Stoker and Bass, 2013, p.457) regardless of their age. While education

may help to integrate these events better, during times when politics are highly visible there is an abundance of information and motivation to pay attention and participate in politics, which may act as a catalyst, because political orientations such as party identification may crystallize and stabilize. In sum, this paper argues that change is not linear thorough adulthood, except when individuals enter adulthood with relatively well-formed political opinions, as in the case of those who grew up in politically active families and neighborhoods. It proposes that extraordinary political events such as the New Deal, the Vietnam War and others played a significant role in making older voters more active -- not simply because they were older, as Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) have suggested, but because these events play a catalytic socializing role for all of those citizens that grew up in a household or environment that was very politicized.

Separating generational from life-cycle effects in native-born population of blacks, whites, Latinos and Asians has been particularly difficult because older adults in the polity who are actually more politically active experienced many of these extraordinary events and became of age during the 1960's and 1970's. This also poses additional complications for the study of Asian and Latino political attitudes and behavior, because it is not clear whether the most active older Latinos and Asians participate more because they are older or because they had more exposure to the political system, having lived through the times when politics were at the forefront of daily life. My research design addresses the challenge of differentiating both the generational effects and the period effects, from the life-cycle effects on political engagement. The open-ended questions proved effective at untangling these effects, since people were given the opportunity to elaborate upon their responses and usually mentioned a factor like the recent completion of higher education, a recent marriage, the birth of young children, retirement, or a political event. As it will become apparent in the results section, the answers were

straightforward and unambiguous, even when a life-cycle was responsible for the fact that a person had become politically engaged. I decided to group extraordinary political events (viz., the Great Depression, Watergate, 9/11, the Vietnam War, Kennedy's assassination) in one category, "Political Shock", and to assume that generational/period effects operate when these types of political events are mentioned. In line with Jennings and Niemi (1977) and as explained in the introduction the main hypothesis of this paper is that political shocks permanently alter the political attitudes of all, particularly those that who have political views that are "weakly held, poorly integrated and resting on fragmentary knowledge" (Stoker and Bass, 2013, p.457) at the time of the event or series of events. These individuals become interested in following and understanding politics for a sustained period of time after the event and this may result in the crystallization of political attitudes such as party identification and interest in politics which may permanently change behavior as well (from non or low participatory behavior to highly participatory).

Most ordinary (Presidential elections) as well as out of the ordinary (9/11) national events have been experienced through the mass media by most Americans. The media gained prominence as a key agent that molded and altered the attitudes of individuals in the years following World War II as radio and TV became widely used in America and specialized and student newspapers proliferated in the 1960's (Niemi and Sobiezek, 1977). The media allowed the communication of political events directly and strikingly, instead of being filtered through parents, teachers, and other traditional agents and it diminished the relative importance of indirect sources of information (parents, teachers and peers) about the political environment. Initial research noted that the relative impact of peers, family, and schools (which may have been different from that of the political environment) on political learning was diminished by the

major changes in the quantity and kind of the informational and communicational channels, such as radio and underground newspapers, which were available to individuals and resulted in generational differences vis-à-vis a certain number of salient political attitudes, particularly those linked to sex-related issues (such as abortion) and to civil rights questions in the 1960s (Niemi and Sobiezek, 1977). It has been challenging to differentiate the effects of the mass media from the actual political events, because it is unclear when the media's accounts serve primarily to reinforce attitudes developed in other ways (Sears and Whitney, 1973; Zaller 1992) and when it serves as an agent of political socialization.

The political socialization literature does not distinguish between the immediate political environment in the neighborhood or city of residence, and the national environment and national political events experienced through the media. My research design allows me to make this distinction, which I think is fundamental in order to understand whether the differences in political participation may be due to the more regular exposure of some groups to political events experienced directly -- attending a rally, meeting a political candidate, being mobilized by a political party -- rather than indirectly through the media, for example, by means of the transmission of presidential campaigns and debates. Much of the Latino and Asian political behavior literature is based on the assumption that the differences in the political socialization of these groups vis-à-vis blacks and whites are derived from the fact that the latter experience a more direct contact with parties, candidates, and institutions and thus are more exposed to the political system (Lee, Ramakrishnan, and Ramírez, 2012; Wong et al., 2011; De la Garza, 2004). To test this hypothesis, I separate the responses that refer to direct contact with local politics from other responses that refer to ordinary political events, without specifying the way in which the contact occurred -- thus assuming that it occurred through the media.

With respect to the individuals' lack of political socialization and political engagement in the polity, most of the political socialization literature, as well as the political participation literature, have emphasized the 'resources' available to the individual or the 'costs'. Resources[72] have been broadly defined by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) as a combination of high socioeconomic status (educational attainment, income, knowledge) as well as free time, and access to a social network or institution that could transmit the knowledge needed to engage in political acts. The other hypothesis points to apathy, that is, individuals may have the resources (mainly education, time) to participate in politics, but they simply do not find this as interesting or meaningful as other social activities and pastimes. Some political scientists argue that the decline in turnout and political engagement has to do with a decline in social capital (Putnam, 1995) and with the decreasing influence of certain social groups as transmitters of information – for example, the family, the churches, and the communal organizations. These groups not only transmitted information but helped individuals of lower socioeconomic status and fewer resources to understand the political realm and to appreciate why politics are relevant for individuals (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). Recent studies (Gronlund and Setala, 2007) have explored the distrust in government institutions as an explanatory factor behind the lack of

[72] As eloquently and succinctly discussed by Eric Plutzer (2002): "Most research on turnout has been guided by a focus on resources that help voters overcome the costs of voting. Dozens of resources have been linked to turnout, including, most conspicuously, various aspects of socioeconomic status, especially education (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Miller and Shanks 1996). Scholars also have examined cognitive resources such as political knowledge (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), indicators of political engagement such as newspaper readership and political interest (Campbell et al. 1960; Strate et al. 1989), and indicators of community involvement and stake-holding such as home ownership (Milbrath 1965; Verba and Nie 1972), social networks(Zipp and Smith 1979; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), marriage (Stoker and Jennings 1995), and church and civic involvement (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Scholars have also examined factors that increase the costs Of voting. Geographic mobility, for example, can substantially increase the barriers to voter registration (Squire, Wolfinger, and Glass 1987). Others have explored the disruptive effects of severe hardship (Rosenstone 1982) and the exhaustion and time demands associated with raising young children (Plutzer 1998). The twin foci of resources and costs have yielded a large number of research findings but not a good sense of how the many factors fit together or when and where variables will matter most. That is, the many findings do not yield a set of conditions and qualifications that marks a mature theory." p. 41.

political participation and political engagement, since the citizens criticize the government for not being sufficiently organized according to widely endorsed democratic norms, such as responsiveness and political equality – that is, there is a growing frustration with the overwhelming influence of organized interests and a mounting suspicion of widespread official corruption. Other scholars (Hetherington, 1999; Plane and Gershtenson, 2004; Anasolbere and Iyengar, 2010) have also found that negative campaigning or the distrust in political actors, including politicians, political parties and incumbent governments, has a negative effect on turnout. I myself examine whether these are factors that also contribute to the lack of political engagement. While it is sometimes assumed that Latinos and Asians do not participate or engage in politics because they are not sufficiently socialized, an alternative explanation may be that they represent the more likely candidates for developing a distrust in the political actors and institutions, given the massive deportation campaigns during the present Obama administration and the lack of policies that address their social priorities (healthcare, employment, and education). Blacks are also ideal candidates for being politically disengaged, not because they have never being sufficiently socialized in order to become interested in politics, but due to the their continuous negative interactions with law enforcement in the past decade and to the sustained neglect of their policy preferences by political leaders (for a discussion, see Weaver and Lerman, 2010, *Political Consequences of the Carceral state*).

With regards to the socialization or *re*-socialization of foreign-born individuals, political behavior scholars have used the hypothesis and the work of political socialization scholars to explain the process through which these individuals integrate into a new political system. Interestingly, they have both retained some outdated assumptions, such as the persistence of early socialization, and downplayed the role of political events and of the political environment.

The political socialization literature identifies three competing explanations of the way in which first generation immigrants are *re*-socialized politically in the host country. First, the resistance hypothesis -- rooted in the classic political socialization theory -- states that most political predispositions are acquired early in life and deepen over a relatively short period of time (Merelman 1986, p. 279). Pre-immigration beliefs may be resistant to change because "orientations that are acquired earlier in life filter subsequent information, and new knowledge is incorporated in ways that typically conform to existing orientations" (White et al., 2008). The second hypothesis focuses on exposure: immigrants who are more frequently exposed to the new political system integrate faster (for example, they live in neighborhoods where the political parties are more active, attend religious services at institutions where the religious leaders discuss politics, reside in a neighborhood where the co-ethnics or the neighbors are politically active and socialize the immigrants). Finally there is the "transfer" hypothesis, which proposes that the immigrants who were exposed to any type of political system in the past transfer to the host system some of their knowledge and basic attitudes. This hypothesis is somewhat similar to the resistance hypothesis, in that it emphasizes orientations that were acquired earlier in life, such as an interest in politics that will be transferred to the new political system in the host country. Past research has found no empirical evidence supporting the resistance hypothesis: pre-immigration beliefs and actions do not appear to be resistant to change (White et al., 2008). In contrast, other studies have found some evidence for the transfer hypothesis, showing that the immigrants who acquired an interest in politics in their country of origin would maintain it in the new political system. I coded as a separate category the answers of the respondents who mentioned an interest in their home-country politics as the reason behind the willingness to participate in American

politics, in order to explore the relative influence of the country of origin beliefs in comparison with the political events and the political environment.

This paper will argue, in accord with the exposure hypotheses that the immigrants from Asia, Africa and Latin America in the United States are more politically active the longer they have lived in the United States (Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991; Wong 2000; Arvizu and Garcia 1996; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). However, this paper's original contribution with respect to the political socialization of the foreign-born lies in its exploration of whether it is a matter of exposure over time, of exposure to extraordinary political events, or of direct contact with political events or actors. In addition, with few exceptions (Schildkraut, 2011, Vargas Ramos, 2003) the exposure hypothesis is assumed to have only positive effects (the more immigrants are exposed and gain experience and understanding to the American political system, the more engaged and participative they will be). However as Vargas Ramos (2003) has found, Puerto Ricans are more participative and engaged in Puerto Rico and the longer they live in the United States the less participative they become. Schidlkraut (2011) has found that Latinos who experience discrimination develop a weaker partisan identity and participate less than those who do not. Finally, as found in another paper (Lasala 2013a), naturalized Latino citizens political behavior in the 2008 presidential election was particularly sensitive to the local political and institutional environment.

2. Data, Measures

The data used to explore the hypotheses of the political socialization and participation literature described above is the American Cities Survey (see appendix for details). Two open-ended questions were asked at the beginning of the survey and several versions of the questions were

tested. The idea was to come up with a question wording that would reveal how respondents thought about politics (political actors as well as government institutions and policies) and what values or considerations went into being politically engaged or disengaged without priming them or suggesting any categories. The hypotheses/models regarding the agents that shape the basic political attitudes of native-born and foreign-born individuals used by the political socialization scholars and Asian and Latino political behavior scholars were used to classify and code the answers to the following: "Please describe briefly as best you can when and how you first became interested in politics." In addition, I added a few categories that came up repeatedly and represented at least ten percent of the answers in a group. Some of these categories (habit of voting, serving in the military and civic duty) also speak to the political science literature trying to explain turnout. For example Donald Green (2003) and Eric Plutzer (2002) have found that individual turnout is explained by the fact that voters have a propensity to settle into habits of voting and not voting.

Enough respondents said that they became interested in politics as a result of participating in the first election they were eligible and have been interested ever after. Finally, behavioral (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954) and formal (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968) scholars attempting to explain electoral participation(voter turnout) have often turned to individuals sense of duty towards the nation or civic duty to explain why people vote even when there is a very slim chance their vote will affect the outcome of the election. Many respondents could not recall a specific event or named an agent as the reason they became interested in politics. They expressed that they were interested in politics because "it was their duty as citizens" or something similar, so I coded these responses as "Civic Duty". Tables 1 and 1.2 illustrate the coding scheme utilized and the final set of categories that will be used for the

analysis. I used coders to read through the answers group similar answers and were not given a coding scheme. For example, in the case of the first probe "How and when did you become interested in politics?" Most respondents gave their age or school year which was coded into three categories: Childhood (0-12), Teenage years (13-18) and Adulthood (18 and above). When the subject did not reveal the time in his or her life when interest began the "when" code assigned was missing. In the description of how they first became interested in politics coders simply grouped answers that used similar language and /or referred to a similar even. This resulted in 60 categories which were then collapsed into the categories shown in Tables 1 and 1.2 below. Coders were unaware of the main hypotheses of the study and most did not participate in the field research to make sure they were not interpreting the answers based on the face to face interaction but rather on the written answer.

The substantive codes for those explaining why they were *not* interested in politics resulted in 35 discrete categories. There were a lot fewer categories because people used very similar words and expressions to explain why they were not interested in politics. The 35 categories were easily combined in to 5 categories because most answers either reflected one of the five categories in Tables 1 and 1.2 above.

Table 1. Political engagement & Political Socialization Hypotheses/Models	
How did you first become interested in politics?	
TRADITIONAL SOCIALIZATION MODEL (STABLE POLITICAL ATTITUDES)	
Family	"My parents were politically active." "My parents were both voters and interested in elections." "My parents taught me to care about who is running my government" "My Mother always took me to vote with her and explained why it was important when I was a child".
School	*The respondent talked about taking a class or about a teacher.*

	"I had to take a political science class in college. Since it was taught properly, I became more interested in politics. By taught properly, I mean the teacher was very good."
Peers	*Mainly in college or high school, but answers that mentioned co-workers or friends were also included here* "Late 1960's college in Madison, Wisconsin, student co-op."
Life-cycle	*Marriage, birth of young children, settling in new communities, and undertaking an occupation.* "When my children started to grow I started to think about it for us and I hoped I could participate."

POLITICAL EVENTS: **PERIOD EFFECTS(LIFE- LONG OPENNES TO POLITICAL EVENTS) AND GENERATIONAL EFFECTS SOCIALIZATION MODELS**	
Political Shock	*Extraordinary events: 2008 recession and presidential election, 9/11, Gulf Wars, Vietnam, JFK's, RFK's or MLK's assassinations , Civil Rights Movement, Watergate, WWII, Great Depression* "When I was a child, and Watergate coverage kept interrupting my cartoons"; or "The current recession and the bailouts that followed the market crash"; and "As a teenager, during the Vietnam War."
DIRECT AND INDIRECT EXPOSURE TO ORDINARY POLITICAL EVENTS	
Political Event (direct experience)	*Answers refer to a direct experience with a candidate, politician, party, campaign, institution, or protest.* "Childhood. I volunteered to pass out leaflets for a local politician and I was hooked."
Table 1 Continued: Political engagement & Political Socialization Hypotheses/Models	
Political Event (indirect experience, media)	"Inspiration of Ronald Reagan and the inabilities of our leaders to follow in his footsteps. Drifting towards socialism--radically with Obama." "When Eisenhower stole the nomination from Taft with all those silly boaters and screaming women. 1952 that is. You could look it up." "High school - Bush winning in Florida."
Social and Economic Policy Issues (indirect experience,	*Responses mentioned gay rights, abortion, education, healthcare, international politics, national economy, governance and*

media)	*representation.* "I am anti-war, pro-choice, and socially liberal." "There are a lot of issues right now. I am most interested in education and budget cuts."

OTHER MODELS:	
Civic Duty	"It's our civic-duty"
Habit	"Voting for the first time"
Foreign Born: **Transfer (from home country)**	**H: Transfer (First and second generation)** "I'm from Austria, I learned there in school" "I was born in India I was interested in politics from Childhood. Became interested in US politics in 2000 Presidential Elections"
1st and second generation: Migrating or Immigrant family, serving in the military	"As a member of the armed forces, I'm interested in the workings of our government, since the military is an instrument of politics."

Table 1.2 Reasons for Political Disengagement

Why do you think you are NOT interested in politics?	
H1. Absence of political socialization and sufficient exposure leads to lack of political engagement	
Apathy	"Boring" "Don't know" "It's not important" "I don't care, it's boring."
H2. Lack of resources leads to lack of political engagement	
Resources (time, knowledge)	"Too hard to understand." "Working, paying bills don't have time."
H2. Negative experiences explains lack of political engagement (not insufficient exposure)	
Lack of Trust (in political actors, including incumbent government)	**H. Lack of trust in the agendas or in the major parties and candidates** "Living in a city (Chicago) where all politicians are [omitted] and only care about illegal activities that can fatten their wallets, why should I care?" "Elected officials are controlled by their party regardless of the desires of their constituents. Major party leaders are not elected."
Ineligible (former felon)	"No voice, no point"
Lack of Trust (in democratic institutions or in the democratic process)	**H. Exposure to political environment and events** "Induced apathy - attempts at change are crushed by lobbyists." "lost interest, all rigged" "Because my opinions don't count. No voice. I used to think they mattered, but not anymore. It only matters how much money can be made, that's what matters." "No honesty and the system do not benefit most groups. Only one race or group benefits and it is not by mistake!"

3. Findings. When do Americans become politically engaged?

As we can see in Table 2 below, the majority of native born blacks, whites, Latinos and Asians in the sample became politically engaged later than what the early political socialization literature hypothesized. The majority of blacks in all cities reported becoming politically engaged after they were 18 years old. Only whites living in Chicago mentioned adolescence or childhood more often than adulthood. Similarly, Latinos and Asians (except for Latinos in Houston and Asians in Chicago) became interested in politics due to the influence of an event or an agent after they were passed the 'impressionable' years. Looking into the individual answers it seemed that older white cohorts reported having been socialized during childhood by their families while younger ones reported becoming interested in politics and socialized during which is in line with the argument made by the political socialization literature in the 1960's about the explosion of news sources (radio, TV and newspapers) reduced the relative importance of parents as a source of political information and socialization (Niemi and Sobiezek, 1977).

Table 2. When did you become interested in politics? (Native Born Sample Only)*				
Chicago				**N= 164**
	Blacks	Whites	Latino	Asian
Childhood	23	**44**	18	**41**
13-17(Teens)	11	19	21	13
Adulthood	**66**	37	**61**	46
Houston				**N=86**
	Blacks	Whites	Latino	Asian**
Childhood	29	28	13	
13-17(Teens)	3	8	29	
Adulthood	**68**	**64**	**58**	
Los Angeles				**N= 96**
	Blacks	Whites	Latino	Asian
Childhood	28	29	**65**	35
13-17(Teens)	15	15	0	3
Adulthood	**57**	**56**	35	**61**
New York				**N=94**
	Blacks	Whites	Latino	Asian
Childhood	3	28	8	11
13-17(Teens)	10	12	11	26
Adulthood	**88**	**60**	**81**	**63**
Phoenix				**N=99**
	Blacks	Whites	Latino	Asian**
Childhood	13	26	19	
13-17(Teens)	27	11	21	
Adulthood	**60**	**64**	**60**	
San Francisco				**N=109**
	Blacks	Whites	Latino	Asian
Childhood	0	30	16	9
13-17(Teens)	15	13	23	11
Adulthood	**85**	**57**	**62**	**80**

* Key: Column Percentages.

** Sample is too small to estimate.

However, the sample sizes shown in Table 2 were small and some of these results may be driven by the social and demographic characteristics of the populations in each of the cities, some cities like Los Angeles and San Francisco have a larger percentage native born Asian and Latino older generations. Older cohorts of Latinos and Asians, those born before 1960 are more likely to have been socialized politically during childhood because they as well as their parents experienced highly salient political events that affected their communities profoundly. Besides

the Great Depression and World War II Latinos born before 1960 in the US lived through or new someone who lived through the massive deportations that took place in the aftermath of the Great Depression, which included the deportation of American citizens to Mexico. Blacks born before the 1960's also knew of or experienced the Jim Crow laws in the South. Older Asian cohorts are mainly Chinese and Japanese from the Southwest who were born at time when the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1868 was still in place (it was not repealed until December of 1943) and while the Japanese American community was still recovering from their experience in the "War Relocation Camps" where they were interned during World War II (over 60 percent of these individuals were second and even third generation American citizens of Japanese heritage who lived on the Pacific coast of the United States). Figure 1 presents the results of the bivariate tabulation of all individuals in the sample (all cities) sorted by year of birth and educational achievement. Those who were born after 1960 are in the top row and those before are in the bottom row.

Figure 1. When did you become interested in politics?



N=237, chi2=.46



N=127, chi2=.016



N=156, chi2=.56



N=76, chi2=.59

As we can see, in Figure 1, and consistently with the idea that there were many more politically salient events for cohorts born before 1960 than younger ones, overall, it seems that for individuals of all racial groups the importance of adolescence and childhood as a period where individuals become politically engaged has decline for younger generations of all groups except for whites. This is consistent with the reports of the Census regarding the 2008 and 2012

Presidential elections which seemed to have "awakened" politically blacks, Asians and Hispanics while political participation of whites has declined[73]. In the following section, I will explore what events/influences resulted in the political socialization of younger cohorts of blacks, Latinos and Asians and if indeed the 2008 Presidential election acted as a catalyst for political engagement. Also, it is worth noting that Latinos born before 1960 (both levels of educational attainment) were 15-20 percentage points more likely than any other group to report that they became interested in politics during their teenage years. This may be due to the political environment which was more stimulating during adolescence for those born before 1960 (the mean age of this group is 63 which means most became of age during the 1960's). In the next section I turn to the specific experiences that led to political engagement to understand whether these small differences, particularly between younger generations are contingent of the political environment and events experienced by individuals or something else.

4. Findings: How do Americans become politically engaged?

4.1 Blacks

The majority of Blacks, 71 percent (Table 3, below), in all cities reported being interested in politics, however, the way in which they became politically engaged varied wildly by city. One interesting finding is the higher levels of political disengagement exhibited by Blacks in New

[73] In a recent report, the Census noted the increase in participation of non-whites compared to previous elections: "In comparison to the election of 2008, about 1.7 million additional Black voters reported going to the polls in 2012, as did about 1.4 million additional Hispanics and about 550,000 additional Asians. The number of non-Hispanic White voters decreased by about 2 million between 2008 and 2012. Since 1996, this is the only example of a race group showing a decrease in net voting from one presidential election to the next, and it indicates that the 2012 voting population expansion came primarily from minority voters." File, Thom. 2013. "The Diversifying Electorate—Voting Rates by Race and Hispanic Origin in 2012 (and Other Recent Elections)." Current Population Survey Reports, P20-569. U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC.

York, Chicago and San Francisco, cities that have parties which mobilize voters. One would expect that minorities living in these cities would be more interested in politics than those living in Los Angeles or Houston. This is due mainly to the frustration of older Black voters with the political system. They have become disengaged rather than being alienated from the political system. In the case of San Francisco, alienation seems to be what is driving this. The city with the highest level of political disengagement for Blacks in Phoenix, where only 58 percent of Blacks said they were interested in politics. Seventy one percent of Whites in that same city (Table 3) and 54 percent of native born Latinos said they were interested in politics in Phoenix.

Table 3. Are you interested in politics? % Yes

City	Chicago (%)	Houston (%)	LA (%)	NY (%)	Phoenix (%)	SF (%)	Total (%)	N
Blacks	**70**	**81**	**83**	**64**	**58**	**70**	**71**	166
Whites	**80**	**75**	**78**	**48**	**71**	**80**	**74**	498
Latinos (Foreign Born)	**69**	**62**	**33**	**44**	**23**	**34**	**44**	280
Latinos (Native)	**69**	**38**	**57**	**70**	**54**	**75**	**60**	156
Asians (Foreign Born)	**49**	**55**	**36**	**34**	**-**	**45**	**40**	171
Asians (Native)	**84**	**-**	**81**	**59**	**-**	**63**	**66**	71

As we can see in Table 4 below, blacks living in these cities reported becoming interested in politics as the result of an extraordinary political or Shock (24 percent), an issue having to do with the well-being of the national economy (18 percent) or a personal experience with a politician, campaign worker or political event (17 percent). However, there is a lot of variation by city. For instance, the fact that "Shock" is the modal category for the whole sample is driven mainly by blacks living in Los Angeles, San Francisco and New York where 47, 41 and 39 percent respectively remembered becoming interested in politics as the result of an extraordinary political event. Older blacks (those born before 1965) mostly recalled events such as the

assassinations of Martin Luther King and John F Kennedy, as well as the Civil Rights movement while younger ones mentioned the Obama Presidential campaign in 2008. One older gentlemen in Phoenix (who self-identified as a strong Republican) wrote:

> *"I was a young man and saw President Kennedy's motorcade, once he was assassinated I followed politics ever since."*

As we can see in Table 4, 47 percent of blacks in Los Angeles referred to a "Shock". The majority of the answers in this category in LA referred to the Civil Rights movement even if the respondent was too young to have experienced that him or herself, so it is possible that it was the collective memory or memory passed on by the family. This is very different from New York where most blacks who recalled a "shock" in the political system recalled a more recent event such as 9/11, the Obama campaign or the 2008 economic crisis. The second most mentioned category for this group in all of these cities was "Issue (Economic/National Well-being.)" which could be indicative of the difficulties low and middle income blacks faced in the aftermath of the 2008 recession, however, many of the responses included comments that signal a more general concern for the well-being of the democracy or the importance to monitor government officials to keep them honest. Black respondents said is that the trigger for them to become politically engaged was the realization that "politicians run the country", "politics have an influence on the national economy" or something along those lines.

Finally, the third highest ranking category in all cities combined was "Political Event/Local", however as we can see in Table 4 this result is driven by blacks in Chicago, where

31 percent reported becoming interested as a result of a direct interaction with a politician, party or campaign worker. One respondent wrote:

"My great aunt was a powerful precinct captain in a large black ward in Chicago under Pop Daley".

Another Black respondent from Chicago said:

"When I was about 18 years old. A friend's father was an alderman".

Several Blacks in Chicago mentioned having met or being inspired to follow politics due to a Mayor, Richard Daley and Harold Washington[74] (the first black Mayor of Chicago). Other categories were mentioned less than 10 percent in the general sample but there some variation by city. For example, in Houston "Family" was the modal category (26 percent of in this city explained that their family taught them "the importance of voting") but it was rarely if ever mentioned in the other cities as the reason blacks became interested in politics. An older Black respondent in Houston said:

"My parents taught me to care about who is running my government"

A young adult in the same city wrote:

"My Mother always took me to vote with her and explained why it was important when I was a child".

[74] "I've been interested in politics since Harold Washington ran for mayor of Chicago in the 80's"

At a first glance, and without controlling for basic socio economic and demographic characteristics, a direct or indirect (through the media) experience with a political event seems to have had a greater impact on blacks in these cities developing an interest in politics. These findings lend support to the exposure to political events hypothesis presented earlier (refer to Table 1). In the next section I will explore whether there is still an effect when controlling for age, income and education. So far it seems that blacks are less socialized by the traditional agents such as school, family or peers and more so by the political environment surrounding them.

Table 4. Blacks (Native Born). Reasons for Political Engagement by City.

How did you first become interested in politics?*

	Chicago	Houston	Los Angeles	New York	Phoenix	San Francisco	All cities
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Shock (9/11, Vietnam, etc.)	9	11	**47**	**39**	**21**	**41**	**24**
Issue (Economic/National W-B)	**20**	**15**	**14**	**16**	**0**	**36**	**18**
Political Event/Actor (Local)	**31**	8	6	5	**21**	**12**	**17**
Political Event/Actor (National)	**13**	9	3	0	8	0	7
Family	4	**26**	2	0	0	0	6
Issue (Social Policy)	2	3	4	**10**	**23**	11	6
Habit (i.e. Voting 1st time)	3	**15**	0	3	0	0	4
Life Cycle (R mentioned aging)	4	10	4	0	0	0	4
No Reason	4	0	4	8	5	0	4
In School (Class or Teacher)	3	1	**9**	4	0	0	3
Military Service	6	0	0	0	**21**	0	3
Issue (City/Community)	2	0	4	8	0	0	3
Civic Duty or Efficacy	0	0	2	3	0	0	1
Peers (School or Network)	0	0	0	3	0	0	1
Issue (Immigration)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transfer (from Home country)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N (Interested only) =	29	26	26	19	12	9	121

Why do you think you are NOT interested in politics? ¥

	Chicago	Houston	Los Angeles	New York	Phoenix	San Francisco	All cities
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Apathy (i.e. Don't care, boring)	**56**	14	**47**	**37**	**70**	24	**44**
Lack of Trust (Dem Institutions)	44	15	13	20	0	24	**26**
Lack of time/knowledge	0	**37**	**40**	12	30	**53**	18
Ineligible (Citizenship or Felon)	0	0	0	23	0	0	7
Lack of Trust (Political Actors)	0	34	0	9	0	0	6
N (not interested only) =	7	7	9	23	7	5	49
Total City N =	**36**	**33**	**35**	**42**	**19**	**14**	**179**

**Only the top three categories in each city are highlighted.*
¥ Only the mode is highlighted, unless there is a less than 10 percent difference between the first and second category
Uncorrected chi2(100) = 141.9769 Design-based F(53.00, 9168.68)= 2.0276 P = 0.0000

Among those black respondents who reported being uninterested in politics (an average of 30 percent in every city), 44 percent could not articulate a reason and simply said that they were not interested because they didn't care or it was "boring" and the remaining 44 percent had well-formed political attitudes and were knowledgeable and articulate about the reasons why they have decided to stop following or participating in politics. Younger, poorer blacks' answers denoted apathy while older blacks of all socioeconomic backgrounds said they no longer trusted the institutions or the political class. One older black respondent said:

"I feel my actions (like voting and mobilizing) cannot outweigh [the influence] of those with money."

Also, the general feeling from the in person responses and the notes of the interviewers in Los Angeles and Chicago is that Blacks are disappointed with the fact that their votes carry less weight in terms of the effort elected officials make to fulfill campaign promises versus the promises made by big campaign donors. Also, in Chicago in particular there was a sense of deep sadness or hopelessness about using political participation, and voting in particular to affect policy and improve the wellbeing of marginalized communities. Respondents went on long angry outbursts about the time and effort they had put into participating and mobilizing and how "nothing has changed in 20 years". Here are examples of answers from blacks in different cities:

"You mean, why I am not interested in 'Money' its Money not 'Politics'. I am not interested because I have none!"

"I am not interested in politics because it is fake! I have not cared since Martin Luther King and John F Kennedy were assassinated".

"[Because] there are no good candidates!"

"Because the system is corrupt"

4.2 Whites

The majority of whites, 74 percent (Table 3), in all cities reported being interested in politics; this is only 3 percent more than Blacks living in the same cities. However, the percentage of whites who are interested in politics also varies by city. As we can see in Table Z, more than 70 percent of whites reported to be interested in politics Chicago, Houston, Phoenix and San Francisco. The city where whites were the least interested in politics is New York (48 percent) which is not surprising given that New York city turnout amongst whites has steadily decreased more than for other groups in this city since the 1990's. The biggest differences between whites and blacks in terms of political engagement are in Chicago, New York and Phoenix where whites were 10 percent more likely to be interested in politics than blacks. In New York, Blacks were 16 percent more likely to be interested in politics than whites. Similarly to blacks, the reasons reported by Whites regarding the events and situations that influenced their political engagement also varied by city. As we can see in Table W below, the majority of whites living in these cities (60 percent) reported becoming interested in politics as the result of their parent's influence (17 percent), a national political event experienced through the media (16 percent), an extraordinary

political event or shock (15 percent) or a personal experience with a politician, campaign worker or political event (12 percent). Of those whose responses talked about their family's influence some simply said their parents explained the importance of being informed, others recalled their parents being involved in a union or directly in politics, for example:

"As a child, my father/mother explained how important to know politics."

Other common responses of whites living in these cities were:

"Always. I think because my father was."

"As a child, my parents were interested in politics. As a member of a teachers Union, my parents were always tuned into the political cycle."

Individuals who identified as non-Hispanic whites who reported that a national political event was what started their interest in politics often mentioned they were keen on following the news or reading newspapers and that is how they became politically engaged. Below are some examples of this, these answers were coded as "National Political Event":

"I watch regular cable news, but I became interested at 25."

"Recently, watching the news when I realized how Obama and the Democratic Party were destroying this country and our fundamental principles."

"Politically inspired by Pres. Ronald Reagan & later both Bush presidents!"

"By having a keen interest growing up listening to the news and reading all the papers. And as for a candidate who inspired me, it was JFK."

"I have read newspapers since I was 12 and was intrigued by the primary system for presidential elections, it was like a baseball season."

The "shocks" or extraordinary political events white respondents recalled as being influential in them becoming politically engaged were really contingent on their age/generation. Younger generations (born after 1970) talked about Obama, the 2008 crisis, the Gulf Wars or 9/11. Here are some of the older generation responses:

"1940s after the depression, the country was in bad shape and I voted for FDR, this was against my principles, but I am glad I did it (I am Republican!)".

"I was in Vietnam when Martin Luther King and Bobby Kennedy were assassinated. My Vietnam experience and the assassinations made me a lifelong progressive."

"Childhood due to the Watergate Scandal"

"When I was a child, and Watergate coverage kept interrupting my cartoons."

Three things stand out with respect to how whites in these cities reported becoming interested in politics in contrast to black, Latino and Asian respondents. First, whites mentioned the traditional agents of socialization (family, peers in school and classroom experiences) more often. Family still is one of the most important agent of political socialization for whites (in all cities except for New York) which probably explains why political socializations studies cited earlier that collected data with a majority of non-Hispanic whites in the sample found parental influence to be a key component of a young adult's political interest. Also, there is a difference between the younger generation's (18 to 25) of blacks and whites in their attitude towards politics in New York City in some of the so called 'hipster' neighborhoods[75] seemed informed but very cynical about politics:

"I think the whole thing is fake. It's the same reason I am not interested in Dungeons and Dragons"

The second thing to note from whites in the survey is that a significant percent of them reported having a direct contact with a political event (campaign, politician) in their neighborhood as the catalyst for their political engagement. Elsewhere, (Lasala, 2013a) I have shown that whites in these cities reported having been contacted more often than other groups in the previous local and national elections. The answers presented in Table 5 as well as previous

[75] Hipsters are a subculture of men and women typically in their 20's and 30's that are often identified with independent thinking, counter-culture, progressive politics, an appreciation of art and indie-rock. The greatest concentrations of hipsters can be found living in the Williamsburg, Wicker Park, and Mission District neighborhoods of major cosmopolitan centers such as New York, Chicago, and San Francisco respectively.

work (Lasala, 2013a) is indicative of the fact that on average candidates, campaigns and party workers have been more visible and active in white neighborhoods. Lastly, answers making an explicit reference to the national well being by itself or in connection with a difficult personal situation in terms of unemployment or other factors were captured in the "Issue (Economic/National Well-Being)" category. This category was among the top three reasons for becoming interested in politics for all other groups, it ranked 9 for whites. They mentioned very narrow specific issues (i.e. abortion, education, gay rights) affecting them directly.

Out of those whites who reported being uninterested in politics (Table 5, last rows), 32 percent could not articulate a reason and simply said that they were not interested because they didn't care or it was "boring"; however, the remainder had well-formed political attitudes and were knowledgeable and articulate about the reasons why they have decided to stop following or participating in politics. Twenty seven percent mentioned feeling used by corrupt politicians or disillusioned by them, 18 percent said that they were not eligible to vote because of former incarceration or not being registered to vote.

Table 5. Whites (Native Born). Reasons for Political Engagement by City.

How did you first become interested in politics?*

	Chicago	Houston	Los Angeles	New York	Phoenix	San Francisco	All cities
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Family	**20**	**17**	**18**	2	**13**	**16**	**17**
Political Event/Actor (National)	**15**	**23**	11	**23**	**20**	11	**16**
Shock (9/11, Vietnam, etc.)	13	11	**15**	**16**	**21**	**16**	**15**
Political Event/Actor (Local)	**15**	15	5	**13**	11	13	12
In School (Class or Teacher)	10	1	7	8	9	6	8
Peers (School or Network)	6	**16**	4	0	8	5	7
Issue (Economic/National W-B)	4	1	8	**13**	7	**17**	7
Issue (Social Policy)	3	9	6	**13**	2	6	5
No Reason	1	1	**14**	4	0	6	3
Life Cycle (R mentioned aging)	6	1	0	4	3	1	3
Habit (i.e. Voting 1st time)	2	4	6	4	5	1	3
Issue (City/Community)	3	2	0	0	0	2	2
Civic Duty or Efficacy	0	0	5	0	2	3	1
Issue (Immigration)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transfer (from Home country)	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Military Service	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N (Interested only) =	107	53	40	27	60	68	354

Why do you think you are NOT interested in politics? ¥

	Chicago	Houston	Los Angeles	New York	Phoenix	San Francisco	All cities
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Apathy (i.e. Don't care, boring)	**34**	**58**	**27**	11	**29**	**41**	32
Lack of Trust (Political Actors)	**41**	36	24	14	19	**35**	27
Ineligible (Moved or Felon)	17	6	18	13	**32**	18	18
Lack of Trust (Dem Institutions)	7	0	21	**47**	21	6	18
Lack of time/knowledge	2	0	11	14	0	0	4
N (not interested only) =	30	10	13	32	25	16	120
Total City N =	**137**	**63**	**53**	**68**	**85**	**84**	**490**

Only the top three categories in each **city are highlighted.*

¥ Only the mode is highlighted, unless there is a less than 10 percent difference between the category ranking 1st and 2nd.
Uncorrected chi2(100) = 203.8581 Design-based F(74.39, 36004.21)= 2.2276 P = 0.0000

4.2 Native Born Latinos

The majority of native Latinos, 60 percent (Table 3 above), in all cities reported being interested in politics but were overall 10 percent less likely to report being politically engaged than blacks and whites. This difference is mostly driven by the cities of Houston and Phoenix where Latinos are much less politically engaged than others living in the same city. In Houston, the percentage of uninterested native born Latinos (62 percent) is *greater* than interested ones (38 percent) in Houston which is surprising because is not the case for native born of any of the other groups in any other city; with the exception of whites in New York City. The variation across cities suggest that as found elsewhere (Lasala, 2013a) making generalizations about Latinos using data collected at the national level may yield incorrect conclusions about the groups political engagement. As Table 3 illustrates there may also be a problem with state level data in large states like California and Texas where there is a lot of variation at the local level in terms of institutions, for example, native born Latinos in Los Angeles reported being much less interested in politics (at least 20 percent) than blacks or whites in the same city, in San Francisco they are more likely than blacks to be politically engaged; the problem with a state sample is that it will contain many more observations from Latinos living in Southern California and Los Angeles in particular obscuring the fact that Latinos living in certain cities in California are actually more likely to be politically engaged than blacks.

Viewing the differences in Table 3, it would be tempting to conclude that native born Latinos lag in their interest in politics because the first generation has failed to socialize them

politically since they themselves are not so interested. Huntington (2000) and others ascribing to the view that political socialization is the result of parental influence have reached a similar conclusion, however, this explanation is inaccurate because many foreign born Latinos (Ramakrishnan 2001), vote *more* not less than native born Latinos[76], particularly in some states and cities (Junn 1999, Lasala 2013a). Also, this explanation is inconsistent with the finding from Table 3 that in Houston first generation Latinos are *more* likely to be interested in politics than second and higher generations. Finally, the idea that parents have a big impact in children's basic political attitudes is only true in highly politicized and politically active families (Jennings, Stoker, & Bowers, 2009), which are still a minority, even within black and white families in the United States.

I turn next to the self-reported experiences about the events or agents that influenced native born Latinos' interest in politics. As we can see in Table 6, below, native born Latinos answers also vary by city, but do so much more than answers given by blacks and whites. Whereas for blacks and whites the three main categories represented 50 percent or more of the whole sample and there categories were also ranking high in each of the cities, for native born Latinos the top three categories are different for most cities. The only exception is that by and large, native born Latinos talked about a "National Political Event" experienced through the media as the primary reason they became interested in politics. This category ranks in the top three in all cities except in San Francisco. Older Latinos especially those residing in Chicago and Houston, mentioned the Kennedy presidency quite often, Latinos in their thirties and forties more recent Presidential elections:

[76] Using the Current Population Survey November Voter Supplements (CPS) from 1994, 1996 and 1998Ramakrishnan, 2001, finds that "Voting among blacks is highest among those first generation respondents who have lived in the United States for 20 years or more. Similar results hold true for Latinos, while for Asian-Americans turnout is highest among those in the third generation or higher. The bivariate results for generational status and voter turnout therefore indicate that the second generation advantage applies only to whites."

"Kennedy, before he was killed"

"JFK"

"I remember as a teen seeing TV coverage of Viet Nam war, discussing it with relatives. It made me learn that my vote is important and an honor and privilege."

"I remember 1980 Presidential election, did not know much about politics, but know that I liked J. Carter and definitely despised Ronald Reagan."

"When Clinton came to office, I was 19."

"I became interested in politics in my teens. I realized how thoroughly I disagreed with conservative views. I have voted against Republican platform ever since."

During the Bush-Kerry elections and before when the election ballot in Florida gave him the win. Became interested in how the Electoral College works.

In second place, native born Latinos mentioned, like blacks in the same cities mentioned the country's well-being ("Issue. Economic/National Well-being". In many cases, the answers reflected anxiety about the lack of employment or work as a consequence of the 2008 economic recession, but also general concerns for the well-being of the American democracy.

"I am interested because they run our country"

"Because I want to know who wants and can to be our leader"

In third and fourth place Latinos mentioned that their families (13 percent) or teachers (11 percent) had inspired them or explained the importance of being politically engaged. Some of the answers coded as "Family" particularly in Los Angeles refer to things happening in the neighborhood and parents being part of it:

"I remember going to the precincts to watch with resident mother (she could not vote)"

School or classroom experiences were a common answer for native Latinos more than for individuals in any of the other groups, including foreign born Latinos and Asians (native and foreign born). This finding is consistent with that of Wong &Tseng's (2008) mentioned earlier about the importance of the school system in socializing second generation Asian American children.

The takeaway point from Table 6 with respect to those who are interested in politics is that beyond the national political events, there is a lot more variation by city in the main influences native born Latinos reported to act as catalysts for their political engagement. The variation in local institutions and local political culture is possibly having an impact in the way Latinos are socialized into the polity in part because the family's influence is not a major factor except in Los Angeles (23 percent) and San Francisco (16 percent). In the case of the second generation, if parents are too busy focused on attaining financial stability or unable to participate in politics due to their immigration status, Latino children's learning is more reliant on the immediate political environment, the media, the classroom and political events in the

neighborhood. This may explain why native born Latino's interest in politics varies more across cities than that of blacks and whites. An alternative explanation is that the Latino communities are different in terms of their national origin and their cultural beliefs (Huntington, 1996 & 2000) which are passed on to the following generation (the resistance hypothesis in the political socialization theory). However, this does not seem to be the case because foreign born Latinos are less likely (19 percent, Table 6) than native born ones (35 percent, table 7) to be uninterested in politics because if apathy. Apathy, as shown by other studies (Vargas Ramos, 2009; Schildkraut, 2011) is developed in the United States sometimes due to negative experiences with the political system or immediate social context.

Among those Latinos born in the U.S. who reported being uninterested in politics (an average of 30 percent in every city), 35 percent could not articulate a reason and simply said that they were not interested because they didn't care or it was "boring". The other 48 percent had well-formed political attitudes and were knowledgeable about the reasons why they have decided to stop following or participating in politics. These differences may or may not be associated to the local political environment, the variation could be explained by socio demographic characteristics of the Latino communities in each of the cities, I will explore whether this is the case in section 5.

Table 6. Latinos (Native Born) Reasons for Political Engagement by City

How did you first become interested in politics?*

	Chicago (%)	Houston (%)	LA (%)	New York (%)	Phoenix (%)	SF (%)	All cities (%)
Political Event/Actor (National)	**22**	**17**	**10**	**32**	**33**	0	**23**
Issue (Economic/National W-B)	5	0	5	0	5	0	**13**
Family	5	0	**23**	**14**	10	**16**	**11**
In School (Class or Teacher)	**22**	0	10	0	7	**16**	9
No Reason	**17**	0	5	**18**	0	0	9
Political Event/Actor (Local)	13	0	0	0	3	**16**	8
Shock (9/11, Vietnam, etc.)	11	0	**21**	5	0	0	5
Issue (Social Policy)	0	**42**	5	0	0	4	5
Peers (School or Network)	0	0	0	5	0	0	4
Habit (i.e. Voting 1st time)	0	0	0	8	0	8	4
Transfer (from Home country)	0	0	8	9	0	0	3
Issue (Immigration)	0	13	0	0	**14**	8	3
Issue (City/Community)	6	**28**	8	9	**18**	**33**	3
Military Service	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Civic Duty or Efficacy	0	0	5	0	12	0	0
Life Cycle (R mentioned aging)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N (Interested only) =	17	7	16	24	23	13	96

Why do you think you are NOT interested in politics? ¥

	Chicago (%)	Houston (%)	LA (%)	New York (%)	Phoenix (%)	SF (%)	All cities (%)
Apathy (i.e. Don't care, boring)	**44**	0	**63**	**52**	28	38	**35**
Lack of Trust (Political Actors)	29	**77**	0	12	19	0	**27**
Lack of Trust (Dem Institutions)	27	0	22	12	**37**	**62**	21
Lack of time/knowledge	0	23	15	0	17	0	15
Ineligible (Citizenship or Felon)	0	0	0	24	0	0	3
N (not interested only) =	1	3	14	10	21	3	56
Total City N =	**25**	**10**	**30**	**34**	**44**	**17**	**160**

**Only the top three categories in each city are highlighted.*
¥ Only the mode is highlighted, unless there is a less than 10 percent difference between the first and second category.

Uncorrected chi2(95) = 166.9010 Design-based F(40.00, 6159.91)= 2.5064 P = 0.0000

4.2.1 Foreign Born Latinos

Foreign born Latinos in the survey include recent immigrants, the so called 1.5 generation (Latinos who migrated as children with their parents) and a mix of naturalized citizens and residents. The only question regarding their immigration status asked was: "Are you a U.S. citizen?" due to Institutional Review Board restrictions[77] (IRB). As shown in Table 7 the majority of the sample (64.29 percent) comes from non-citizen foreign born individuals. As can be seen in the Appendix the percentage of citizens and non- citizens varies by city, there are more citizens than non-citizens in Los Angeles (59 percent), New York (70 percent) and San Francisco (54 percent). In Chicago, Phoenix and Houston foreign born Latino citizens were over 60 percent of the sample.

Table 7. Foreign Born Latinos: Citizenship & Interest in Politics

Q: Are you interested in Politics?

	Non-Citizen	Citizen	Total N=
No%	**67**	**33**	*159*
Yes %	**61**	**34**	*121*
Total %	**64**	**36**	*280*

[77] The IRB thought it was too risky to ask immigration status questions for this population.

Foreign born Latinos in all cities combined, were less likely to be interested in politics than native born Latinos (Table 3 above in page 21). More than half of the individuals in this sample are non-citizens, and this may be the primary reason why 44 percent only reported being interested in politics (Table 3); this is 16 percent less than native born Latinos. As for other groups, political interest varies by city, for example in Chicago and Houston there is a similar proportion of citizens and non-citizens foreign born Latinos however, in Chicago there is *no* difference between native and foreign born Latinos in terms of interest in politics, in Houston foreign born Latinos are more likely to be interested in politics. I have shown elsewhere (Lasala, 2013a) this may be due to the fact that the local institutions and local political environment has had a negative effect on the political participation of native born Hispanic. In cities like Houston or Phoenix, where some social structures and racial stereotypes from the pre-Civil Rights movement era still exist, native born Latinos have become alienated from politics. Newcomers did not endure as many negative experiences due to their ethnicity which may have, as shown by Schildkraut (2011) in a weakened motivation to participate in politics.

The self-reported experiences about the events or agents that influenced foreign born Latinos in Table 7, native born Latinos answers regarding how they became interested in politics also vary by city. Foreign born Latinos talked mostly about the national well-being "**Issue** and the economy **(Economic/National W-B)**, especially the themes in the 2008 Presidential campaign and economic crisis**.** Only in Chicago did the native born did not mention this as the reason they became interested in politics, signaling that the interest in politics for the Latino community in Chicago pre dates the 2008 economic crisis. These are some examples:

"We need to bring about change"

"I live here so I want the economic situation to be better"

The second most popular reason cited by foreign born Latinos as a reason they became interested in politics was a "National Political Event/Actor" in the media. Foreign born Latinos answers are not different to those given by Native born Latinos in that they refer mostly to popular democratic presidents and campaigns: Obama, Clinton and John F Kennedy.

Table 8. Latinos (Foreign Born). Reasons for Political Engagement by City

How did you first become interested in politics?*

	Chicago	Houston	LA	New York	Phoenix	SF	All cities
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Issue (Economic/National W-B)	0	**65**	**35**	**24**	**18**	**23**	**26**
Political Event/Actor (National)	**46**	0	0	**29**	0	3	**19**
Issue (Social Policy)	0	0	**19**	**12**	0	**29**	**11**
Issue (Immigration)	**21**	8	2	7	**15**	6	9
In School (Class or Teacher)	5	**9**	**13**	3	**38**	0	7
Family	8	**10**	6	6	0	12	7
No Reason	0	0	8	3	13	5	3
Shock (9/11, Vietnam, etc.)	5	0	4	0	**15**	5	3
Peers (School or Network)	5	8	5	0	0	0	3
Political Event/Actor (Local)	0	0	0	7	0	3	3
Issue (City/Community)	0	0	0	6	0	0	2
Transfer (from Home country)	0	0	2	1	0	**14**	2
Civic Duty or Efficacy	0	0	5	3	0	0	2
Life Cycle (R mentioned aging)	**10**	0	0	0	0	0	2
Military Service	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Habit (i.e. Voting 1st time)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N (Interested only) =	14	6	26	48	6	21	121

Why do you think you are NOT interested in politics? ¥

	Chicago	Houston	Los Angeles	New York	Phoenix	San Francisco	All cities
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Lack of Trust (Political Actors)	30	0	23	**39**	9	15	**27**
Lack of Trust (Dem Institutions)	11	**51**	**44**	11	12	**30**	**25**
Lack of time/knowledge	11	0	13	26	**67**	**28**	23
Apathy (i.e. Don't care, boring)	**48**	31	18	17	11	19	19
Ineligible (Citizenship or Felon)	0	17	3	8	0	8	6
N (not interested only) =	8	6	42	46	15	32	134
Total City N =	**22**	**11**	**68**	**94**	**21**	**53**	**269**

**Only the top three categories in each city are highlighted.*

¥ Only the mode is highlighted, unless there is a less than 10 percent difference between the first and second category.
Uncorrected chi2(95) = 176.1997 Design-based F(36.13, 9502.95)= 2.2022 P = 0.0000

In third place Foreign born Latinos mentioned an issue that referred to perceived discrimination against Latinos (not the immediate community)

"Because of the injustices against Latinos"

"Due to California's Governor Wilson Policies"

Or, some other issue:

"The Palestinian occupation"

Among those foreign Latinos living in the U.S. who reported being uninterested in politics 27 percent could articulate a reason and explain their disdain for politicians Lack of Trust (Political Actors). The overwhelming disappointment had to do in part with being disillusioned with Obama, the failed promise of immigration reform and just a general sense that politicians are not trustworthy. Here are some examples of naturalized citizens:

"Because, I have no faith in any politician"

"I don't trust politicians. I am disillusioned. Obama promised things - they forget as soon as they get into office"

"Politicians are liars"

"Not very happy after Obama, very disillusioned"

"They always do whatever they want to do"

Foreign born non-citizens were also very vocal about what they were not engaged in politics, a lot of the answers referred to "empty promises":

"Politicians trick people."

"I don't believe in politicians, they speak one thing do another"

"Too many empty promises"

"No faith in politics"

"They don't help people like they're supposed to"

"Don't believe in liars"

"It's a circus, I'm bored by it, and it's all a lie"

"Empty promises always result in no help"

"Politicians don't do anything for Hispanics"

"They promise but don't fulfill their promises"

Twenty five percent of those who said were uninterested in politics mentioned being disillusioned in general with the political system without referencing a politician, corruption and "not seeing any improvements" for Hispanics and the country in general was a common answer among foreign born citizens.

4.3 Native and Foreign Born Asians

The sample of native born Asians is smaller than the sample of foreign born (N=71). This is so for two reasons; first, the population characteristics: the majority of Asians over 18 years of age living in the United States are foreign born and are highly concentrated in certain cities. The Census Bureau recently reported, the Asian population is the fastest growing race or ethnic group but this is largely due to immigration:

> The U.S. Census Bureau announced Asians were the nation's fastest-growing race or ethnic group in 2012. Their population rose by 530,000, or 2.9 percent, in the preceding year, to 18.9 million, according to Census Bureau annual population estimates. More than 60 percent of this growth in the Asian population came from international migration. By comparison, the Hispanic population grew by 2.2 percent, or more than 1.1 million, to just over 53 million in 2012. The Hispanic population growth was fueled primarily by natural increase (births minus deaths), which accounted for 76 percent of Hispanic population change. Hispanics remain our nation's second largest race or ethnic group (behind non-Hispanic whites), representing about 17 percent of the total population[78].

Asians are also highly concentrated (more so than Hispanics) thus, going back to Table 3, at a first glance it would appear like native born Asians were more likely to report being interested in politics (66 percent) that native born Latinos (60 percent). However, the overall percentage is deceiving because there were not enough individuals from this group in Houston and Phoenix, cities that have political institutions that depress turnout (Lasala, 2013a; Bridges, 1997) where Latinos reported being the *least* interested in politics. Native born Latinos were more likely than native Asians to report being interested in politics in New York and San Francisco, whereas native born Asians were more interested in politics than Latinos in Los Angeles and Chicago. The interesting thing about this is that the cities where native born Asians are less likely to be politically engaged are also the oldest Chinese settlements in the United States; likewise, Los Angeles and Chicago are where some of the oldest Mexican settlements in the country are. The

[78] United States Census Bureau (2013, June 13th). *Asians Fastest-Growing Race or Ethnic Group in 2012, Census Bureau Reports.* Retrieved August 12, 2013 from http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/population/cb13-112.html

fact that newer immigrants are more likely to be politically engaged signals that older generations of immigrants has to do with the fact that the majority of native born Latinos and Asians in these cities are of Chinese and Mexican origin and members of both communities experienced racial profiling and were socialized during the early twentieth century in the era that proceeded the Civil Rights movement, when being 'American' was still being tied to 'being white' (Zolberg, 2006).

As shown on Table 3, foreign born Asians in all cities were 40 percent likely to report that they were interested in politics. This is 26 percent less than those Asians born in the United States. Overall, we can see in Table 3 that there is less variation across cities in political engagement for Asians compared to Latinos. Houston is, like in the case of Latinos, the exception; in all cities the percentage of engaged Asians is less than those who reported not being interested in politics. This is probably the case because most Asians in Houston were refugees and naturalized fairly quickly. Through the interviews we learned that they were mobilized and courted a lot by political parties. In fact, the frequency of contact with politicians and political campaigns between foreign born Asians and Latinos was abysmal. One possible explanation for the persistent low levels of Asian American political engagement may be simply the proportion of foreign born vs. native born individuals, which is much higher than for Latinos.

As we can see in Tables 9 and 10 below, most Asians (both native and foreign born reported becoming interested in politics as a result of their interest in the national economy and the country's well-being in general or the connection between these two and their personal well-being (**Issue. Economic/National W-B)**. This is similar to Latinos and blacks in these cities.

Native born Asians reported becoming politically engaged for different reasons in each of the cities. About 30 percent of Asians in San Francisco and Los Angeles mentioned the national economy or country's well-being:

"Politics affects all"

"Economy"

"Affect way of life in US"

Thirteen percent of native born Asians mentioned a national political event as the catalyst for their engagement:

"During the 2000 election between bush and gore because it was the first time I became aware of presidential elections"

"I realized that republicans save money"

"During my childhood (about 15 years old) I liked to read newspaper about political news"

For foreign born Asians, the highest ranking categories were the National Economy and well-being, transferring their interest in politics that started in their home country "Transfer" and a "shock" in the political system. The highest ranking category for foreign born Asians was also "Issue: Economic/National Well Being",

"They decide what happens in our lives"

"Politics affects all those around us including family, friends, and even those overseas"

Below are some examples of those answers coded as "Transfer":

"I was born in India I was interested in politics from Childhood. Became interested in US politics in 2000 Presidential Elections"

"The 1970s politics in China got me interested"

"I came from mainland China [during the Mao era], so I know that politics can destroy a few generations of people. And now I know that politics can also be used to save a few generations of people.

"I'm part of the community; family in politics everyone is involved in the Philippines"

This may be in part related to the socio demographic characteristics of the Asian versus the Latino population. Also, Asian immigrants are on average better educated than Latino immigrants, also the proportion of refugees among first generation Asian immigrants which is larger than for foreign born Latinos, this facilitates naturalization and voting. The percentage of Asians with a Bachelor's degree or more is 49.4; in contrast only 12.6 percent of Hispanics hold a similar degree.

The category that ranked third for both native and foreign born Asians deserves is worth discussing separately because many answers (from all cities) referred to Barack Obama's candidacy and election as President:

"I was interested in 2008 the African American Barak Obama wanted to be a President and I voted for him as well"

"Obama becoming president"

"A political candidate… Barak Obama"

"After G. W. Bush was reelected and country's economic problems became critical. Election of president Obama motivated me to pay attention to politics and participate"

Some New Yorkers living in Chinatown mentioned 9/11:

"9/11 happened in my backyard, induced me to follow current/event"

Table 9. Asian (Native) Reasons for Political Engagement by City.

How did you first become interested in politics?*

	Chicago	Houston	Los Angeles	New York	San Francisco	All cities
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Issue (Economic/National W-B)	0		**29**	**19**	**34**	**27**
Political Event/Actor (National)	0		0	**41**	7	**13**
Shock (9/11, Vietnam, etc.)	**41**		0	6	**16**	**11**
No Reason	0		**18**	10	0	7
In School (Class or Teacher)	13		0	0	**18**	7
Issue (Immigration)	**23**		**18**	0	0	7
Issue (Social Policy)	0		0	5	10	6
Family	0		**18**	0	0	5
Civic Duty or Efficacy	0		10	0	6	5
Transfer (from Home country)	0		0	0	9	3
Peers (School or Network)	0		0	**11**	0	2
Military Service	0		8	0	0	2
Life Cycle (R mentioned aging)	0		0	0	0	2
Habit (i.e. Voting 1st time)	**23**		0	0	0	1
Issue (City/Community)	0		0	4	0	1
Political Event/Actor (Local)	0		0	3	0	1
N (Interested only) =	5	0	10	12	13	40

Why do you think you are NOT interested in politics? ¥

	Chicago	Houston	Los Angeles	New York	San Francisco	All cities
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Ineligible (Citizenship or Felon)		0	0	**38**	**35**	**30**
Lack of Trust (Dem Institutions)		29	**40**	26	**38**	**28**
Apathy (i.e. Don't care, boring)		**71**	20	11	27	28
Lack of Trust (Political Actors)		0	20	10	0	7
Lack of time/knowledge		0	20	15	0	7
N (not interested only) =	2	3	7	11	10	33
Total City N =	**7**	**3**	**17**	**23**	**23**	**73**

Only the top three categories in each **city are highlighted.*
¥ Only the mode is highlighted, unless there is a less than 10 percent difference between the category ranking 1st and 2nd
Uncorrected chi2(80) = 88.5644 Design-based F(29.87, 2031.01)= 2.0174 P = 0.0009.

Table 10. Asian (Foreign Born). Reasons for Political Engagement by City.

How did you first become interested in politics?*

	Chicago	Houston	Los Angeles	New York	San Francisco	All cities
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Issue (Economic/National W-B)	**30**	**54**	0	13	**26**	**25**
Transfer (from Home country)	**22**	0	**29**	**15**	8	**11**
Shock (9/11, Vietnam, etc.)	**0**	**25**	**39**	0	**16**	**11**
No Reason	13	5	0	**24**	0	10
Peers (School or Network)	0	0	16	11	8	10
Political Event/Actor (National)	0	**16**	0	11	11	10
In School (Class or Teacher)	5	0	0	**20**	0	7
Civic Duty or Efficacy	0	0	16	0	**15**	6
Issue (Social Policy)	0	0	0	6	11	6
Political Event/Actor (Local)	0	0	0	0	5	2
Family	**18**	0	0	0	0	1
Issue (City/Community)	8	0	0	0	0	1
Issue (Immigration)	5	0	0	0	0	0
Military Service	0	0	0	0	0	0
Habit (i.e. Voting 1st time)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Life Cycle (R mentioned aging)	0	0	0	0	0	0
N (Interested only) =	8	7	4	17	14	51

Why do you think you are NOT interested in politics?

	Chicago	Houston	Los Angeles	New York	San Francisco	All cities
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Lack of Trust (Dem Institutions)	12	6	26	20	**33**	**31**
Lack of Trust (Political Actors)	29	**42**	**29**	**21**	**44**	21
Apathy (i.e. Don't care, boring)	**45**	**36**	**29**	17	12	20
Lack of time/knowledge	10	8	0	15	0	20
Ineligible (Citizenship or Felon)	5	8	16	**28**	11	7
N (not interested only) =	14	9	9	46	18	96
Total City N =	**22**	**16**	**13**	**64**	**32**	**147**

Only the top three categories in each **city are highlighted.*
¥ Only the mode is highlighted, unless there is a less than 10 percent difference between the category ranking 1st and 2nd.
Uncorrected chi2(90) = 88.7801 Design-based F(39.62, 5665.63)= 1.4846 P = 0.0259

4.4 Discussion: Are Native-Born Blacks, Whites, Latinos and Asians Socialized Differently into the Political System?

The findings of the tables above are summarized in Figures 3 and 4 which illustrate the differences in political socialization across native born individuals of all groups without taking into consideration the local context. Overall, the finding is that (consistently with what the political socialization scholarship has argued since the 1970's) being socialized by the traditional socialization agents was not as frequent as by other agents (media) and political events (bottom graph) for non- whites. The political socialization of whites differs from other groups (top graph of Figure 2) in that seventeen percent of whites in these cities reported being socialized at home, 6 percentage points more than native born Latinos and more than 10 percentage points more than native born blacks and Asians living in the same cities. Latinos were also about 5 percentage points more likely to report having been socialized politically by their family (parents) than blacks and Asians. All these differences across and are statistically significant at the .05 alpha levels. It terms of the effects of traditional agents of the different groups we can see that blacks stand out in that they are the least likely to report being socialized politically in the classroom (less than 3 percent) while all others were about 4 to 6 percentage points more likely to report being socialized through an experience in the classroom (any level). This could be due to lower levels of educational attainment as many Latinos and Asians mentioned a classroom experience in College. This will be explored in the next section with a multivariate regression analysis. There are no big differences in the percentage of individuals from each of the groups in terms of experiences having to do with Peers (in school or social network) as well as "Life Cycle" (i.e. ageing, having a child, etc.).

The bottom graph of Figure 2 illustrates the importance of political events as catalysts in the political engagement of individuals of all groups. National political events experienced through the media were critical for the engagement of native born Latinos (23 percent) and to a lesser extent whites (16 percent) in these cities. Local political events (campaigns, rallies, etc.) were critical, as anticipated, for Blacks and Whites. There are two possible interpretations, first that a direct experience is not as important for Latinos and Asians in terms of their political engagement. The second and more plausible one is that native born Latinos and Asians in general have had fewer opportunities to interact directly with candidates or party workers because there are less door-to-door mobilization efforts in immigrant neighborhoods where many of these second or higher generation individuals grew up in. Finally, extraordinary political events ("Shock") were mentioned by a quarter of Blacks who said they were politically engaged. As we saw in the previous section, older generations mentioned the Civil Rights movement and Kennedy's assassination; younger generations mentioned the 2008 economic crisis and the Presidential campaign of that year. There is clearly still a collective memory about the Civil Rights Movement because some respondents were too young to have a personal memory of this event. As Harris, (2006) has suggested "events and collective memories are appropriated by political entrepreneurs for collective action" (p. 19). It seems that many blacks have been socialized growing up by political entrepreneurs as well as traditional agents (teachers, ministers, parents and peers) which evoke and use meaningful past events to mobilize in the present[79].

[79] These findings are also consistent with those Dawson's (1994) work who has argued that blacks are socialized politically

Figure 2. How did you become interested in Politics?
Percent of Responses that Referred to Traditional Socialization Agents and Political Events
(All Cities, Native Born Only)





Native Born Blacks: N=179, chi2 significant at 0.00001 alpha level ; Native Born Whites: N=490, chi2 significant at 0.00001 alpha level; Native Born Latinos: N=160, chi2 significant at 0.00001 alpha level; Native Born Asians: N=73, chi2 significant at 0.0009 alpha level

Figure 3. Figure 2. How did you become interested in Politics?
Percent of Responses that Referred to Political and Economic Issues and Other Categories
(All Cities, Native Born Only)





Native Born Blacks: N=179, chi2 significant at 0.00001 alpha level ; Native Born Whites: N=490, chi2 significant at 0.00001 alpha level; Native Born Latinos: N=160, chi2 significant at 0.00001 alpha level; Native Born Asians: N=73, chi2 significant at 0.0009 alpha level

The figures above (Figures 2 and 3) illustrate that while traditional political socialization agents (family, age-related events, teachers), habitual voting, a sense of civic duty and even political issues or policies affecting the individual (i.e. abortion, gay rights, taxes) may be partially responsible for present-day political engagement, meaningful political events were the most common reason for political engagement for all groups. It is possible that since the majority of Americans living in these cities who grew up in less affluent politically active families, they may have entered adulthood with political views that are "weakly held, poorly integrated and resting on fragmentary knowledge" (Stoker and Bass, 2013, p.457). Experiencing these events (particularly extraordinary ones) may act as catalysts to pay attention and participate in politics for all transcending individual levels of education, income and age as the period effects model suggests, resulting in the politicization of many. Events mentioned by respondents such as the Great Depression, the Civil Rights Movement, Kennedy's assassination and more recently the 2008 economic crisis and the Presidential election are so deeply meaningful and prominent in the news for a sustained period of time that individuals either strive to understand what is happening in the political sphere or receive many consistent cues about the importance of the political sphere and the repercussions of political events in their lives.

Going back to the original discussion of whether certain elections or political contexts can alternative and even foreign-born Latino or Asian political behavior (De la Garza and Yang, 2011 have argued that it only affects the political behavior of Latinos momentarily and superficially), I would argue that extraordinary political events act as a catalyst for individuals in all groups, but that there are fewer native born Latinos and Asians in the population that lived through some of them, simply because most occurred in the 1960's or before. These extraordinary political events permanently alter basic political attitudes and behaviors such as

interest in politics and voting in the long-term, therefore promoting the political socialization of individuals of any group, at any age. If motivation is a key element to political participation as Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1994, 1995 and 2013) have argued living through these events may be one of the long lasting fuels that keep the motivation alive. This is so mostly because it generates a strong partisan identity[80] (Dawson, 1994; Erikson and Stoker, 2011).

In the next section (Section 5), I explore the explanatory power of the period-effects model in explaining present day political participation with a multivariate regression analysis. This will allow me to include individual characteristics such as age, income and education as well as group level variables like the city of residence to explore alternative explanations of political activity other than being socialized politically through meaningful extraordinary. The overall expectation is that being socialized as a result of a deeply meaningful event, such as a political shock or having a personal contact with a candidate or campaign event will be associated with higher levels of present day political participation than other forms of political socialization. If indeed, people from all ages and socioeconomic backgrounds and cities are more likely to participate in elections because they were socialized through a political event, this would imply that as the period-effects model advances, change in fundamental political attitudes is not linear[81] nor does it occur mostly during childhood or adolescence. Also, that even though

[80] See Dawson 1994 for a discussion on how and why blacks developed a strong democratic partisan identity; Erikson and Stoker, 2011 for a discussion of the impact of the Vietnam draft on citizens ideology and partisan identity Erikson and Stoker, 2011, find that: "Males holding low lottery numbers became more antiwar, more liberal, and more Democratic in their voting compared to those whose high numbers protected them from the draft. They were also more likely than those with safe numbers to abandon the party identification that they had held as teenagers. Trace effects are found in reinterviews from the 1990s. Draft number effects exceed those for preadult party identification and are not mediated by military service. The results show how profoundly political attitudes can be transformed when public policies directly affect citizens' lives." (p.221)

[81] Sears and Valentino (1997) have argued also that change is not linear but they refer specifically to preadult acquisition of political attitudes. They find that "periodic political events catalyze political socialization, generating predispositions that persist into later life stages", their theory applies mostly to Adolescents (11 to 17) and ordinary political campaigns. Their study is mostly about partisanship, not general political interest. My theory goes beyond adolescence and assumes that this type of socialization will predict greater stability in political behavior, not only political attitudes (i.e. voting in competitive and non-competitive elections).

the local political and social environment (neighborhood, city) accounts for most of the differences in participation between native Latinos and Asians on one hand and blacks and whites on the other the changing national political environment is also to explain these differences[82]. In sum, the next section investigates whether extraordinary political events such as the New Deal, the Vietnam War and others played a significant role in making all older voters regardless of the racial and ethnic group more active -- not simply because they were older, as Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) and others (De la Garza and Jang 2011) have suggested, but because these events play a catalytic socializing role.

[82] Except when individuals enter adulthood with relatively well-formed political opinions, as in the case of those who grew up in politically active families (Jennings, Stoker, & Bowers, 2009)

4.5 Discussion: Why Are Native-Born Blacks, Whites, Latinos and Asians Politically Disengaged?

Figure 4. Why are you *not* interested in politics? (Percent)
(*All Cities, Native Born Only)*



Native Born Blacks: N=179, chi2 significant at 0.00001 alpha level ; Native Born Whites: N=490, chi2 significant at 0.00001 alpha level; Native Born Latinos: N=160, chi2 significant at 0.00001 alpha level; Native Born Asians: N=73, chi2 significant at 0.0009 alpha level

Figure 4 shows the percentage differences in the answers to the question "Why are you not interested in politics?" The participation literature has assumed that what drives non-voting behavior is indifference towards politics and lack of knowledge or motivation to obtain a basic knowledge. It is surprising, then to find that "Apathy" constitutes only between 44 and 28 percent of the reasons given by individuals of all four groups who said they were uninterested in politics. Also, the lack of resources (time and knowledge) was only about 20 percent of all

answers. This is interesting because the political participation literature has emphasized the 'resources'[83] available to the individual or the 'costs'. Some political scientists have argued that the decline in turnout and political engagement has to do with a decline in social capital (Putnam, 1995) and with the decreasing influence of certain social groups as transmitters of information – for example, the family, the churches, and the communal organizations. These groups not only transmitted information but helped individuals of lower socioeconomic status and fewer resources to understand the political realm and to appreciate why politics are relevant for individuals (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). However, "Lack of Trust" (in political actors or institutions) accounted for half of the answers for whites and Latinos and one third for Asians and blacks in the sample. This finding point to what the recent scholarship has found regarding the decline in political participation in advanced democracies and distrust in government, political actors and political institutions. Grönlund, & Setälä (2007) have argued distrust in government institutions is also an explanatory factor behind the lack of political participation and political engagement. Distrust includes citizens criticism of the government for not being sufficiently organized according to widely endorsed democratic norms, such as responsiveness and political equality (frustration with the overwhelming influence of organized interests and a

[83] As eloquently and succinctly discussed by Eric Plutzer (2002): "Most research on turnout has been guided by a focus on resources that help voters overcome the costs of voting. Dozens of resources have been linked to turnout, including, most conspicuously, various aspects of socioeconomic status, especially education (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Miller and Shanks 1996). Scholars also have examined cognitive resources such as political knowledge (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), indicators of political engagement such as newspaper readership and political interest (Campbell et al. 1960; Strate et al. 1989), and indicators of community involvement and stake-holding such as home ownership (Milbrath 1965; Verba and Nie 1972), social networks(Zipp and Smith 1979; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), marriage (Stoker and Jennings 1995), and church and civic involvement (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Scholars have also examined factors that increase the costs of voting. Geographic mobility, for example, can substantially increase the barriers to voter registration (Squire, Wolfinger, and Glass 1987). Others have explored the disruptive effects of severe hardship (Rosenstone 1982) and the exhaustion and time demands associated with raising young children (Plutzer 1998). The twin foci of resources and costs have yielded a large number of research findings but not a good sense of how the many factors fit together or when and where variables will matter most. That is, the many findings do not yield a set of conditions and qualifications that marks a mature theory", p. 41.

mounting suspicion of widespread official corruption) as well as distrust in political actors, including politicians, political parties and incumbent governments (Hetherington, 1999; Plane and Gershtenson, 2004; Anasolbere and Iyengar, 1995). It seems that distrust is affecting individuals from all groups in a similar way. It is quite clear from Figure 4 that the assumption that Latinos and Asians do not participate or engage in politics only because they are not sufficiently socialized to have an opinion about politics is incorrect. Almost half of the native born Latinos that are politically disengaged reported developing a negative view due to exposure at the political system. Young black males are probably disengaged due to their continuous negative interactions with law enforcement in the past decade and to the sustained neglect of their policy preferences by political leaders (for a discussion, see Weaver and Lerman, 2010, *Political Consequences of the Carceral state*). This is reflected in the fact that 7 percent of blacks in these cities said they were not interested in politics because they could not vote.

5. Are political socialization experiences associated with different levels of political participation?

In this section I explore the extent to which voting on the 2008 Presidential elections and the mayoral elections immediately before then is associated with how an individual became politically engaged. Specifically, I am interested in the differences between individuals that reported becoming interested in politics through an extraordinary, national and local political event and those who reported becoming interested through the influence of traditional socialization agents. As outlined in the introduction the argument this paper advances is that

meaningful national political events are particularly important to socialize those who have not yet developed basic political attitudes or have weakly held ones.

Table 11 compares the percentage of people who voted on both elections for each of the self-reported categories of political socialization: traditional agents, political events, issues and other. As shown in Table 11 the percentage of whites, blacks, and Latinos who voted on both elections is greater among those who reported becoming interested in politics due to the influence of a traditional agent. Forty three percent of blacks, 39 percent of whites and 36 percent of Latinos who voted in both elections (the 2008 election and the previous mayoral election) reported becoming politically engaged as a result of a political event. This positive correlation between voting in both elections and becoming interested in politics as a result of a does not exist for native born Asians. It is interesting that there is a positive correlation between voting and being socialized by a national political event given that much of the previous research in Asian and Latino political behavior mentioned earlier has assumed that politically active blacks and whites were more likely to be socialized by their families during childhood. However, these results may be driven in part by the demographic characteristics of the sample (especially age), thus, we will examine this relationship using a multivariate regression model.

Table 11. Voted in Previous Local and Presidential Elections by Reasons for Political Engagement by City.

How did you first become interested in politics?*

	Blacks	Whites	Latinos	Asians
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Family	3	16	10	9
Peers (School or Network)	0	5	3	0
In School (Class or Teacher)	2	6	10	11
Life Cycle (R mentioned aging)	3	3	2	0
Traditional Agents	**8**	**30**	**25**	**20**
Political Event/Actor (National)	7	15	22	13
Political Event/Actor (Local)	20	11	6	0
Shock (9/11, Vietnam, etc.)	16	13	8	8
Political Events	**43**	**39**	**36**	**21**
Issue (Social Policy)	1	3	2	2
Issue (Economic/National W-B)	15	4	4	18
Issue (City/Community)	3	1	0	1
Issues	**19**	**8**	**6**	**21**
No Reason	6	3	10	9
Habit (i.e. Voting 1st time)	3	2	2	1
Civic Duty or Efficacy	1	1	0	5
Military Service	4	0	3	0
Transfer (from Home country)	0	0	0	0
Issue (Immigration)	0	0	4	9
All Other	**14**	**6**	**19**	**24**

Why do you think you are NOT interested in politics? ¥

	Blacks	Whites	Latinos	Asians
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
No Reason	0	0	0	10
Ineligible	1	1	0	0
Apathy	3	2	4	0
Lack of Trust (Actors)	8	7	2	0
Lack of Trust (Institutions)	4	5	5	0
Lack of time/knowledge	1	2	2	6
Total N =	**72**	**307**	**47**	**24**

The multivariate logistic regression (Table 12 below) used a measure of political participation is a scale with information about whether the person voted in the past presidential and local elections. A score of "2" means he or she voted in both elections, a score of "1", indicates that the person voted in only one of these ("0"=neither election, all information about the construction of the scale and exact question wording can be found in the Appendix). The dependent variables are dummy variables indicating how the person became interested in politics (e.g. "Shock"). The baseline category for the self-reported political socialization experiences dummies is "Not Interested in politics (any reason)". The coefficients indicate the differences in the means for the dependent variable, voting. In Table 12, we can see that overall there is a significant (both substantively and statistically) relationship between being socialized by a political event and voting. There is also some support for the period-effects hypothesis (life-long openness to political events) for Latinos and whites in the sample.

Table 12. Multivariate Analysis of Electoral Participation[¥] on Political Socialization

Sample:	**Blacks (Native)**		**Whites (Native)**		**Latinos (Native)**		**Asians (Native)**	
	(1)		**(2)**		**(3)**		**(4)**	
VARIABLES	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.
Family	-0.24	0.26	**0.44*** **	0.10	0.09	0.26	0.03	0.39
School	0.10	0.23	**0.36*** **	0.12	**0.84*** **	0.22	0.17	0.32
Peers	**-0.39** **	0.14	**0.28** **	0.12	**0.58** **	0.22		
Life-Cycle	**0.37***	0.19	**0.34** **	0.13	0.10	0.74		
Shock	0.13	0.20	**0.29** **	0.11	**1.07*** **	0.17	0.04	0.31
National Political Event	**0.40***	0.22	**0.25** **	0.13	**0.43** **	0.20	0.30	0.39
Local Political Event	**0.43** **	0.14	**0.29** **	0.11	**0.87*** **	0.26	0.15	0.20
Issue (National Well-Being)	0.21	0.19	**0.14**	0.14	0.35*	0.19	0.21	0.21
Issue (Social Policy)	-0.22	0.25	**0.29***	0.18	0.43	0.31	**-0.92** **	0.28
Issue (City/Community)	**0.71** **	0.31	**0.25***	0.14	-0.13	0.15	**0.77** **	**0.29**
Immigration			0.13	0.12	**0.93*** **	0.19	**1.26** **	0.31
Transfer (Parents)	0.13	0.15	**0.38*** **	0.09			**-0.49***	0.29
Habit	0.16	0.33	0.16	0.26	**0.66*** **	0.19	-0.06	0.34
Civic Duty	**0.77*** **	0.12	0.33	0.23			0.29	0.27
No Reason	0.28	0.27	0.39	0.19	0.19	0.37	**-1.40*** **	0.27
Military	**0.61*** **	0.15			**1.04*** **	0.15	**-0.99*** **	0.20
Education	**0.05***	0.03	0.02	0.02	**0.09** **	0.03	**0.20** **	0.05
Income	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01
Age	**0.02*** **	0.00	**0.02*** **	0.00	**0.03*** **	0.00	0.02	0.01
Gender (Male=1)	-0.12	0.11	-0.07	0.06	0.18	0.13	0.15	0.19
Constant	-0.41	0.39	0.16	0.26	**-1.63*** **	0.39	**-3.05*** **	0.64
N	158		**420**		**133**		**57**	
Adj.R Squared	0.39		**0.29**		**0.46**		**0.784**	

For black females who are not interested in politics (the base category) the predicted value in the political participation scale (0= did not Vote, 1= Voted in one, 2=Voted in both elections) when they have a mean education (High School), Household income ($40,000 to $50,000) and age (40 years of age) is 1.04. The analysis predicts that black females of mean age, income, and education voted at least in one of the elections (either the 2008 Presidential election or the nearest Mayoral election) even when they reported being uninterested in politics. This makes sense given that the 2008 Presidential election mobilized large portions of the African-American population in these cities. However, when compared to similarly situated blacks (in terms of income, age, education and gender) who reported being interested in politics due to those who became interested in politics, especially those that mentioned this interest beginning as a result of a sense of "Civic Duty", a concern about their community ("Issue City/Community"), "Serving in the Military" or experiencing a political event (Local or National) were more likely to have voted on both elections. The coefficients for these categories were .77, .61, .43, .40 respectively, have the largest absolute value among the fifteen dummy variables, and are statistically significant). Another interesting finding here is that becoming interested in politics due to the influence of traditional socialization agents (family, school peers) for blacks in these cities is *negatively* associated with voting while becoming interested in politics due to political events (especially, local ones which may or may not have been tied to the atmosphere of a national extraordinary event) is positively associated with voting in the previous local and Presidential elections. The fact that the coefficient for "Shock" is not statistically significant is possibly due to the fact that once age is considered there is not an independent effect on the participation scale. I suspect that the "generational" model may work better to explain black political behavior than the "period-effects" model.

The same analysis was conducted for the white sample only (third column in Table 12). The predicted a value in the political participation scale for the base category (uninterested) native born whites with similar characteristics in terms of age, gender, income and education (High School, Household income of $40,000 to $50,000 and 40 years of age, female) is 1.48. The main difference found for whites *vis-à-vis* others who become interested in politics due to the traditional socialization agents (family, peers, teachers and age-related events) seem to be more likely to have voted on both elections. The coefficients for political events (shock, national events and those experienced directly in the locality of residence) ranged from .25 to .29 and were significant at the .05 alpha level. Even while controlling for age, whites who were socialized during a shocking political event are more likely to vote, signaling that the period-effects model (life-long openness and alteration of basic political attitudes, especially to extraordinary events) may have additional explanatory than the generational model (basic political attitudes only being altered by extraordinary events in the "impressionable years")

An interesting revelation of this analysis for whites is that "Family" had the largest absolute value among the fifteen dummy variables (.44), and was statistically significant at the $\alpha = 0.001$ alpha level. Family was not significant for explaining voting in any of the other groups, which could be partially explained by the fact that whites have a higher concentration of highly politically active families (Stoker and Bass, 2013) with higher socioeconomic status (Schlozman, Verba and Brady, 2013) which have been known to have long-term effects in political attitudes such as partisan identity strength which are highly correlated with voting. We can conclude that for whites becoming interested in politics due to the influence of traditional socialization agents and political events and political issues is positively associated with voting although traditional agents, especially family, have a bigger effect on levels of political participation (voting).

Nonetheless, it could also be the case that families were more active politically because of the overall national political environment (Niemi and Sobiezek, 1977).

The regression analysis with the native born Latino sample provides (column 5 in Table 12) further support to the main argument of this paper: some of the differences in voting behavior found between native born blacks, whites, Latinos and Asians in the national population may be due to differences in the age pyramids (younger generations making up the native or second and third generation Latino and Asian population, while age is more evenly distributed in the White and Black populations as shown in Figures 5 and 6). This age imbalance results in an imbalance in terms of how these groups were socialized; there are a greater number of native born blacks and whites that experienced extraordinary and deeply meaningful political event ("Shock"). The analysis shown in Tables 11 and 12 confirm that consistent voting behavior for whites, Latinos and blacks of certain generations too is more likely to occur when individuals become politically engaged as a result of a "Shock". The predicted a value in the political participation scale for the base category (uninterested) native born Latinas with similar characteristics in terms of age, income and education (High School, Household income of $40,000 to $50,000 and 40 years of age) is 0.6. However, the coefficient for "Shock" is 1.7 (and statistically significant at the .001 alpha level). Even when holding constant age, education income and gender becoming interested in politics through an extraordinary political event significantly improves the probability of Latinos voting in general and local elections. Also, local political events (direct experiences in the neighborhood or city) have a large and significant effect on behavior (.87).

The effect of "Shocks" on Asians is not as strong as for Latinos. The predicted a value in the political participation scale for the base category (uninterested) native born Asians with

similar characteristics in terms of age, income and education and age is 0.25 (Table 12, seventh column). Becoming politically engaged as a result of an extraordinary political event (Shock) has a small and insignificant (.04) effect on Asians voting behavior. There are two possible explanations. First, the experiences of older native born Asians in these cities are with the American political system is vastly different than for the other groups. While meaningful historical events in the 1940's, 1950's and 1960's served to positively engage Latinos, blacks and whites through various ways including serving in the military, native and foreign born Asians living in the US at that time experienced quite traumatic events or negative political socialization: the Chinese immigrants still lived with the stigma associated with the Chinese Exclusion Act (not repealed until the 1943) and the Japanese American community (the most populous Asian American group from 1910 to 1960) was recovering in these decades of the internment camps and loss of property traumatic experiences . The other explanation is simply that the demographic profile of the Asian American population in the United States and in the cities included in the study: there is simple a much small number of second generation or higher Asians who are old enough to have experienced historical events of these decades and that were socialized during the 1970's, 1980's, 1990's decades characterized by the decline in political participation and saliency of the political dimension in general compared to previous decades.

To further explore the question of whether differences in the experiences of national and meaningful political events (period-effects model) due to the demographic characteristics of the population is one of the missing pieces in the puzzles of Asian and Latino political participation, I included dummies for the city of residence of individuals as a proxy for their local political environments to hold constant local level characteristics that may explain in part the differences in political participation (Lasala, 2013a). Table 13 shows the multivariate regressions for each

sample (native born blacks, whites, Latinos and Asians) including city dummies, New York is the base category.

Figure 5. Percentage of Second and Higher Generation Asian Americans



According to the regression equation from the model in Table 13, the predicted values in the political participation scale for the base category of each group (politically disengaged, native born females, in New York, mean age, education and income) are: .93 for blacks, .78 for whites, .3 for Latinas and .36 for Asians. As we can see in this table, the coefficient of the main independent variable, "Shock" for blacks is larger (.23) than in the previous model without the city dummies, but continues to be insignificant. The "Shock" coefficient for whites, remains the same and statistically significant than in the previous model, however, notice that for Latinos, the

effect of being socialized through an extraordinary political event on the participation scale is *greater* (1.37) once the city dummies are included in the model. The fact that the coefficient for extraordinary political events "Shock" for Latinos continues to be substantively and statistically significant even when proxies for local political environment are included in the model is striking because so far, researchers, including myself have looked mostly at the local and immediate environment (family, school, neighborhood, city or state) in search for clues about the differences in the political socialization between Latinos, Asians, blacks and whites. Not at the frequency of exposure to these events in their life span. Deeply meaningful and information-rich political events may be an important mechanism through which the differences in the age pyramid (see Figure 6 below and Figure 5 above) of these groups may be a critical factor in explaining the differences found at the national level in political participation among blacks and whites and Asians and Latinos.

Table 13. A Multivariate Analysis of Electoral Participation[¥] on Mode of Political Socialization

Sample:	Blacks (Native) (1)		Whites (Native) (2)		Latinos (Native) (3)		Asians (Native) (4)	
VARIABLES	**Coef.**	s.e.	**Coef.**	s.e.	**Coef.**	s.e.	**Coef.**	s.e.
Family	-0.20	0.25	**0.27****	0.10	0.09	0.20	0.11	0.47
School	0.16	0.20	**0.25****	0.10	**0.50****	0.19	0.15	0.29
Peers	-0.21	0.19	0.16	0.12	0.23	0.28	-	-
Life-Cycle	**0.35****	0.15	**0.20***	0.12	0.17	0.65	-	-
Shock	0.20	0.18	**0.23****	0.11	**1.37*****	0.24	0.02	0.33
National Political Event	0.25	0.21	**0.18***	0.11	**0.40****	0.19	0.48	0.40
Local Political Event	**0.31****	0.15	**0.16***	0.10	0.58	0.42	0.35	0.22
Issue (National Well-Being)	0.14	0.18	0.06	0.12	**0.36****	0.17	0.11	0.21
Issue (Social Policy)	-0.19	0.19	0.18	0.16	0.54	0.35	**-0.87****	0.28
Issue (City/Community)	**0.80****	0.20	0.02	0.14	0.19	0.20	**0.96****	0.29
Immigration	-	0.25	-0.05	0.12	**0.57****	0.28	**1.17****	0.38
Transfer (Parents)	0.34*	**0.31****	**0.33****	0.11	-	-	**-0.62****	0.29
Habit	0.16	0.30	0.11	0.25	**0.47****	0.17	-0.29	0.44
Civic Duty	**1.03*****	0.14	0.24	0.19	0.00		0.12	0.25
No Reason	0.40	0.32	**0.35****	0.15	0.08	0.31	**-1.16*****	0.27
Military	**0.54****	0.19	0.00	-	**1.37*****	0.19	**-1.10*****	0.24
Education	**0.05***	0.03	0.01	0.01	**0.11*****	0.03	**0.21*****	0.06
Income	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Age	**0.02****	0.00	**0.02*****	0.00	**0.03*****	0.00	**0.01***	0.01
Gender (Male=1)	-0.12	0.10	-0.08	0.05	0.04	0.12	0.13	0.17
Chicago	**0.44****	0.17	**0.84*****	0.11	**0.82*****	0.20	0.54	0.41
Houston	0.13	0.19	**0.66*****	0.14	-0.09	0.21	-0.34	0.56
Los Angeles	-0.06	0.19	**0.65*****	0.13	**0.61****	0.22	0.48*	0.24
Phoenix	-0.01	0.21	**0.46*****	0.13	0.34*	0.20	-	-
San Francisco	**0.39****	0.19	**0.73*****	0.12	0.33	0.21	0.37	0.23
Constant	**-0.52**	0.39	**-0.14**	0.24	**-2.17*****	0.34	**-3.16*****	0.66
N	**158**		**462**		**133**		**57**	
Adj.R-Squared	**0.20**		**0.36**		**0.56**		**0.49**	

**p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .001* [¥] *Electoral participation is the Dependent Variable. It is a scale that ranges from 0 to 2. (0=Did not vote in 2008 General election and previous local election, 1= Voted in one of them, 2 Voted in both elections)*

6 .Conclusions

The results presented in the last section along with the qualitative evidence and narratives provided in section 4 support the main argument advanced in this paper: a missing piece of the puzzle in explaining the differences in political participation between blacks and whites in the United States on one hand, and Latinos and Asians on the other, is the difference in the demographic characteristics in terms of age between the native born in these groups and blacks and whites. Older *native* born Americans of any group have experienced more political events in general but also, due to the development of the American state in the 20th Century, they are more likely to have been alive during the 1940's, 1950's, 1960's and 1970's when "politics was in the air". Political events of the magnitude of the Great Depression, the New Deal, World War 2 and all the information rich and meaningful series events occurred until Watergate in 1974, helped socialize individuals who did not grow up in a politically active family. This is true for most native born second generation Latinos and Asians.

Through the data collected in the American Cities survey, I find that the ways and period during which individuals become politically engaged varies by groups and by city but that the majority of native born citizens in the US in these six cities acquired an interest in politics during adulthood and as a result of a political event. I also find that differences in the ways individuals acquire basic political attitudes (interest in politics) in the past, is associated with their present-day voting behavior. Those who became engaged through a political event seem to be more likely to vote in both, local and Presidential elections (except for Asians). In addition, I also

found that those that are politically disengaged are uninterested in voting or following politics for various reasons, not only due to apathy or lack of political opinions, the lack of trust in politicians and political institutions seems to be a reason behind political disengagement although it is not as highly correlated with non-participatory behavior. As one of the respondents expressed: “I vote defensively”.

Regarding the explanatory power of group differences in the political socialization among blacks, whites, Latinos and Asians to explain political participation, there are two important findings, first, that many more whites in these cities were brought up in politically active families than the other groups, experienced political events directly in all cities and experienced more extraordinary political events (they are older). Overall, blacks were more likely to experience political events directly than Asians and Latinos and become interested in politics as a result of it. Latinos, though less likely to experience events in their neighborhood and grow up in a politically active family are an older more established community, thus they are more likely to have experienced “Shocks” and become politically engaged as a result of it.

Figure 6. Population Pyramids by Ethnicity: 2005



Source: Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of 2005 American Community Survey .X-axis represents percent of group total.

This finding is remarkable because it suggests that even though local political environment provides more regular cues about the political system in general and may explain a greater proportion of the variation in political participation among these groups, the number of events experienced by an individual may be the key to the remaining unexplained variation when using local political and institutional variation models. National representative samples of native born Latinos and Asians contain a much smaller proportion of individuals who have experienced local, national and extraordinary events such as the Great Depression, World War II, the Civil Rights Movement, Martin Luther King, John F. Kennedy and Robert Kennedy's assassinations, Vietnam, and other events that acted as catalysts for a deeply seated and stable interest in politics for blacks and whites in the United States. The majority of the Latino and Asian immigrant

population in contemporary America grew up in a different national political environment and this is why considering "period-effects" may be important when examining the factors behind differences in political participation between Latinos and Asians and blacks and whites living in the United States.

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CONCLUSION

God made the country, and man made the town
-William Cowper, *The Sofa,* 1785

Are all immigrants willing and able to integrate politically successfully within a liberal democratic polity? The three papers included in the present dissertation provided an answer based on the study of Latino immigrants currently residing in the United States. However, the human migration from Latin America towards the United States during the World Wars heralded the type of movement that occurred in the later part of the century European countries. Migration from Latin America to the United States began as a result of several conditions: labor shortage, the formal establishment of guest-worker programs and active recruitment on behalf of the host country employers[84] and the explosion in communication and transportation technologies that made it easier and more attractive[85] for some individuals to migrate to another country in search of better economic opportunities, escape poverty or move to a place they perceived as providing

[84] "Not so long ago, the lure of higher wages in the United States was not sufficient by itself to attract foreign workers and had to be activated through active recruitment. Mexican immigration, for example, was initiated by U.S. growers and railroad companies who sent recruiters into the interior of Mexico to bring needed workers. By 1916, five or six weekly trains full of Mexican workers hired by agents were being run from Laredo to Los Angeles. According to one author the competition in El Paso became so fierce that recruiting agencies stationed their employees at the Santa Fe Bridge, where they literally pounced on immigrants as they crossed the border" Portes & Rumbaut, 2006, p.14

[85] Emily Rosenberg, (2011). *Spreading the American dream: American economic and cultural expansion, 1890-1945*. Macmillan.

more opportunities to pursue their own happiness. [86](Massey et.al. 2003, Portes & Rumbaut, 2006; Zolberg, 2006; Kymlicka, 2012).

The large-scale human migration[87] that has led to unprecedented levels of diversity and demographic change, transforming communities in fundamental ways and challenging closely held notions of national identity in Europe have two things in common with the migration flows from Latin America to the United States. First, these immigrants "do not originate mostly in the poorest countries or the most destitute regions. They often come from middle income nations and among groups that are relatively advantaged with respect to the source population" (Portes & Rumbaut, 2006, p.15). Also, their average educational and skill credentials are higher than that of their original community.[88] In addition, the original settlers were actually recruited by the host country as guest workers or had access to the nation due to the existing commercial routes between the two countries. That is, the sending country was in some way under the cultural and commercial influence of the host country. As Demographer Douglas Massey[89] has shown this is crucial because immigration is a process of "cumulative causation", once started, it becomes its own major determinant in the future. Although the specific circumstances of migration in the first generation may be different and in some cases affect the political integration of certain immigrant groups, for the most part, I would argue that the findings in this dissertation are relevant to our general understanding of key factors in the host polity that influence the political

[86] See: Douglass Massey, Durand, J., & Malone, N. J. (2003). *Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in the Area of Economic Integration*. Russell Sage Foundation. Alejandro Portes, A., & Rumbaut, R. G. (2006). *Immigrant America: a portrait*. University of California Press. Kymlicka, W. (2012). *Multiculturalism: success, failure, and the future*. Transatlantic Council on Migration, Migration Policy Institute. Aristide, Z. (2006). *A nation by design: immigration policy in the fashioning of America*. Russell Sage Foundation.
[87] Non-refugee
[88] A review on the subject is found in Douglas S Massey, et al, Worlds in motion: Understanding International Migration at the end of the Millennium. New York: Oxford University Press.
[89] Douglas Massey and Felipe Garcia España, (1987). *The social process of international migration*. Science, 237(4816), 733-738.

integration of the second generation in a liberal democratic polity regardless of their cultural or religious background.

This dissertation finds that immigrants from religious and cultural backgrounds that differ from the majority population are able to integrate into a liberal democratic polity as long as the local political and religious institutional environment they settle in and the political temporal conditions they arrive in provide them with the same opportunities to participate and the same exposure to political events of those in the majority group in the same polity. The three major influences on the probability of an immigrant (and an immigrant community) to become fully integrated politically[90] are political institutions, religious institutions and the national temporal dynamics that interact and sometimes offset each other. In the following paragraphs I try to answer the following questions: 1) Under what local institutional conditions did out of the ordinary political events or the political socialization undertaken by co-ethnic religious institutions make a difference in the basic political attitudes and behavior of Latino immigrants? 2) Under what temporal conditions did the local religious and political institutional context make a difference in the behavior of these immigrants? And, finally, 3) under what local political institutional and temporal conditions did religious institutions (mobilization) make a difference in the formation of political attitudes and behavior of Latino immigrants?

I argue, based on my findings and experiences in the field, that the local political environment is what has the largest and most long lasting influence of an immigrant's bundle of political attitudes and behaviors. Consistent cues are essential for the formation of political attitudes as explained in the third paper. This environment provides consistently a view of what

[90] As defined in the introduction, immigrants are thought to be politically integrated citizens in a liberal democratic country when they 1) exhibit a basic interest in the political system and have a basic understanding of their role as citizens in it, 2) participate in electoral processes as much as similarly situated citizens in terms of age, income and educational attainment and 3) are attached to the basic liberal democratic rules the game and country's political institutions representing them, like political parties.

the political system is, its relevance for the individual as well as the community and the possible points of access. According to the findings of these papers, the local institutional environment determined an immigrant's ability to clearly identify winners and losers in local elections and make the connection between electoral results and policy outcomes in different neighborhoods. In cities where policy decisions are masked as rational decisions taken by an independent bureaucracy that allocates them based on efficiency, like Houston and Phoenix it was harder for all low income groups (including non-immigrants) in poor neighborhoods to see this connection at the national as well as at the local level. Local Institutions also affect basic political attitudes and behavior indirectly through the overall level of political competition in a given city, which has consequences in terms of the likelihood that local parties will try to mobilize non-active immigrant groups. Also, immigrants are concentrated in non-battleground states, so that if political parties are not competing to gain control of the city, there are very few opportunities to experience events that will ignite an interest in politics. Even in cities like Chicago where Latinos and Asians where not contacted as often as other groups in their neighborhoods by national political parties, residing in a city where political events happen frequently increased the saliency of politics vis-à-vis other aspects of their lives and they exhibited greater understanding and interest in local and national politics.

Out of the ordinary political events such as the civil rights movement, anti-Vietnam War demonstrations, anti-4437 demonstrations and the 2008 crisis generally resulted in public mobilization in highly politicized cities. Immigrants in this city experienced the event indirectly through the media and also, directly through participation or simply observing these demonstrations happen in the streets of their city. Thus, in local institutional environments where the institutions promote political competition, out of the ordinary political events have a

big impact on the basic political attitudes and behavior of immigrants. Religious institutions in these types of cities too are used as places to recruit and mobilize immigrants and the political behavior of those who attend church frequently in both types of cities is similar. However, in cities where political parties do not mobilize directly, immigrants who attend church less often are less likely to be politically engaged. Whereas the non-churchgoers have opportunities to be socialized politically in the active cities, they do not in cities like Houston and Phoenix.

As shown in the last paper of the dissertation, living through historical events had a profound impact on Latinos who due to the socioeconomic characteristics of their community, are less likely to be from highly politically active families. Experiencing meaningful and information-rich events was associated with a higher probability of participating in local and Presidential elections. Thus, being present while extraordinary national political events occurred (what I refer to as temporal conditions) offset the negative features or made an enormous difference for Latino immigrants living in cities like Houston and Phoenix where the local conditions depressed political activity. Individuals did not become interested until events of the magnitude of the tragic assassination of President Kennedy or Martin Luther King Jr., or the 2008 economic crisis occurred. Mobilization and political socialization in the churches can help immigrants become better acquainted with the political system at times during which national politics are not salient or there is a general sense of disillusionment with the democratic institutions either because of corruption or, as explained in the third paper, because the system is perceived to be insensitive to certain groups even if they mobilize. During these times, religious institutions seem to inject resilience and keep immigrant churchgoers somewhat interested in politics. However, whether religious leaders encourage or discourage immigrants is also tied to

the temporal national dynamics: the Catholic Church after the Second Vatican Council and Kennedy's Presidency were helpful to immigrants.

William Cowper, one of the most read poets during the American war of independence, published in 1785, *The Task: A Poem, in Six Books*, a poem in blank verse. In the first of these books, *The Sofa* Cowper denounces the vices of the "gain-devoted cities" and extolls nature saying that "God made the country, and man made the town". Even though Cowper used the word "country" in this verse to refer to the country side, and I to refer to the nation- state where immigrants arrive to, the point he makes about common man "making" or developing towns and institutions in them to serve their particular interests is something I have tried to emphasize throughout the papers, immigrants do not arrive to the same political environment even in they settle in the same country. They settle into specific man-made towns or cities[91] with their distinct political and social dynamics that may have a bigger influence in their understanding of the host country's political system, than the national political institutions. Given that immigration is a network driven process and immigrant communities tend to settle in a few places, the title is a reminder to the fact that the study of immigrant political integration must remain attentive not only to the national conditions and formal federal regulations that facilitate or delay their political integration but also to the formal and informal political arrangements and other social dynamics at the local level. I titled the dissertation "God made the country and man made the town", because I wanted to emphasize that is essential for any scholars or policymakers trying to understand what factors influence immigrant political integration of a community or when doing cross-country comparative work that local level arrangements and institutions may have a bigger impact. As the Latino voting behavior puzzle bears witness to, using national data to make

[91] "Gain-devoted" cities are the natural habitat of immigrants and immigrant communities because it is where their "gain-devoted" employers recruit and get away more easily with circumventing immigration laws and regulations.

inferences a bout immigrant groups who are usually less dispersed than the original settlers can be misleading. As shown in the first paper, in the case of the country that is the main focus of this dissertation, the United States, the opportunities to integrate for Latino immigrants (including the native born) varied by city. Immigrants who settled in cities in the southwest, where the more established city dwellers have resisted notions of a multicultural national identity, have been less able to integrate politically than those who arrived in cities like New York where local institutions better reflect the national ideals.

The title, "God made the country, and man made the town" is also meant to emphasize the role that religion continues to play in the causes of human migration and the possibilities immigrants have to integrate into the host polity. Religion continues to play a major role in how an immigrant or an immigrant community is perceived by the rest of their fellow citizens, especially if they are affiliated with a different religious tradition than that of the majority. Scholars as well as politicians continue to view certain religious affiliations and practices as an impediment for integration. That is, political leaders, some academics and sections of the public continue to treat the outdated assumption that attitudes and beliefs, especially religious ones, do not change or adjust to the new political and social context. The riots led by North African youth in Paris in 2005 and the Latino mobilizations in California in 2006 were viewed as "signs" that Huntington was right: the racial, cultural and religious bonds will always be a stronger influence than the host society and political system. A closer look at the local dynamics that led to these events (the persistent racial discrimination and harassment by law enforcement officials in Californian cities and the suburbs of Paris) would reveal the opposite: immigrant children have internalized the host society's passion to defend individual civil liberties and political rights—in this case, their own.

San Jose, CA. Field Dates: 08/10/2011-09/1/2011

	Census 2010	American Cities Survey
Adult (18+) Population:	**709,457**	
Total Population:	**945,942**	**N=49**
Asians		
% Female 18-29	2.9	8.2
% Male 18-29	2.9	4.1
% Female 18-29	3.9	4.1
%Male 30-39	3.6	6.1
% Female 40- 49	3.5	0.0
%Male 40-49	3.4	4.1
% Female 50-59	2.7	2.0
% Male 50-59	2.4	2.0
% Female 60-69	1.6	0.0
% Male 60-69	1.5	4.1
% Female 70-79	1.1	0.0
% Male 70-79	0.9	0.0
% Female 80+	0.6	0.0
% Male 80+	0.5	0.0
Total Asians	**31.4**	**34.7**
Blacks (Not Hispanic)		
% Female 18-29	0.3	0.0
% Male 18-29	0.4	2.0
% Female 18-29	0.3	0.0
%Male 30-39	0.3	0.0
% Female 40- 49	0.3	0.0
%Male 40-49	0.3	0.0
% Female 50-59	0.2	0.0
% Male 50-59	0.3	0.0
% Female 60-69	0.1	0.0
% Male 60-69	0.1	0.0
% Female 70-79	0.1	0.0
% Male 70-79	0.1	0.0
% Female 80+	0.0	0.0
% Male 80+	0.0	0.0
Total Blacks	**2.9**	**2.0**
Hispanics (All races)		
% Female 18-29	3.6	4.1
% Male 18-29	4.3	8.2
% Female 18-29	2.9	4.1
%Male 30-39	3.2	0.0
% Female 40- 49	2.3	8.2
%Male 40-49	2.6	4.1
% Female 50-59	1.7	2.0
% Male 50-59	1.6	2.0

% Female 60-69	0.9	0.0
% Male 60-69	0.7	2.0
% Female 70-79	0.5	0.0
% Male 70-79	0.4	2.0
% Female 80+	0.3	0.0
% Male 80+	0.2	0.0
Total Hispanics	**25.1**	**38.8**
Whites		
% Female 18-29	2.8	4.1
% Male 18-29	3.2	0.0
% Female 18-29	2.5	2.0
%Male 30-39	2.8	2.0
% Female 40- 49	3.6	4.1
%Male 40-49	4.1	0.0
% Female 50-59	3.8	2.0
% Male 50-59	4.1	2.0
% Female 60-69	2.8	0.0
% Male 60-69	2.8	0.0
% Female 70-79	1.6	0.0
% Male 70-79	1.4	0.0
% Female 80+	1.3	0.0
% Male 80+	0.8	0.0
Total Whites	**37.7**	**16.3**
Other (Pacific Islander, Native American, Mixed Race)	**2.9**	**10.2**

San Francisco, CA. Field Dates: 08/10/2011-09/1/2012

	Census 2010	American Cities Survey
Adult (18+) Population:	**717,954**	
Total Population:	**805, 235**	**N=266**
Asians		
% Female 18-29	3.6	4.1
% Male 18-29	3.1	4.1
% Female 18-29	3.4	2.6
%Male 30-39	3.0	2.6
% Female 40- 49	2.8	2.3
%Male 40-49	2.5	1.5
% Female 50-59	3.0	2.3
% Male 50-59	2.4	1.5
% Female 60-69	2.1	0.8
% Male 60-69	1.8	0.8
% Female 70-79	1.7	0.0
% Male 70-79	1.3	0.4
% Female 80+	1.3	1.1

% Male 80+	0.8	0.0
Total Asians	**32.8**	**24.1**
Blacks (Not Hispanic)		
% Male 18-29	0.5	0.4
% Female 18-29	0.4	0.4
%Male 30-39	0.4	0.4
% Female 40- 49	0.4	
%Male 40-49	0.6	1.5
% Female 50-59	0.5	0.8
% Male 50-59	0.6	
% Female 60-69	0.3	0.4
% Male 60-69	0.4	
% Female 70-79	0.2	0.4
% Male 70-79	0.2	
% Female 80+	0.2	
% Male 80+	0.1	
Total Blacks	**5.4**	**5.7**
Hispanics (All races)		
% Female 18-29	1.7	2.6
% Male 18-29	1.9	4.5
% Female 18-29	1.2	4.1
%Male 30-39	1.5	2.6
% Female 40- 49	0.8	2.3
%Male 40-49	1.2	6.0
% Female 50-59	0.6	0.4
% Male 50-59	0.7	3.0
% Female 60-69	0.4	0.4
% Male 60-69	0.3	0.8
% Female 70-79	0.3	0.4
% Male 70-79	0.2	0.4
% Female 80+	0.2	
% Male 80+	0.1	
Total Hispanics	**11.2**	**27.5**
Whites		
% Female 18-29	5.5	3.4
% Male 18-29	5.4	4.1
% Female 18-29	5.0	3.4
%Male 30-39	6.5	4.9
% Female 40- 49	3.2	2.3
%Male 40-49	5.2	3.4
% Female 50-59	2.8	5.6
% Male 50-59	3.9	3.8
% Female 60-69	2.4	2.6
% Male 60-69	2.7	2.6
% Female 70-79	1.3	1.1

% Male 70-79	1.3	0.8
% Female 80+	1.2	1.1
% Male 80+	0.8	0.8
Total Whites		
Other (Pacific Islander, Native American, Mixed Race)	**3.4**	**3.0**

Los Angeles, CA. Field Dates: 08/10/2011-09/1/2012

	Census 2010	American Cities Survey
Adult (18+) Population:	**2,920,318**	
Total Population:	**3,792,621**	**N=247**
Asians		
% Female 18-29	1.7	2.0
% Male 18-29	1.9	4.1
% Female 18-29	1.5	0.8
%Male 30-39	1.3	2.8
% Female 40- 49	1.1	0.8
%Male 40-49	0.9	0.8
% Female 50-59	1.4	0.8
% Male 50-59	0.8	0.8
% Female 60-69	0.8	
% Male 60-69	0.6	
% Female 70-79	0.5	
% Male 70-79	0.4	
% Female 80+	0.3	0.4
% Male 80+	0.2	
Total Asians	**13.5**	**13.4**
Blacks (Not Hispanic)		
% Female 18-29	1.2	1.6
% Male 18-29	1.0	2.0
% Female 18-29	1.0	1.2
%Male 30-39	0.8	1.6
% Female 40- 49	1.1	0.8
%Male 40-49	1.0	2.4
% Female 50-59	1.1	2.0
% Male 50-59	1.0	2.4
% Female 60-69	0.8	
% Male 60-69	0.6	
% Female 70-79	0.5	
% Male 70-79	0.3	0.4
% Female 80+	0.3	
% Male 80+	0.2	0.4
Total Blacks	**11.0**	**15.0**
Hispanics (All races)		
% Female 18-29	4.6	7.3
% Male 18-29	5.0	4.5

% Female 18-29	3.6	4.9
%Male 30-39	3.8	6.1
% Female 40- 49	3.0	4.5
%Male 40-49	3.2	4.1
% Female 50-59	2.2	1.2
% Male 50-59	2.0	4.9
% Female 60-69	1.2	0.8
% Male 60-69	1.0	0.8
% Female 70-79	0.6	0.4
% Male 70-79	0.4	0.8
% Female 80+	0.4	0.4
% Male 80+	0.2	
Total Hispanics	**31.2**	**40.5**
Whites		
% Female 18-29	3.9	1.2
% Male 18-29	3.9	3.6
% Female 18-29	3.3	4.9
%Male 30-39	3.7	2.8
% Female 40- 49	3.3	0.8
%Male 40-49	3.8	1.2
% Female 50-59	3.3	3.2
% Male 50-59	3.9	2.8
% Female 60-69	2.7	1.6
% Male 60-69	2.6	1.6
% Female 70-79	1.7	2.4
% Male 70-79	1.5	0.8
% Female 80+	1.7	0.8
% Male 80+	1.1	1.2
Total Whites	**40.5**	**29.1**
Other (Pacific Islander, Native American, Mixed Race)	**3.9**	**2.0**

Phoenix, AZ Field Dates: 03/10/2012-04/10/2012

	Census	American Cities Survey
Adult (18+) Population:	**4,857,931**	
Total Population:	**6,392,015**	**N=189**
Asians		
% Female 18-29	0.4	1.1
% Male 18-29	0.4	0.0
% Female 18-29	0.5	0.0
%Male 30-39	0.5	0.0
% Female 40- 49	0.4	0.0
%Male 40-49	0.3	0.0

% Female 50-59	0.3	0.0
% Male 50-59	0.2	0.0
% Female 60-69	0.2	0.0
% Male 60-69	0.1	0.0
% Female 70-79	0.1	0.0
% Male 70-79	0.1	0.0
% Female 80+	0.0	0.0
% Male 80+	0.0	0.0
Total Asians	**3.4**	**1.1**
Blacks (Not Hispanic)		
% Female 18-29	0.7	0.0
% Male 18-29	0.8	2.1
% Female 18-29	0.5	1.1
%Male 30-39	0.6	1.6
% Female 40- 49	0.5	0.5
%Male 40-49	0.5	2.1
% Female 50-59	0.4	0.0
% Male 50-59	0.5	1.1
% Female 60-69	0.2	1.6
% Male 60-69	0.2	0.5
% Female 70-79	0.1	0.0
% Male 70-79	0.1	0.0
% Female 80+	0.1	0.0
% Male 80+	0.0	0.0
Total Blacks	**5.4**	**11.8**
Hispanics (All races)		
% Female 18-29	4.8	6.4
% Male 18-29	5.0	8.6
% Female 18-29	3.6	4.3
%Male 30-39	3.7	3.7
% Female 40- 49	2.8	3.2
%Male 40-49	2.9	1.6
% Female 50-59	1.7	1.1
% Male 50-59	1.7	3.2
% Female 60-69	0.9	0.5
% Male 60-69	0.8	1.6
% Female 70-79	0.4	0.0
% Male 70-79	0.3	0.5
% Female 80+	0.2	0.0
% Male 80+	0.1	0.5
Total Hispanics	**29.0**	**35.3**
Whites		
% Female 18-29	5.3	3.2
% Male 18-29	5.5	3.7
% Female 18-29	4.8	2.1
%Male 30-39	5.0	4.8

% Female 40- 49	6.0	3.7
%Male 40-49	6.2	2.1
% Female 50-59	6.1	5.4
% Male 50-59	6.0	7.5
% Female 60-69	4.2	4.8
% Male 60-69	4.0	3.7
% Female 70-79	2.0	1.6
% Male 70-79	1.8	1.6
% Female 80+	1.5	2.1
% Male 80+	0.9	1.1
Total Whites	**59.3**	**47.6**
Other (Pacific Islander, Native American, Mixed Race)	**2.9**	**5.4**

Houston, TX Phoenix, AZ Field Dates: 03/10/2012-06/10/2012

	Census	American Cities Survey
Adult (18+) Population:	**1,572,913**	
Total Population:	**Population= 2,097,217**	**N= 154**
Asians		
% Female 18-29	0.8	3.4
% Male 18-29	0.8	2.0
% Female 18-29	0.8	2.7
%Male 30-39	0.8	1.4
% Female 40- 49	0.6	3.4
%Male 40-49	0.6	0.7
% Female 50-59	0.5	
% Male 50-59	0.5	
% Female 60-69	0.3	
% Male 60-69	0.3	
% Female 70-79	0.1	
% Male 70-79	0.1	
% Female 80+	0.1	
% Male 80+	0.1	2.0
Total Asians	**6.5**	**15.6**
Blacks (Not Hispanic)		
% Female 18-29	2.5	4.1
% Male 18-29	2.2	3.4
% Female 18-29	1.9	6.1
%Male 30-39	1.7	2.7
% Female 40- 49	1.9	
%Male 40-49	1.6	1.4
% Female 50-59	1.8	2.0
% Male 50-59	1.5	1.4
% Female 60-69	1.1	0.7
% Male 60-69	0.8	0.7

% Female 70-79	0.6	
% Male 70-79	0.4	0.7
% Female 80+	0.3	
% Male 80+	0.2	0.7
Total Blacks	**18.4**	**23.7**
Hispanics (All races)		
% Female 18-29	5.2	0.7
% Male 18-29	5.9	0.7
% Female 18-29	4.2	1.4
%Male 30-39	4.7	2.0
% Female 40- 49	3.2	2.7
%Male 40-49	3.5	2.7
% Female 50-59	2.1	
% Male 50-59	2.2	0.7
% Female 60-69	1.1	0.7
% Male 60-69	1.0	0.7
% Female 70-79	0.5	
% Male 70-79	0.4	0.7
% Female 80+	0.2	
% Male 80+	0.2	1.4
Total Hispanics	**34.4**	**14.2**
Whites		
% Female 18-29	3.6	3.4
% Male 18-29	3.6	2.0
% Female 18-29	3.1	2.7
%Male 30-39	3.3	4.7
% Female 40- 49	3.5	2.7
%Male 40-49	3.6	5.4
% Female 50-59	4.1	4.1
% Male 50-59	4.2	8.1
% Female 60-69	2.7	5.4
% Male 60-69	2.7	0.7
% Female 70-79	1.5	2.0
% Male 70-79	1.2	2.0
% Female 80+	1.2	2.0
% Male 80+	0.7	1.4
Total Whites	**38.8**	**46.6**
Other (Pacific Islander, Native American, Mixed Race)	**1.6**	**100.0**

Chicago, IL Phoenix, AZ Field Dates: 11/20/2011-04/10/2012

Demographic	Census	American Cities Survey
Adult (18+) Population:	**2,075,610**	
Total Population:	**2,695,598**	**N=278**
Asians		

% Female 18-29	1.4	2.6
% Male 18-29	1.1	4.7
% Female 18-29	0.8	2.6
%Male 30-39	0.8	0.4
% Female 40- 49	0.5	0.7
%Male 40-49	0.4	1.1
% Female 50-59	0.4	0.4
% Male 50-59	0.4	0.4
% Female 60-69	0.3	0.7
% Male 60-69	0.3	0.4
% Female 70-79	0.2	0.0
% Male 70-79	0.1	0.0
% Female 80+	0.1	0.0
% Male 80+	0.1	0.0
Total Asians	**6.9**	**13.8**
Blacks (Not Hispanic)		
% Female 18-29	3.7	1.1
% Male 18-29	3.1	1.5
% Female 18-29	2.8	0.0
%Male 30-39	2.1	1.5
% Female 40- 49	2.9	2.6
%Male 40-49	2.3	1.8
% Female 50-59	2.9	1.5
% Male 50-59	2.3	1.5
% Female 60-69	1.9	1.5
% Male 60-69	1.4	1.5
% Female 70-79	1.3	0.4
% Male 70-79	0.8	0.7
% Female 80+	0.8	0.0
% Male 80+	0.4	0.0
Total Blacks	**28.5**	**15.3**
Hispanics (All races)		
% Female 18-29	3.0	2.6
% Male 18-29	3.3	2.9
% Female 18-29	2.4	1.1
%Male 30-39	2.7	2.9
% Female 40- 49	1.8	1.1
%Male 40-49	1.9	2.2
% Female 50-59	1.3	0.7
% Male 50-59	1.3	1.5
% Female 60-69	0.7	1.1
% Male 60-69	0.6	0.7
% Female 70-79	0.4	0.4
% Male 70-79	0.3	0.0
% Female 80+	0.2	0.0
% Male 80+	0.1	0.0

Total Hispanics	**20.0**	**17.1**
Whites		
% Female 18-29	6.2	4.7
% Male 18-29	5.5	2.2
% Female 18-29	3.8	3.7
%Male 30-39	4.2	4.4
% Female 40- 49	3.1	4.4
%Male 40-49	3.4	6.6
% Female 50-59	3.4	7.7
% Male 50-59	3.4	6.2
% Female 60-69	2.5	4.4
% Male 60-69	2.4	3.7
% Female 70-79	1.6	1.5
% Male 70-79	1.2	0.7
% Female 80+	1.6	0.4
% Male 80+		
Total Whites	**153.1**	**1.5**
Other (Pacific Islander, Native American, Mixed Race)	**-53.1**	**1.8**

New York City Field Dates

Pilot (08/01/2010-08/20/2010)
Main data collection (07/01/2011-08/20/2011)
Supplementary Data Collection in Staten Island, Queens and Brooklyn (07/01/2012-08/20/2012)

New York City- Bronx

	Census	**ACS**
Adult (18+) Population:	**1,024,980**	
Total Population:	**1,385,108**	**N= 87**
Asians		
% Female 18-29	0.4	1.2
% Male 18-29	0.4	0.0
% Female 18-29	0.4	0.0
%Male 30-39	0.3	0.0
% Female 40- 49	0.3	0.0
%Male 40-49	0.3	0.0
% Female 50-59	0.3	0.0
% Male 50-59	0.3	0.0
% Female 60-69	0.2	0.0
% Male 60-69	0.2	1.2
% Female 70-79	0.1	0.0

% Male 70-79	0.1	1.2
% Female 80+	0.0	0.0
% Male 80+	0.0	0.0
Total Asians	**3.3**	**3.5**
Blacks (Not Hispanic)		
% Female 18-29	3.6	2.3
% Male 18-29	3.2	3.5
% Female 18-29	2.9	3.5
%Male 30-39	2.2	8.1
% Female 40- 49	3.2	4.6
%Male 40-49	2.6	4.6
% Female 50-59	2.7	4.6
% Male 50-59	2.1	4.6
% Female 60-69	1.9	3.5
% Male 60-69	1.2	1.2
% Female 70-79	1.1	1.2
% Male 70-79	0.6	1.2
% Female 80+	0.7	
% Male 80+	0.3	1.2
Total Blacks	**28.2**	**43.7**
Hispanics (All races)		
% Female 18-29	7.3	3.5
% Male 18-29	7.1	4.6
% Female 18-29	5.4	3.5
%Male 30-39	4.5	4.6
% Female 40- 49	5.3	2.3
%Male 40-49	4.2	3.5
% Female 50-59	4.1	1.2
% Male 50-59	3.2	3.5
% Female 60-69	2.7	2.3
% Male 60-69	2.0	2.3
% Female 70-79	1.6	2.3
% Male 70-79	1.0	
% Female 80+	0.8	
% Male 80+	0.4	
Total Hispanics	**49.4**	**33.4**
Whites		
% Female 18-29	1.4	
% Male 18-29	1.5	
% Female 18-29	1.1	
%Male 30-39	1.2	
% Female 40- 49	1.2	2.3
%Male 40-49	1.4	2.3
% Female 50-59	1.5	1.2
% Male 50-59	1.5	3.5
% Female 60-69	1.4	

% Male 60-69	1.2	2.3
% Female 70-79	1.1	1.2
% Male 70-79	0.8	2.3
% Female 80+	1.3	1.2
% Male 80+	0.7	
Total Whites	**17.2**	**16.1**
Other (Pacific Islander, Native American, Mixed Race)	**1.9**	**3.5**

New York City- Queens

	Census	ACS
Adult (18+) Population:	**178,458**	
Total Population:	**2,230,722**	**N= 127**
Asians		
% Female 18-29	1.6	1.6
% Male 18-29	1.5	5.7
% Female 18-29	1.4	1.6
%Male 30-39	1.2	3.3
% Female 40- 49	1.1	1.6
%Male 40-49	1.1	0.8
% Female 50-59	0.9	0.8
% Male 50-59	1.0	4.9
% Female 60-69	0.6	2.4
% Male 60-69	0.5	0.8
% Female 70-79	0.3	0.8
% Male 70-79	0.3	
% Female 80+	0.1	
% Male 80+	0.1	
Total Asians	**11.8**	**24.4**
Blacks (Not Hispanic)		
% Female 18-29	3.3	
% Male 18-29	2.9	
% Female 18-29	2.6	0.8
%Male 30-39	1.9	
% Female 40- 49	2.8	1.6
%Male 40-49	2.0	
% Female 50-59	2.6	0.8
% Male 50-59	1.8	0.8
% Female 60-69	1.8	1.6
% Male 60-69	1.1	1.6
% Female 70-79	1.0	0.8

% Male 70-79	0.6	1.6
% Female 80+	0.6	0.8
% Male 80+	0.2	
Total Blacks	**25.4**	**10.57**
Hispanics (All races)		
% Female 18-29	2.6	2.4
% Male 18-29	2.9	5.7
% Female 18-29	2.1	1.6
%Male 30-39	2.2	4.1
% Female 40- 49	1.8	2.4
%Male 40-49	1.7	1.6
% Female 50-59	1.4	
% Male 50-59	1.2	1.6
% Female 60-69	1.0	
% Male 60-69	0.7	
% Female 70-79	0.6	1.6
% Male 70-79	0.4	0.8
% Female 80+	0.3	2.4
% Male 80+	0.1	1.6
Total Hispanics	**18.9**	**26.0**
Whites		
% Female 18-29	5.0	1.6
% Male 18-29	4.7	
% Female 18-29	4.0	2.4
%Male 30-39	4.4	1.6
% Female 40- 49	2.8	4.1
%Male 40-49	3.1	1.6
% Female 50-59	3.0	4.1
% Male 50-59	2.9	2.4
% Female 60-69	2.5	4.9
% Male 60-69	2.2	6.5
% Female 70-79	2.0	0.8
% Male 70-79	1.4	1.6
% Female 80+	2.6	1.6
% Male 80+	1.3	1.6
Total Whites	**41.7**	**35.0**
Other (Pacific Islander, Native American, Mixed Race)		**4.1**

New York City- Bronx

	Census	ACS
Adult (18+) Population:	**1,024,980**	
Total Population:	**1,385,108**	**N= 87**
Asians		
% Female 18-29	0.4	1.2

% Male 18-29	0.4	0.0
% Female 18-29	0.4	0.0
%Male 30-39	0.3	0.0
% Female 40- 49	0.3	0.0
%Male 40-49	0.3	0.0
% Female 50-59	0.3	0.0
% Male 50-59	0.3	0.0
% Female 60-69	0.2	0.0
% Male 60-69	0.2	1.2
% Female 70-79	0.1	0.0
% Male 70-79	0.1	1.2
% Female 80+	0.0	0.0
% Male 80+	0.0	0.0
Total Asians	**3.3**	**3.5**
Blacks (Not Hispanic)		
% Female 18-29	3.6	2.3
% Male 18-29	3.2	3.5
% Female 18-29	2.9	3.5
%Male 30-39	2.2	8.1
% Female 40- 49	3.2	4.6
%Male 40-49	2.6	4.6
% Female 50-59	2.7	4.6
% Male 50-59	2.1	4.6
% Female 60-69	1.9	3.5
% Male 60-69	1.2	1.2
% Female 70-79	1.1	1.2
% Male 70-79	0.6	1.2
% Female 80+	0.7	
% Male 80+	0.3	1.2
Total Blacks	**28.2**	**43.7**
Hispanics (All races)		
% Female 18-29	7.3	3.5
% Male 18-29	7.1	4.6
% Female 18-29	5.4	3.5
%Male 30-39	4.5	4.6
% Female 40- 49	5.3	2.3
%Male 40-49	4.2	3.5
% Female 50-59	4.1	1.2
% Male 50-59	3.2	3.5
% Female 60-69	2.7	2.3
% Male 60-69	2.0	2.3
% Female 70-79	1.6	2.3
% Male 70-79	1.0	
% Female 80+	0.8	
% Male 80+	0.4	
Total Hispanics	**49.4**	**33.4**

Whites		
% Female 18-29	1.4	
% Male 18-29	1.5	
% Female 18-29	1.1	
%Male 30-39	1.2	
% Female 40- 49	1.2	2.3
%Male 40-49	1.4	2.3
% Female 50-59	1.5	1.2
% Male 50-59	1.5	3.5
% Female 60-69	1.4	
% Male 60-69	1.2	2.3
% Female 70-79	1.1	1.2
% Male 70-79	0.8	2.3
% Female 80+	1.3	1.2
% Male 80+	0.7	
Total Whites	**17.2**	**16.1**
Other (Pacific Islander, Native American, Mixed Race)	**1.9**	**3.5**

New York City- Queens

	Census	ACS
Adult (18+) Population:	**178,458**	
Total Population:	**2,230,722**	**N= 127**
Asians		
% Female 18-29	1.6	1.6
% Male 18-29	1.5	5.7
% Female 18-29	1.4	1.6
%Male 30-39	1.2	3.3
% Female 40- 49	1.1	1.6
%Male 40-49	1.1	0.8
% Female 50-59	0.9	0.8
% Male 50-59	1.0	4.9
% Female 60-69	0.6	2.4
% Male 60-69	0.5	0.8
% Female 70-79	0.3	0.8
% Male 70-79	0.3	
% Female 80+	0.1	
% Male 80+	0.1	
Total Asians	**11.8**	**24.4**
Blacks (Not Hispanic)		
% Female 18-29	3.3	
% Male 18-29	2.9	
% Female 18-29	2.6	0.8
%Male 30-39	1.9	

% Female 40- 49	2.8	1.6
%Male 40-49	2.0	
% Female 50-59	2.6	0.8
% Male 50-59	1.8	0.8
% Female 60-69	1.8	1.6
% Male 60-69	1.1	1.6
% Female 70-79	1.0	0.8
% Male 70-79	0.6	1.6
% Female 80+	0.6	0.8
% Male 80+	0.2	
Total Blacks	**25.4**	**10.57**
Hispanics (All races)		
% Female 18-29	2.6	2.4
% Male 18-29	2.9	5.7
% Female 18-29	2.1	1.6
%Male 30-39	2.2	4.1
% Female 40- 49	1.8	2.4
%Male 40-49	1.7	1.6
% Female 50-59	1.4	
% Male 50-59	1.2	1.6
% Female 60-69	1.0	
% Male 60-69	0.7	
% Female 70-79	0.6	1.6
% Male 70-79	0.4	0.8
% Female 80+	0.3	2.4
% Male 80+	0.1	1.6
Total Hispanics	**18.9**	**26.0**
Whites		
% Female 18-29	5.0	1.6
% Male 18-29	4.7	
% Female 18-29	4.0	2.4
%Male 30-39	4.4	1.6
% Female 40- 49	2.8	4.1
%Male 40-49	3.1	1.6
% Female 50-59	3.0	4.1
% Male 50-59	2.9	2.4
% Female 60-69	2.5	4.9
% Male 60-69	2.2	6.5
% Female 70-79	2.0	0.8
% Male 70-79	1.4	1.6
% Female 80+	2.6	1.6
% Male 80+	1.3	1.6
Total Whites	**41.7**	**35.0**
Other (Pacific Islander, Native American, Mixed Race)		**4.1**

New York City- Brooklyn

	Census	ACS
Adult (18+) Population:	**1,916,096**	
Total Population:	**2,504,700.00**	**N= 156**
Asians		
% Female 18-29	1.6	1.3
% Male 18-29	1.5	1.9
% Female 18-29	1.4	1.3
%Male 30-39	1.2	0.6
% Female 40- 49	1.1	1.3
%Male 40-49	1.1	0.6
% Female 50-59	0.9	0.6
% Male 50-59	1.0	
% Female 60-69	0.6	
% Male 60-69	0.5	0.6
% Female 70-79	0.3	0.6
% Male 70-79	0.3	
% Female 80+	0.1	
% Male 80+	0.1	
Total Asians	11.8	9.0
Blacks (Not Hispanic)		
% Female 18-29	3.3	1.3
% Male 18-29	2.9	
% Female 18-29	2.6	4.5
%Male 30-39	1.9	1.9
% Female 40- 49	2.8	1.9
%Male 40-49	2.0	
% Female 50-59	2.6	1.3
% Male 50-59	1.8	1.9
% Female 60-69	1.8	3.2
% Male 60-69	1.1	
% Female 70-79	1.0	1.3
% Male 70-79	0.6	
% Female 80+	0.6	0.6
% Male 80+	0.2	
Total Blacks	25.4	17.9
Hispanics (All races)		
% Female 18-29	2.6	0.6
% Male 18-29	2.9	2.6
% Female 18-29	2.1	1.3
%Male 30-39	2.2	1.9
% Female 40- 49	1.8	
%Male 40-49	1.7	1.3

% Female 50-59	1.4	0.6
% Male 50-59	1.2	1.3
% Female 60-69	1.0	
% Male 60-69	0.7	1.3
% Female 70-79	0.6	
% Male 70-79	0.4	0.6
% Female 80+	0.3	0.6
% Male 80+	0.1	
Total Hispanics	18.9	12.2
Whites		
% Female 18-29	5.0	5.1
% Male 18-29	4.7	4.5
% Female 18-29	4.0	7.7
%Male 30-39	4.4	6.4
% Female 40- 49	2.8	2.6
%Male 40-49	3.1	3.2
% Female 50-59	3.0	1.9
% Male 50-59	2.9	2.6
% Female 60-69	2.5	5.8
% Male 60-69	2.2	5.1
% Female 70-79	2.0	0.6
% Male 70-79	1.4	2.6
% Female 80+	2.6	1.9
% Male 80+	1.3	1.9
Total Whites	41.7	51.9
Other (Pacific Islander, Native American, Mixed Race)	2.2	9.0

New York City- Manhattan

	Census	ACS
Adult (18+) Population:	**1,347,992**	
Total Population:	**1,585,873**	**N=240**
Asians		
% Female 18-29	1.6	3.8
% Male 18-29	1.1	1.7
% Female 18-29	1.3	1.7
%Male 30-39	1.1	1.7
% Female 40- 49	2.1	0.8
%Male 40-49	0.5	1.3
% Female 50-59	0.5	0.0
% Male 50-59	0.4	1.3
% Female 60-69	1.1	0.0
% Male 60-69	0.3	0.4
% Female 70-79	0.2	0.0
% Male 70-79	0.2	0.8

% Female 80+	0.2	0.0
% Male 80+	0.1	0.8
Total Asians	**10.5**	**14.3**
Blacks (Not Hispanic)		
% Female 18-29	1.4	0.4
% Male 18-29	1.1	2.5
% Female 18-29	1.1	0.8
%Male 30-39	1.7	2.9
% Female 40- 49	1.1	2.1
%Male 40-49	1.9	2.1
% Female 50-59	2.5	0.8
% Male 50-59	0.9	1.3
% Female 60-69	0.9	2.5
% Male 60-69	0.6	2.5
% Female 70-79	0.5	1.3
% Male 70-79	0.3	
% Female 80+	0.4	0.8
% Male 80+	0.2	1.3
Total Blacks	**14.5**	**21.4**
Hispanics (All races)		
% Female 18-29	1.7	
% Male 18-29	1.7	2.1
% Female 18-29	1.3	1.7
%Male 30-39	1.3	2.5
% Female 40- 49	1.1	0.8
%Male 40-49	1.1	1.3
% Female 50-59	1.0	0.8
% Male 50-59	0.9	0.8
% Female 60-69	0.7	
% Male 60-69	0.6	1.3
% Female 70-79	0.5	1.3
% Male 70-79	0.3	0.4
% Female 80+	0.3	
% Male 80+	0.1	
Total Hispanics	**12.7**	**13.02**
Whites		
% Female 18-29	7.1	1.7
% Male 18-29	4.1	2.5
% Female 18-29	5.3	4.2
%Male 30-39	4.5	5.9
% Female 40- 49	3.3	4.6
%Male 40-49	3.7	2.5
% Female 50-59	3.1	3.4
% Male 50-59	3.0	3.8
% Female 60-69	3.5	4.2
% Male 60-69	2.2	6.7

% Female 70-79	1.5	2.5
% Male 70-79	1.1	1.3
% Female 80+	1.2	0.4
% Male 80+	0.5	0.8
Total Whites	**44.2**	**44.5**
Other (Pacific Islander, Native American, Mixed Race)	**18.1**	**6.7**

New York City- Staten Island

	Census	ACS
Adult (18+) Population:	**360,922**	
Total Population :	468730.0	N=81
Black (NH)	10.8	22.2
White (NH)	65.3	66.7
Hispanic	17.2	11.1
Asian	3.7	0.0
Other	3.0	0.0